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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the role of right-wing refugees in British politics during the 
middle years of the nineteenth century, considering the relationships which these 
refugees established with British politicians, and the difficulties which their 
multifarious activities created for the makers of British foreign policy. Whereas the 
contribution of left-wing refugees to British politics and diplomacy during the 
Victorian era has been considered at length by numerous historians, the relationships 
which their right-wing counterparts formed with British politicians and the diplomatic 
concerns which they created have found little attention. This thesis seeks to redress 
this imbalance by analysing an overlooked but nevertheless important series of 
networks and controversies in which these exiles became involved during the 
tumultuous middle years of the nineteenth century. 
 
The study first considers the largely diplomatic implications of the presence of the 
former Charles X of France and his court in Britain during 1830-32, before turning to 
the difficulties and opportunities which both the Carlist and Miguelite pretenders and 
their refugee supporters presented for British governments and politicians alike 
throughout the 1830s and 1840s. The next three chapters consider the apogee of 
refugee influence over British politics during the years 1848-50, when the victims of 
the European revolutions of 1848 intrigued with allies in both Britain and continental 
Europe alike. The final two chapters then chart the rise of the refugee Orléans branch 
of the French royal family into highly-regarded political actors, whilst considering the 
diplomatic implications of their presence in Britain. 
 
This study suggests that whereas left-wing refugees boasted a modest political legacy 
and provoked several international controversies, those of the right not only enflamed 
diplomatic dispute but often actively intervened in British high politics. It therefore 
posits that refugees played a far wider and more important role in nineteenth-century 
Britain than previously noted. 
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1: Introduction 
 
The Right-Wing Exiles
1
 of the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
 
During the late eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth, Britain received 
innumerable conservative or right-wing refugees. But although the histories of the 
émigrés of the French ancien regime and later liberal and radical refugees have been 
charted, the right-wing refugees of the mid-nineteenth century have been ignored, in 
spite of their high contemporary profile.2 After the French July Revolution of 1830, 
Charles X and his court fled to Britain; his successor Louis Philippe, along with his 
court and ministers, most notably François Guizot, made the same journey after 
another revolution in 1848; and in the flurry of revolutions that followed, the 
Orleanist exiles were joined by the fallen Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich and 
the Prince of Prussia (later Wilhelm I of Germany).3  
 
Others arrived at different junctures. The Spanish pretender Don Carlos sought refuge 
after military defeat in 1834, only to escape and wage civil war whilst fellow-exiles 
intrigued in his favour; Carlos’ son Count Montemolin escaped house arrest in France 
in 1846, to promote his claim to the Spanish throne; and the fallen Portuguese usurper 
Dom Miguel fled from Rome in 1847 with the hope of exploiting civil war in 
Portugal. Further French politicians including Adolphe Thiers arrived after President 
Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état in December 1851. Among the most high-profile of 
these refugees, only the Orléans branch of the French royal family resided in Britain 
for a decade or more.  
 
Nevertheless, these exiles possessed either the political capital to influence British 
politicians, or enough support abroad to create diplomatic concerns, or indeed both. 
One of Charles X’s advisers could have precipitated war with France; Don Carlos’ 
escape escalated civil conflict in Spain; Dom Miguel’s departure would have 
                                                 
1   The words ‘refugee’ and ‘exile’ were used interchangeably. 
2   i.e. Burrows, Simon, French Exile Journalism and European Politics, 1792-1814 (Woodbridge, 
2000); Carpenter, Kirsty, Refugees of the French Revolution: The French émigrés in London, 1789-
1802. (Basingstoke, 1999); Carpenter, Kirsty and Mansel, Philip (eds.), The French Émigrés in Europe 
and the Struggle against Revolution, 1789-1814 (Basingstoke, 1999); Weiner, Margery, The French 
Exiles, 1789-1815 (London, 1960); the historiography concerning left-wing refugees is discussed 
below. 
3   Mayer, A.J., The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (London, 1981), p.109 
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precipitated British military intervention in Portugal and probably the defeat of Lord 
John Russell’s Whig government; the victims of the Revolutions of 1848 intrigued 
with British allies; and the Orléans became highly esteemed by British politicians.4 
Although not a homogeneous community, right-wing refugees were certainly 
conspicuous. Their actions and ambitions often threatened to create controversy both 
at Westminster and in the councils of Europe. 
 
The question of which refugees might be considered “right-wing” poses some 
difficulties. Even the words ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ were rarely used to describe 
British politicians, who were elected under myriad labels, until the 1830s. The terms 
right- and left-wing were not applied to British politics until the late 19th century. Yet 
they were used in relation to French politics, and would have been understood by 
informed Britons.5 Charles X, Metternich, Dom Miguel and Don Carlos can easily be 
classified as reactionaries or absolutists – opponents of popular government, and thus 
firmly on the “right”. But although Montemolin claimed to be a liberal, appearances 
can be deceptive. Montemolin’s professions have been dismissed by historians, 
whereas his radical brother and successor Juan was rejected by the reactionary Carlist 
movement.6  
 
Similarly, although both the Orléans and their supporters retained liberal pretensions, 
historians have identified the Orléans and their followers as right-wing, and 
questioned the authenticity of their liberalism.7 Roger Magraw and Pamela Pilbeam 
emphasise that the Orléans represented an oligarchic and elitist political system, and 
Theodore Zeldin suggests that Orleanism in practice and in theory were two very 
distinct things. Supported by a wealthy, propertied electorate, Louis Philippe’s 
“liberal” regime soon became somewhat authoritarian and elitist. It has also been 
described as a ‘failed right-wing experiment’, and even the ostensibly liberal Guizot 
                                                 
4
   Bamford, Francis and the Duke of Wellington (eds.), The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot (2 Vols., 
London, 1950), 8 August 1830, ii p.377; Holt, Edgar, The Carlist Wars in Spain (London, 1967), ch.5-
6; Ridley, Jasper, Lord Palmerston (London, 1972), pp.431-33; Simpson, M.C.M. (ed.), Journals kept 
in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852 (2 Vols, London, 1871), i p.vi; Hansard, 30 March 1860, clvii, 
cc.1648-49 
5  Watson, George, The English Ideology: Studies in the Language of Victorian Politics (London, 
1973), ch.6; Hawkins, Angus, British Party Politics, 1852-1886 (Basingstoke, 1998), ch.2 
6  Holt, Carlist Wars, p.223; Bullen, Roger, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente 
Cordiale (London, 1974), p.272 
7  i.e. Du Pay de Clinchamps, Philippe, Le Royalisme (Paris, 1967); Rémond, René, The Right wing in 
France from 1815 to De Gaulle (Philadelphia, 1969) 
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dubbed his supporters in the National Assembly the ‘Conservative Party’.8 Those who 
fled France in early 1848 were right-wing by the standards of both their 
contemporaries and later historians.  
 
This distinction is complicated by the role which Orleanists played after 1848. 
Although they defended the “social order” against the French Second Republic, 
Orleanists later espoused parliamentary government during the authoritarian regime 
of Napoleon III, and thereby ‘rediscovered the virtues of liberalism’.9 Two of Louis 
Philippe’s sons, the Prince de Joinville and Duc d’Aumale, were thought more liberal 
than their father, and the ex-King’s grandson the Comte de Paris was considered 
‘conscientious, cultivated and liberal’. This was reflected in British perceptions of the 
refugee princes: Aumale and Paris were considered not to be ‘self-pitying and useless’ 
pretenders, but ‘duty-minded military men with a surprising streak of democratic 
idealism.’10 However, Thiers, a leading Orleanist, remained ‘on the right’ as well a 
‘prominent liberal’, and Orleanist conceptions of parliamentary government were 
anathema to the Republican left, which ‘had no wish to copy’ Britain’s aristocratic 
constitution.11 Orleanism became simultaneously liberal and right-wing, and in the 
French National Assembly elected in February 1871, the Orleanists, including 
Aumale and Joinville, composed the centre-right, which advocated ‘conservative 
institutions’ to resist ‘the rising flood of democracy’.12 Although Paris appeared to be 
one of the first ‘socialist millionaires in the early 1870s’, he became known as an 
ambitious opportunist, and his second exile from France after 1886 owed much to 
burgeoning conservative support.13 Appearances notwithstanding, the Orléans and 
their supporters were right-wing by French standards. 
 
                                                 
8  Magraw, Roger, France 1814-1915: The Bourgeois Century (London, 1983) ,p.149; Pilbeam, 
Pamela, ‘Orleanism: A Doctrine of the Right?’ in Atkin, Nicholas and Tallett, Frank (ed.), The Right in 
France: From Revolution to Le Pen (New York, 2003), p.48; Zeldin, Theodore,  A History of French 
Passions (2 Vols., Oxford, 1993-95), i pp.417-19; Price, Munro, The Perilous Crown: France Between 
Revolutions, 1814-1848 (London, 2007), p.225. For Guizot as a liberal, see Johnson, Douglas, Guizot: 
Aspects of French History, 1787-1874 (London, 1963) 
9  Rémond,  Right Wing, p.149 
10  Bury, J.P.T., France, 1814-1940 (London, 1964), p.137; Comte d’Ideville, Memoirs of Marshal 
Bugeaud (trans. Charlotte M. Young) (2 vols., London, 1884), n.117; Downing, Ben, Queen Bee of 
Tuscany: The Redoubtable Janet Ross (New York, 2013), p.154 
11  Ibid., p.108; Zeldin, Émile Ollivier and the Liberal Empire of Napoleon III (Oxford, 1963), ch.6; 
Price, Roger, People and Politics in France, 1848-1870 (Cambridge, 2004), p.105 
12  Chapman, Guy, The Third Republic of France: The First Phase (London, 1962), p.16; Williams, 
R.L., The French Revolution of 1870-1871 (London, 1969), p.159 
13  Zeldin, Passions, i p.423-4 
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The reverse could be applied when considering another refugee, the fallen Spanish 
Regent General Espartero, who arrived in Britain in 1843. In practice, Espartero’s rule 
could be considered conservative, and even authoritarian.14 But Espartero was a 
partisan Progresista – a party regarded as ‘radicals’ or ‘liberals’ in Britain, whose 
Moderado counterparts provided an ‘alternative to either exaggerated liberalism or 
royalism’. Furthermore, some Moderados were otherwise ‘akin’ to the absolutist 
Carlists were it not for their loyalty to Queen Isabella II.15 In terms of party politics, 
the position which Espartero occupied was that of a liberal. 
 
Even more complicated is how to classify Louis Napoleon, French President (1848-
52) and Emperor (1852-70), a refugee in Britain during the 1830s, 1840s and 1870s. 
Although the historian René Rémond identified Bonapartism as a right-wing 
ideology, those who professed loyalty to the Bonapartes represented all shades of 
opinion, albeit with ‘core’ principles ‘based almost exclusively on an interpretation 
of’ the first Napoleon's achievements. Louis Napoleon himself cooperated with 
conservatives during his presidency, and simultaneously identified himself as a 
‘Socialist’.16 Perhaps it would be most accurate to posit that Louis Napoleon almost 
defies ideological classification, a quality which, in conjunction with the 
historiographical attention his life has attracted, excludes him from this study. 
 
Not all right-wing refugees left a mark upon British politics. Judah P. Benjamin, the 
former Secretary of State of the Confederate States of America who fled to Britain, 
instead practised law. Benjamin’s dramatic escape to the Bahamas occasioned a 
dispatch from the Governor, which was subsequently sent to the Foreign Office with 
the intimation that Benjamin would seek asylum in Britain. But despite this concern, 
Benjamin, who remained ‘a conservative’, abandoned politics, aside from writing a 
‘weekly leader on international affairs’ for the Daily Telegraph.17 For this reason, he 
too falls beyond consideration.  
                                                 
14  Payne, Stanley, ‘Spanish Conservatism, 1834-1923’, Journal of Contemporary History 13:4 (1978) 
pp.770-1 
15 Rosenblatt, Nancy A., ‘The Spanish "Moderados" and the Church, 1834-1835’, Catholic Historical 
Review 57:3 (1971) pp.403-6 
16 Hazareesingh, Sudhir, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern 
French Democracy (Princeton, 1998), pp.31-36; Plessis, Alain, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire 
(Cambridge, 1985), p.54 
17 Meade, R.D., Judah P. Benjamin: Confederate Statesman (New York, 1975), ch.18-20; R.W. 
Rawson to Edward Cardwell, 22 July 1865, TNA CO 23/180/185; J.F. Elliot to Lord Russell, 23 
August 1865 (copy), Ibid. 
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The same applies to the Carlist General Ramon Cabrera. Renowned for both military 
genius and extreme cruelty, Cabrera resided in Britain from 1849 until his death in 
1877. It was widely supposed that his marriage to the heiress Marianne Richards in 
1850 ‘civilised’ him, and they settled into a peaceful married life with the approval of 
her family. However, the refugee General had been so vital to Carlist operations that 
he often attracted speculation.18 When the Carlist sympathiser Lord John Manners 
entered the Cabinet in 1852, the Catholic Tablet reported that this had irked the 
Spanish government, for Manners had been Best Man at Cabrera’s wedding.19 The 
Times often conjectured about Cabrera’s involvement in unsuccessful uprisings, and 
when a Spanish revolution seemed likely in 1865, one senior Carlist asked Cabrera 
what he would do, a matter of the highest importance.20  
 
Yet Cabrera’s presence appears never to have attracted a formal protest; and rumours 
that Britain supported his fellow-exile the Carlist pretender Juan were summarily 
dismissed. By September 1860, certain Spanish Ministers thought that Juan was 
‘favoured’ by Britain. Although the story was ‘so preposterous’ that the British 
Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid thought it ‘almost an act of folly’ to report, to assuage 
Spanish concerns, he sought confirmation that it was nonsense.21 This was a rare 
exception to Spanish disinterest in exile activity after the 1840s, and whilst Cabrera 
corresponded with Juan’s son and successor “Carlos VII”, he eventually pledged 
loyalty to the Spanish crown.22 Exiles who avoided controversy unsurprisingly 
created little diplomatic contention. 
 
Refugees, Asylum and British Law 
 
During the nineteenth century, Britain hosted innumerable refugees, and as Bernard 
Gainer notes, ‘England’s tradition of asylum was an old one.’23 Although all ‘aliens’ 
                                                 
18  Elizabeth Hoper to Marianne Cabrera, 31 May 1850, Olliver Collection (hereafter ‘OC’) 10549 f.13; 
Elizabeth Hoper to Marianne Cabrera, 21 January 1851, Ibid., f.15; Holt, Carlist Wars, pp.215-16, 221, 
239-40, 264-65; Ramos Oliveira, Antonio, Politics, Economics and Men of Modern Spain (London, 
1946), pp.75-76 
19  Tablet, 20 March 1852 
20  Times, 24 January 1855; 2 June 1855; 14 April 1860; 26 September 1868; Princess Beira to 
Marianne Cabrera, 8 December 1865, OC10548 
21  R. Edwardes to Lord Russell, 18 September 1860, FO 72/984/120 
22  Holt, Carlist Wars, pp.227-30, 239-40, 264-65 
23  Gainer, Bernard, The Alien Invasion (London, 1972), p.2 
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were banished from England in 1155 and Jews were banished en masse in 1290, over 
the proceeding centuries, migrants largely came to be welcomed, so long as their 
presence provided an economic benefit.24 By the late 16th century, hospitality to 
foreign refugees was considered a tradition, as religious migration to Britain became 
increasingly common.25 A pledge of support from King James I is regarded as a 
turning-point in the history of toleration of these migrants.26 From 1657, Jews were 
again admitted, and after 1685, England ‘opened her doors wide’ to the French 
Protestant Huguenots.27 It is interesting to note that the word ‘refugee’ – derived from 
the French réfugié – entered the English lexicon as a result of the sympathy which 
they found.28 German Protestants were similarly welcomed to settle in England from 
the reign of Edward VI onwards, attracted by economic opportunities and political 
freedoms.29 
 
These migrants could become the subject of suspicion and jealousy; during times of 
distress, attempts were made to restrict their employment, and they were sometimes 
treated as potential foreign spies as well as economic competitors.30 But by the turn of 
the eighteenth century, the right to enter Britain was rarely contested, an attitude 
which was bolstered by the laissez-faire economics which prevailed in the 
nineteenth.31 Political tradition and economic orthodoxy dictated that foreigners could 
enter Britain as and when they wished. 
 
As Bernard Porter notes, in nineteenth-century Britain, the term ‘refugee’ covered ‘a 
multitude of situations’. Deposed monarchs and royalists, the ‘remnants of 
revolutionary armies’ and escaped prisoners were all granted asylum; and from 1823 
until the end of the nineteenth century, Britain did not expel a single refugee. Whilst 
refugees in France were subject to innumerable controls, foreigners could freely 
reside in Britain, and ‘Aliens Acts’ allowing their deportation were only imposed 
when Britain appeared vulnerable to foreign subversion, amidst war with France in 
1793, and revolutionary turmoil throughout Europe in 1848. During the periods 1826-
                                                 
24  Roche, T.W.E., The key in the Lock  (London, 1969), p.15; pp.22-23; p.27 
25  Ibid., pp.36-7 
26  Cottret, Bernard, The Huguenots in England (Cambridge, 1991), pp.84-85 
27  Roche,  Key in the Lock, p.45 
28  Cottret, Huguenots , p.2 
29  Panyani, Panikos (ed.), Germans in Britain since 1500 (London, 1996), pp.4-5, 32-34 
30  Ibid., passim; Scouloudi, Irene, ‘The Stranger Community in the Metropolis, 1558-1640’, Scouloudi 
(ed.), Huguenots in Britain and their French background, 1550-1800 (Basingstoke, 1987) p.44 
31  Roche, Key in the Lock, p.56 
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48 and 1850-1905, British governments had no power to expel refugees, and nobody 
was deported under the 1848 Act’s terms.32  
 
Objections to controlling entry and exit were also based upon practical grounds. It 
was then possible to use passports issued by foreign governments, and before the 
genesis of photographic identification, travel under another’s name. One ground for 
the rejection of the compulsory use of passports for entry into Britain was that it could 
not prevent refugees from intriguing or even waging war abroad. When the matter 
was debated by the Commons in March 1851, both the Conservative Lord Mahon and 
the Whig Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston commented upon how the easy 
acquisition of foreign passports had allowed two right-wing refugees - Don Carlos 
and the Duchesse de Berri – to leave Britain and lead violent uprisings. Rather than 
consider introducing stringent passport controls, MPs rejected effective intervention 
as impossible when diplomatic missions could issue passports as they pleased.33 
 
Some British laws did affect foreigners alone. Under legislation concerning the 
‘Registration of Aliens’, upon landing in Britain, ‘numbers, names and occupations of 
foreign passengers’ had to be reported to the local authorities. Captains were fined 
£10 per passenger for failing to do so under the 1793 Aliens Act, raised to £20 in 
1836.34 According to one Immigration Officer-cum-historian, the latter regime 
represented the nadir of British attempts to control immigration.35 While the entry and 
exit of aliens was subject to few regulations, refugees’ activities, which threatened to 
undermine Britain’s foreign relations, sometimes rendered them liable to surveillance. 
Until a scandal erupted over the opening and sharing of the Italian nationalist 
Giuseppe Mazzini’s correspondence with Austria in 1844, the Home and Foreign 
Offices occasionally connived to open refugees’ letters on behalf of foreign 
governments. The morally questionable nature of this practice, which undermined the 
                                                 
32  Porter, Bernard, The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics (Cambridge, 1979), pp.1-3; for 
refugees in France, see Noiriel, Gérard, La Tyrannie du National: Le Droit d’Asile en Europe, 1793-
1993 (Paris, 1991); Burgess, Greg, Refuge in the Land of Liberty (Basingstoke, 2008) 
33  Hansard, 20 March 1851, cxv, cc.223-26 
34  Menz, Georg, ‘The Neoliberalised State and the growth of the Migration Industry’, Gammeltoft-
Hansen, Thomas and Nyberg Sørensen, Nina (eds.), The Migration Industry and the 
Commercialisation of International Migration (Abingdon, 2013), p.115 
35  Roche, Key in the Lock , pp.4-6 
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right of refugees to undertake political activity, ensured that it was rarely used, and 
quickly abandoned.36  
 
In addition, foreigners could not own land or hold Crown Offices until 1871. As 
Aumale’s secretary acidly recalled, a foreigner could ‘enjoy the liberties of the 
English constitution, but English soil is withheld from him’.37 These stipulations 
could be evaded; in 1852, Coutts’ bank purchased the Twickenham mansion Orléans 
House on Aumale’s behalf.38 But when the respected Belgian diplomat Sylvain Van 
der Weyer protested about being unable to purchase property in 1864, the law 
remained. According to Palmerston, by then Prime Minister, the ‘possession of land’ 
was ‘the source of some political influence’, and should remain in British hands. 
Otherwise, British politics would be left open to foreign interference, especially 
during elections.39 Property ownership’s place at the heart of politics ensured that this 
law elicited strong responses on both sides.  
 
Nevertheless, refugees enjoyed a great deal of freedom in Britain. Although some 
abused their asylum, it could not be effectively stopped, and so insignificant was 
surveillance upon refugees that during the 1850s, it was dominated by a sole detective 
named John Sanders.40 This approach reflected both Britain’s aversion to the growth 
of government security apparatus and the refugee’s right to British liberties, and 
foreign requests to tighten such legislation were habitually refused. Many European 
governments felt vulnerable to ‘revolutionary subversion’, and these complaints were 
usually groundless.41  
 
Such liberality was not motivated by generosity alone; as Porter notes, the 1793 
Aliens Act was ‘casually dismantled’ in 1826 because it was considered a sop to 
absolutist governments.42 It took a refugee plot of great significance to make a British 
government pursue a stronger line. In early 1858, an Italian refugee named Felice 
Orsini left Britain for France, and armed with British-made bombs, he killed eight 
                                                 
36  Smith, S.B., ‘British Post Office Espionage, 1844’, Historical Studies XIV (1969-71) 
37  Porter, Refugee Question, p.4; Laugel, Auguste, England, Political and Social (New York, 1874), 
p.94 
38  See chapter 7. 
39  Palmerston to Lord Westbury (copy), 20 February 1864, Broadlands Papers (hereafter, ‘BP’), 
PP/LB/162 
40  Porter, Refugee Question, p.117, pp.151-59 
41  Ibid., pp.46-48 
42  Ibid., p.134, p.71 
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people and wounded 142 in an attempt to assassinate Napoleon III. This plot to 
murder a vital partner alarmed Palmerston’s government, but its attempt to make 
Conspiracy to Murder a felony in response was resoundingly defeated, albeit in a vote 
heavily influenced by party politics.43 Although refugee plots were a diplomatic 
liability, British liberties were not considered worth sacrificing.  
 
Only later in the century did attitudes change. Whereas the Aliens Acts of 1793 and 
1848 had sought to exclude ‘spies, subversives, agitators and fanatics’, the nature of 
immigration to Britain changed  as the nineteenth century wore on. As economic 
migration became increasingly common, so did opposition to it, especially on the 
‘radical right’.44 By 1890, the Conservative predilection for protectionism and Liberal 
support for free trade had crystallised into opposing views on the right of entry, and in 
1905, Arthur Balfour’s disintegrating Unionist government passed a new Aliens Act. 
The new law targeted those deemed ‘undesirable’, and represented a first attempt to 
‘permanently restrict immigration’, its illiberalism and ‘rank prejudices’ in deep 
contrast to earlier attitudes.45 Although the Liberal administration charged with its 
enforcement did so unenthusiastically, the Act’s harshness and the prior 
transformation of public opinion have attracted significant attention. As Jill Pellew 
noted in 1989, ‘much of its story’ has already been told.46 The same is not true of the 
conservatives who fled to Britain in the middle years of the nineteenth century. 
 
The Historiographical Context 
 
Numerous studies have considered the experience of liberal and revolutionary 
refugees in nineteenth century Britain. Karl Marx’s exile has been the subject of 
substantial scholarship, Mazzini’s correspondence with the Ashurst family was 
published in the early 1920s, as was a study of French radical refugees, and these 
works were complemented in mid-century by several works considering left-wing 
refugees and their British sympathisers.47 Further important works have appeared 
                                                 
43
 Ibid., p.6; Hicks, Geoffrey, Peace War and Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe, 1846-59 
(Manchester, 2007), pp.176-77 
44  Glover, David, Literature, Immigration and Diaspora in fin-de-siècle England (Cambridge, 2012), 
ch.3 
45  Ibid., pp.1-4; Gainer, Alien Invasion, p.144 
46  Pellew, Jill, ‘The Home Office and the Aliens Act, 1905’, Historical Journal 32:2 (1989), p.369 
47 Eubanks, V.L., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: an Analytical Bibliography (London, 1977); 
Richards, E.F.(ed.), Mazzini’s letters to an English family (London, 1920-22); Calman, A.R., Ledru-
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since 1979.  That year saw the publication of Porter’s study of the ‘Refugee 
Question’, which  provides the sole monograph overview of the problem which 
refugees posed for British politicians during the mid-nineteenth century, and Thomas 
Kabdebdo’s study of the Hungarian ‘diplomat in exile’ Francis Pulszky, which 
highlights the difficulties even liberal refugees had influencing elite politicians.48 The 
various refugee communities and their British supporters have since found further 
consideration.49  
 
Much ink, then, has been expended about refugees of the broad left. But with a few 
exceptions, notably the art collector and historian Aumale, and the conspiring French 
Bourbons, conservatives’ experiences of exile - let alone their relationships with 
British politics - have often been dismissed.50 Judith Cromwell’s biography of the 
Russian intriguer Princess Lieven, who also fled Paris in 1848, only briefly mentions 
her hopes to split Russell’s government; and John Charmley, another recent 
biographer of Lieven, essentially concluded his study at 1840.51 Yet Lieven remained 
politically active into the 1850s, and even acted as an Anglo-Russian intermediary 
during the Crimean War.52 Metternich’s most recent biographer merely noted the 
fallen Chancellor’s continued interest in politics, while Guizot omitted his exile from 
his memoirs.53 Ostensibly removed from positions of influence, their activities in 
exile were assumed to be of less interest - or in Guizot’s case, a regrettable coda to his 
career.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Rollin après 1848, et les Proscits Français en Angleterre (Paris, 1921);  Rudman, Harry W., Italian 
Nationalism and English Letters (London, 1940); Wicks, M.C., The Italian Exiles in London, 1816-
1848 (Manchester, 1937); Carr, E.H., The Romantic Exiles (Harmondsworth, 1949) 
48  Kabdebdo, Thomas, Diplomat in Exile (Boulder, 1979) 
49  i.e. Ashton, Rosemary, Little Germany (Oxford, 1986); Finn, Margot, After Chartism: Class and 
Nation in English Radical Politics, 1848-1874 (Cambridge, 1993); Freitag, Sabine (ed.), Exiles from 
European Revolutions: Refugees in Mid-Victorian England (Oxford, 2003); Jones, T.C., French 
Republican Exiles in Britain, 1848-1870 (PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 2010); Bantman, 
Constance, The French Anarchists in London, 1880-1914 (Liverpool, 2013) 
50 Cazelles, Raymond, Le Duc d’Aumale (Paris, 1984) is the most complete biography; his artistic 
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Certain royal refugees have attracted scholars. Louis Napoleon’s sojourns in Britain, 
the death of his son the Prince Imperial whilst serving with the British army in 
Zululand in 1879, and Queen Victoria’s relationship with the Bonapartes have all 
been charted.54 Yet much of what has been printed concerning the refugees covered 
by this study is anecdotal. As early as 1856, Ralph Waldo Emerson recorded that 
Guizot was blackballed at the Athenaeum in 1848; biographies of the Whig politician 
and wit Richard Monckton Milnes quoted his bons mots about the exiles; and 
Benjamin Disraeli recalled his friendship with Metternich fondly (the ex-Chancellor 
even inspired a character in Disraeli’s 1880 novel Endymion.)55 These refugees were 
both remembered and memorialised, albeit usually as a matter of curiosity. Historians 
have a somewhat shakier record. While Richard Shannon noted that William 
Gladstone would have heard Guizot’s warnings about threats to ‘civilised society’ 
upon meeting the fallen Minister, Porter casually commented that the refugees of 
1848 left after eighteen months, and Elizabeth Longhurst asserted that Wellington 
regarded Don Carlos positively, despite accounts of him upbraiding the refugee 
pretender.56 Although remembered by contemporaries, later writers made sweeping 
and often inaccurate statements about them.  
 
Recent publications suggest a shift in focus. Exiled royalty were the subject of a 
collection of essays in 2011, and further recent essays have briefly considered the 
French royalty who resided in Britain after 1789, impressionistically charted Dom 
Miguel’s British sojourn, analysed Disraeli’s friendship with Metternich, and 
concluded that the Orléans’ experience of revolution deeply affected Queen 
Victoria.57 This trend is reflected in a few standalone works. Palmerston’s apparent 
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preoccupation with exile influence over the Times during 1848-49 has been charted by 
Lawrence Fenton, albeit with little explanation; the Comte de Paris’ diaries of his 
service during the American Civil War have been edited and published; Sylvie Aprile 
has devoted a chapter of her study of French refugees to royalty; and Wolfram 
Siemann has considered Metternich’s relationship with Britain.58 Albeit in a scattered 
and sometimes impressionistic fashion, historians have begun to reconsider right-wing 
refugees’ multifarious activities. 
 
The wider historiography also suggests that right-wing refugees found support and 
influence. The adventurer William Bollaert’s 1870 memoirs allude to the intrigues of 
Carlist refugees, especially the financier Moritz von Haber, and Lord John Manners’ 
biographer acknowledged the Tory MP’s zealous support for Montemolin. But these 
stories have been plotted skeletally, and in Bollaert’s case, from memory long after. 
Although Haber’s relationship with Disraeli has interested the latter’s biographers, 
they have not considered Haber in his own right.59 Only in connection with the lives 
of others have these refugees’ activities found some consideration.  
 
Those who arrived in 1848 found rather more recognition. Metternich’s letters to 
Disraeli were utilised by his biographers, and Metternich’s correspondence with the 
Tory politician Lord Aberdeen about Disraeli’s prospects was considered by M.E. 
Chamberlain.60 Metternich’s correspondence in exile was also utilised in a study of 
his relationship with Hungary.61 However, these exiles’ activities remain under-
analysed. Although both Chamberlain and E. Jones Parry considered Aberdeen’s 
interest in the Orléans’ ambitions, and David Brown utilised Aberdeen’s 
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correspondence with Guizot in his biography of Palmerston, Aberdeen’s relationship 
with the refugee Guizot remains largely unexplored. A published selection of their 
correspondence includes little from this period.62 Because the political historian finds 
more interest in their subject’s career, these exiles have been relegated to the role of 
supporting characters.  
 
When Osbert Wyndham Hewett charted Lady Waldegrave’s rise as a political hostess, 
he paid little attention to her cooperation with the Orléans aside from her initial 
efforts, and thereafter largely cast them as a nuisance to his subject.63 Conversely, in 
emphasising the cosmopolitan nature of aristocratic politics, K.D. Reynolds 
acknowledged Waldegrave’s links with the Orléans, and Lieven’s with the Russian 
court.64 The wider historiography thus suggests that right-wing refugees found both 
support and influence, often as a result of their presence in elite social circles. This 
prompts the question of what role right-wing refugees - who inhabited the same 
exclusive social circles as British politicians - played in British politics. 
 
Diplomatic histories similarly suggest that these exiles’ activities influenced the 
course of British politics. Although Porter claims that ‘refugees were hardly an issue’ 
during the 1830s and 1840s, both Chamberlain and Robert Franklin have considered 
the difficulties of granting asylum to the fleeing Charles X, whilst chapters in two 
further studies have analysed the public response to the French Bourbons during 
1830-32.65 But the impact which their presence (or even the 1832 rebellion in the 
Vendée, led by Charles’s daughter-in-law Berri) had upon Anglo-French relations 
remains unexplored. Other right-wing refugees certainly concerned British diplomats. 
Edgar Holt emphasised this in briefly charting Don Carlos’ exile, and Roger Bullen’s 
intensive study of the splintering Anglo-French entente during 1846-48 reveals both 
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Palmerston’s concerns about Montemolin and interest in him as an ally against French 
ambitions in Spain.66  
 
However, these are insights within wider surveys, and other studies prompt further 
questions. While Roy Austensten notes that the refugee Metternich continued to 
correspond with Austrian politicians and diplomats, historians have often simply 
accepted or dismissed wild opinions which Palmerston promoted about the exiles of 
1848; that they formed part of a vast conspiracy against him, or that Louis Napoleon’s 
1851 coup d’état was a justified response to the Orléans’ apparent plots.67 Palmerston 
was not alone in at least ostensibly fearing exile ambitions. The possibility of Orléans 
Princes reigning in Mexico, Greece, Spain and France all concerned British diplomats 
and politicians.68 These exiles’ ambitions all found British attention, often at critical 
diplomatic junctures. However, their contribution to British political history has been 
overlooked as a whole, and is therefore scattered, recorded in little detail without 
being given any consideration as a subject in its own right. 
 
This study seeks to build upon the existing, fragmentary research which has offered a 
glimpse into the experience of right-wing refugees in British politics during the mid-
nineteenth century. It does not seek, as previous studies of refugees in Victorian 
Britain have done, to chart the history of a migrant community. Rather, its object is to 
explore the multifarious impact which right-wing refugees had upon British politics, 
as an influence upon British contemporaries and as a diplomatic problem for 
successive British governments.  
 
Such a work is needed to counterbalance the attention given to left-wing refugees and 
economic migrants in the history of nineteenth-century Britain. This study seeks to 
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understand how right-wing refugees influenced the course of British politics, either as 
the collaborators of British politicians, or as a source of contention with Britain’s 
neighbours. It seeks to demonstrate that right-wing refugees participated in and 
influenced the course of British politics with more success than their radical fellow-
exiles, and that their presence similarly created diplomatic difficulties. 
 
Refugees in British Politics 
 
The idea that prominent left-wing refugees found sympathy and exercised some 
influence amongst British contemporaries has long been recognised. Although 
Mazzini became progressively less “respectable” owing to his advocacy of violence, 
the Italians who arrived in Britain in the 1820s were moderate liberals, and their 
‘congeniality’ combined with ‘direct acquaintance’ with mostly Whig politicians. 
Many British hosts had ‘already met them in the aristocratic salons’ during Grand 
Tours, and the Italian language was widely understood among Britain’s elite. Others 
who arrived in the 1830s and 1840s also found widespread sympathy. Two of the 
most prominent Italian liberals, Antonio Panizzi and Giacomo (James) Lacaita, 
became respected figures in Whig circles, and Lacaita’s naturalization was witnessed 
by a Baronet and an MP.69 Even Orsini became a martyr, for his plot indirectly 
contributed to Italian unification.70 As representatives of what was considered a noble 
cause, they were highly regarded by both their contemporaries and later historians. 
 
More notably, the refugee leader of the 1830 Polish Uprising, Prince Adam 
Czartoryski, was fêted by Whigs and radicals upon his arrival in Britain in 1831. 
Although the Cabinet refused to sanction military assistance for Poland (by rebelling, 
the Poles had ‘forfeited whatever rights they had under the Treaty of Vienna’), 
Czartoryski’s efforts secured several Commons debates on Poland, and Britain did 
attempt to discourage reprisals against the Poles.71 While this fell short of 
Czartoryski’s hopes, it demonstrates that his exhortations found support from 
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sympathetic politicians and the Earl Grey’s Whig government alike. Czartoryski later 
chose to reside in Paris, but many Poles found asylum in Britain, and further support 
was forthcoming.   
 
The Literary Association of Friends of Poland, established in 1831, was supported by 
such diverse figures as ‘Peel, Shaftesbury, Dickens and Gladstone’, and in 1834, 
Parliament voted a grant of £10,000 for Polish refugees, ‘renewed annually until 
1838’.72 Polish refugees even received the patronage of Whig politicians. Palmerston 
sent one, Wojciech Chrzanowski, to Turkey as a military adviser, and another, 
Ladislas Zamoyski, was instrumental in promoting the exiled Poles’ aims into the 
1860s.73 Although the influence which Polish refugees exercised was restricted by the 
violent nature of Polish uprisings against Russian rule, their cause has been 
recognised as having received significant attention. 
 
Exiled Spanish liberals also found regard. Those who fled to Britain after the re-
imposition of absolutism in 1823 were welcomed and became ‘decisive to a growing 
awareness’ of Spanish literature.74 Twenty years later, Espartero was also fêted. Upon 
Espartero’s fall in a coup d’état and subsequent flight, the British Minister, Arthur 
Aston, strongly defended him. When the leader of the coup accused Espartero of 
treason, Aston recorded that this was ‘utterly false’, and further manifested his disgust 
in refusing to attend a thanksgiving service. The removal of Espartero’s titles and the 
filing of false charges against him invoked further disdain from Aston.75  
 
The liberal diplomat’s sympathies were echoed by the Conservative Prime Minister. 
Sir Robert Peel hoped ‘that everything should be done to show him civility’, and 
although Aston’s partisanship necessitated his replacement, Espartero was presented 
to the admiring Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.76 The ex-Regent was also honoured 
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by Whigs. ‘Palmerston says we are all Progresistas… and Espartero is the head of 
that party’, noted Lady Palmerston in 1847.77 However, much to her regret, Espartero 
devoted little time to politics in exile.78 He also spoke little English or French, a 
problem which also afflicted at least one Carlist refugee; the Bishop of León struggled 
to converse with the Irish politician Daniel O’Connell because their only shared 
language was Latin, which both spoke with incomprehensible accents!79 Nevertheless, 
Espartero provides a useful example of a widely esteemed liberal refugee. 
 
After the turmoil of 1848, aristocratic politicians increasingly ignored revolutionary 
refugees. Those who had led many of the revolutions of 1848 were generally far more 
radical than the refugees who previously fled Poland, Spain and Italy. When both 
Gladstone and Palmerston were invited to a meeting held on behalf of Italian refugees 
in 1851, presided over by the Chartist Bronterre O’Brien, Palmerston did not even 
reply.80 Radical refugees were received by few of Britain’s elite, except for Lord 
Shaftesbury and Susannah Milner Gibson, the wife of Radical MP Thomas Milner 
Gibson.81 Nor was the public necessarily sympathetic to their causes. The Jersey 
office of L’Homme, a newspaper set up by Victor Hugo, was ransacked after it 
libelled Queen Victoria, and Hugo himself was verbally abused.82  
 
By the 1850s, support for these refugees was limited to radicals rather than 
aristocratic Whigs, let alone Conservatives. Both Tories and Whigs deplored the 
radical refugees’ views and activities. Lord Lyndhurst spoke of their desperation and 
hostility “to all regular governments”, and in 1853, Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon 
asked the journalist Henry Reeve to ‘thoroughly’ condemn refugees’ ‘abuse of 
hospitality’ in the Times.83 Although Britain offered asylum to all, its political elite 
was unsympathetic to plots which attracted diplomatic protests. 
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Such refugees instead associated with British counterparts. As Margot Finn notes, by 
1851-52, middle-class radicals had organised numerous charitable appeals on behalf 
of refugees who had fled to Britain after the failed revolutions, and ‘the late Chartist 
press’ was heavily influenced by refugee thought.84 Like refugees from elite 
backgrounds, they found support from British contemporaries; ‘networks of 
sociability, services and patronage that proved of mutual benefit’ were all established, 
whilst ‘radical ceremonies’ reinforced partnerships between Chartists, exiles and the 
public.85 Although Miles Taylor has downplayed these exiles’ importance, their 
assimilation into political networks guaranteed influence over their allies. As Thomas 
Jones notes, John Stuart Mill’s writings were influenced by the exiled Louis Blanc, 
and Finn similarly comments upon radical and Chartist circulation of Mazzini’s 
publications.86 Much like their right-wing counterparts, revolutionary refugees found 
attention from British sympathisers. 
 
However, unlike those of the left, right-wing refugees usually possessed the social 
standing which allowed access to ‘high society’, and thus senior politicians. The elite 
environment in which diplomacy and politics was conducted has itself been subject to 
significant review in recent decades, particularly the relationship between partisan 
politics and foreign policy – which such exiles were well-placed to exploit.87 
Historians have also traced the political importance which aristocratic networks held. 
For example, Leslie Mitchell and Peter Mandler have charted the political 
significance of Whig networks, whilst K.D. Reynolds has explored how women, 
including the Orléans’ patron Lady Waldegrave, were able to exercise influence in 
aristocratic social circles.88 Michael Bentley has similarly charted the ‘environments’ 
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of late-nineteenth century Conservatism.89 What is clear from these studies is that the 
importance of personal relationships in Victorian politics should not be 
underestimated; and right-wing refugees could often exploit these relationships. These 
refugees were largely aristocrats, if not royalty, and ‘the landed classes’ dominated 
British high politics.90 The British aristocracy also ‘looked down on almost everyone’ 
except for foreign aristocrats and royalty, and as David Cannadine notes, Europe’s 
elite shared a ‘transnational perspective’. Brought up to ‘speak French as the language 
of diplomacy and high society’, many aristocrats were equally at ease in London, 
Paris, Rome or St Petersburg.91 As a consequence, elite refugees often easily 
assimilated into London’s high society. Much as Reynolds suggests of aristocratic 
women, their status allowed them to become political actors.92  
 
This was further accentuated by past acquaintances with British politicians. For 
example, Guizot was a historian of England and former French Ambassador to 
Britain; Lieven had been Russian Ambassadress between 1812 and 1834; and 
Metternich had known Wellington and Aberdeen since the wars against Napoleon and 
subsequent European Congresses.93 Familiarity bred respect, and those who fell 
victim to revolution or led political opposition abroad were uniquely placed to exploit 
British concerns about foreign affairs.  Moreover, fear of revolution persisted 
throughout Britain’s elite.94 For this reason, the exiles of 1848 found a great deal of 
attention from British politicians. Similarly, the social position held by some of the 
Orléans ensured that they were treated as authorities on French affairs, and could thus 
shape elite perceptions of Napoleon III’s regime. When the causes they advocated 
found attention and support, right-wing refugees could advise and influence 
sympathetic British politicians. 
 
The role of “society” was an important one.  Aristocrats flocked to London during the 
‘season’ to engage in an ‘intense struggle’ for celebrity and influence in clubs and 
drawing-rooms, a stepping-stone to the ‘political realm’, and senior politicians led a 
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‘dual existence’ devoted to both fashionable pastimes and ‘public business.’95 Politics 
and sociability were closely intertwined, and as Reynolds notes, invitations to social 
functions were considered an effective method of gaining support. Aumale’s secretary 
thought it impossible to enter a parlour without ‘finding politics side by side with 
pleasure’, whilst the salon and hostess both benefited from the lack of ‘highly 
organised’ political parties.96 The ambitious thus had to secure attention in a social 
sphere open only to the titled or wealthy, although by the later 1860s, “society” was 
fragmenting, and party organisations had begun to encroach upon aristocratic 
influence.97 Only “respectable” people could “enter society”, and the widely execrated 
French Bourbons, Don Carlos and Dom Miguel were not considered as such. 
Nevertheless, many of their fellow-exiles were, and this accorded them access to 
political circles which their left-wing contemporaries could seldom enter. Whilst 
many right-wing refugees’ mere presence created diplomatic controversy, the 
moderate and/or well-connected could also exercise a significant degree of political 
influence. 
 
A New Study 
 
This study seeks to redress the lack of attention which these right-wing refugees have 
received from historians, and progresses chronologically from the fall of Charles X in 
1830 to the Orléans’ return to France in 1871. By exploring two broad themes - the 
role which right-wing refugees played in British party politics and the impact of their 
activities upon the course of British foreign policy - it considers an overlooked but 
nevertheless important series of networks and controversies.  
 
The study begins by charting the exile of Charles X and his court in Britain from 
1830-32. This analysis exposes previously overlooked diplomatic disputes centred 
upon the exiles’ right to asylum and French unease at their continued plotting. It first 
considers the controversies surrounding the fallen court’s arrival in Britain and the 
combination of privilege and execration which they met, and then explores the 
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difficulties which these exiles found in engaging with British politics and the various 
concerns which their plots, especially Berri’s rebellion, created among British 
diplomats and politicians. It finally reveals that their departure, previously ascribed to 
French pressure, was the result of no such demarche.  
 
The theme of right-wing refugees creating difficulties for British governments is 
further developed in considering the experience of Carlist and Miguelite refugees. 
This third chapter first analyses Carlos’ brief, disastrous exile in Britain and the Whig 
government’s responsibility for it, the limited support which Carlist refugees found in 
Britain, and the problems which they presented to British diplomacy during the mid-
1830s, before contemplating  Montemolin’s and Miguel’s sojourns in Britain during 
1846-51. Whilst Montemolin secured the support of Tory Carlists and Palmerston, 
Miguel’s potential departure for Portugal to intercede in civil conflict threatened 
British intervention, and thus the British government’s survival. This chapter suggests 
that Carlist and Miguelite refugees had a modest impact upon British party politics 
but often frustrated British diplomacy.  
 
The next three chapters consider the apogee of refugee influence over British politics 
during the years 1848-50, centred upon the intrigues of Metternich, Guizot and 
Lieven, who hoped to reunite the Conservative party and precipitate Palmerston’s 
downfall. The first chapter considers these exiles’ influence upon Conservative 
politics, and the degree of support which they found both inside and outside 
Parliament. The second then charts their relationship with Russell’s government by 
considering the exiles’ interactions with Whig politicians, their role in the 
development of British foreign policy and their relationships with the royal family. 
The third chapter considers the question of ‘refugee conspiracies’ and their impact 
upon British politics and diplomacy. These chapters argue that during these 
tumultuous years, right-wing refugees played an important role in the formation and 
critique of British foreign policy, as well as developments in party politics, especially 
in attempts to reunite the shattered Conservative party. 
 
The final two chapters chart the rise of the Orléans family from pariahs supported by 
a few loyal Britons into highly-regarded political actors. The first of these chapters 
also considers Thiers’ brief exile and his influence over British politicians, and the 
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importance which rumours surrounding the Orléans played in Palmerston’s response 
to Louis Napoleon’s 1851 coup d’état. At the same time as considering the Orléans’ 
political fortunes in exile and the encouragement they received from British patrons, 
these chapters explore the problems which their presence created for the makers of 
British foreign policy, as candidates for numerous vacant thrones, and as a regular 
nuisance in the conduct of Anglo-French relations.  
 
Although these exiles have often been ignored, this study contends that they exercised 
a degree of influence over British politicians and created an important series of 
challenges for British diplomacy. It argues that the influence they had over British 
politicians at a national level was far greater than that established by their left-wing 
counterparts. This study will also shed new light upon the history of British politics 
and diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century by providing an example of the many 
outside influences which affected the conduct of British politicians. Although its 
refugee subjects did not achieve their ultimate goals, they certainly succeeded in 
influencing the course of British politics. 
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2: A Miserable Emigration? The French Bourbons
1
, 1830-32 
 
Much like other European convulsions which were to follow, the July Revolution 
created a wave of right-wing refugees. This chapter explores the political and 
diplomatic implications of the exiled court’s presence. It will consider the relationship 
between the sympathy they received as refugees and the lack of political support they 
found, while charting the effect their presence had upon British diplomacy. Their 
sojourn in Britain may have been miserable, but it demonstrates the complex range of 
responses which characterised British governments’ relationships with such exiles. 
 
On Sunday, 25 July 1830, King Charles X of France signed the ‘Four Ordinances of 
Saint-Cloud’, and set in course a revolution, his abdication, and exile in Britain. The 
revolution in France inspired a series of conflagrations throughout Europe, and at this 
tumultuous time, good relations with Orleanist France were vital. This was not only to 
restrain France’s revisionist ambitions; as a fellow constitutional state and near 
neighbour with a large army, France was an ideal ally for Britain against absolutism 
in the councils of Europe. Between 1830 and 1832, the Great Powers squabbled over 
the fates of Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Poland, and further revolutions erupted in 
Germany and Italy. But while Britain sought agreement with the French government, 
both countries experienced turmoil. In Britain, agrarian riots created consternation in 
late 1830, and during 1831-32, domestic politics were dominated by increasingly 
acrimonious debates over Whig attempts to introduce parliamentary reform. By 1832, 
Tory resistance, especially in the House of Lords, appeared to threaten revolution.2   
 
Meanwhile, France was racked by discontent and even uprisings, some of which were 
encouraged by the exiles. Charles requested an estimate of his supporters’ strength 
barely a month after his ejection, and received the reply that if Charles’ scheming 
daughter-in-law the Duchesse de Berri and her son the Duc de Bordeaux (Charles’ 
grandson and anointed successor) arrived in the royalist west, an army could quickly 
be raised to march on Paris. Charles failed to lead, and by November the project was 
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abandoned.3 He and his personal followers thereafter abstained from politics. Yet 
some exiled courtiers ‘dreamed of’ restoring Bordeaux.4 This reached a disastrous 
climax in May 1832, when Berri (who had already left Britain) led an unsuccessful 
insurrection in the Vendée with the eventual hope of restoring Bordeaux.5 Exile plots 
threatened to adversely affect Anglo-French relations, and the exiles’ departure was 
attributed to French complaints of British inactivity in the face of refugee 
machinations.6 The French Bourbons proved to be a thorn in the side of British 
diplomacy.  
 
Only rarely did these exiles find support from British politicians, although they were 
sympathetically received in their new home in Edinburgh. Even Tories were 
disappointed to hear of exile plots against Orleanist France, and Lord Palmerston, 
appointed Foreign Secretary in the Reform government of 1830-34, famously wrote 
after the July Revolution that he would drink to liberalism ‘all over the world.’7 
Rather than influence the course of politics, their presence created debate and concern 
at an exceptionally restive time. 
 
Before examining the French Bourbons’ exile, it is necessary to consider the 
circumstances in which they fell, which precipitated unrest and calls for reform 
throughout Europe.8 Charles’ reign (1824-1830) was characterised by political 
repression, and although intense activism ensured that liberals acquired ‘the balance’ 
of the National Assembly in 1827, the King refused to appoint liberal Ministers and 
made effective government impossible. A further election in 1830 returned a liberal 
majority, and persuaded that France was in danger, Charles signed the ordinances, 
drawn up by Prime Minister Prince Polignac. The Chamber of Deputies was to be 
dissolved, its powers curbed, and its narrow electoral franchise restricted; the liberty 
of the press was to be suspended; and additional reactionaries were to join the cabinet.  
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The Ordinances provoked violent rage, and protests steadily grew. By 29 July, army 
units had fled Paris, now under revolutionary control, and on 2 August, Charles fled 
from the nearby Palace of Saint-Cloud. The King and his son the Duc d’Angoulême 
abdicated their rights to the throne in favour of the 10 year-old Bordeaux, and Charles 
appointed his cousin the Duc d’Orléans Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom and 
Bordeaux’s Regent. The court retreated first to the Palace at Rambouillet, and then 
slowly towards the coast, optimistic that they would be asked to return. But on the 9th, 
Orléans was proclaimed Louis Philippe, King of the French by liberal deputies. 
Charles reached Cherbourg on 16 August.9 Although he requested asylum in Austria, 
it was believed that the ex-King would seek asylum in Britain, and ‘not move 
again.’10 The exiled court remained in Britain for just over two years, and finally left 
for Austria September 1832. It was, one exiled courtier later recalled, a miserable 
second emigration.11 
 
Although the July Revolution was ‘celebrated’ in Britain ‘as a victory for the middle 
classes against a repressive and ultraconservative regime’, and Anglo-French relations 
had been in a parlous state, the refugee royal family found some sympathy.12 Whilst 
the emergence of a new regime offered an opportunity to reset Anglo-French 
relations, it also occasioned regret and trepidation among Tories. The former Prime 
Minister Lord Grenville thought it ‘a great misfortune’; Queen Adelaide (a Tory 
sympathiser) was deeply affected by the exiles’ plight; and the Prime Minister, the 
Duke of Wellington, considered the change of regime a bitter, but necessary, pill to 
swallow. He had to recognise ‘la nouvelle France’ or resign.13 
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Most accepted the July Revolution as a fait accompli, and while they pitied Charles 
and his court, they had little sympathy for his politics. Even Ultra-Tory newspapers 
had long condemned Charles’s ardent Catholicism, and only ‘a few Ultras (with the 
Duke of Cumberland at their head)… would have liked to go to war to support the 
claim of the Duke of Bordeaux.’ For most of this grouping, Charles’ fall was lauded – 
it was a ‘death blow to Popery’ in France.14 Tory sympathy for the exiles owed more 
to deference towards royalty than politics, and some were even hostile.15 Curiously, 
the Whig MP for Caithness, George Sinclair, who had known Charles during his first 
exile in Edinburgh, felt a ‘profound sympathy’ for the ex-King, and unsuccessfully 
urged King William IV to continue to recognise Charles’ reign.16 Most Tories were 
ambivalent about Charles’ fate. 
 
This ambivalence was reflected in the government’s response to the ex-court’s flight. 
King William IV was ‘disposed to receive’ Charles, but Wellington cautiously replied 
that the ‘Old Pretender’ (son of the deposed James II) had been removed from Paris 
upon British requests on three occasions. The Prime Minister feared that the presence 
of a rival court would cause disagreement with France, and this was reflected in the 
cabinet’s decision on 4 August to offer the ex-court asylum in exchange for a promise 
not to plot their return.17 While these strict terms had no legal basis, Orleanist France 
was an unknown quantity, and good relations with it were vital.  
 
Meanwhile, the British Ambassador to France, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, attempted to 
ensure that Charles was sent into an honourable, British exile. Because the ex-King 
was unwilling to leave France in an American vessel, on 5 August, Stuart sent on 
Charles’s request to be taken aboard a British ship to Foreign Secretary Aberdeen. 
Charles also wanted Wellington to ‘send out some ships to intercept him at sea and 
prevent’ the exiled court’s departure. Wellington, Aberdeen, and Home Secretary Sir 
Robert Peel concluded that this was ‘utterly impossible, unless they mean to provoke 
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a war’, and Stuart was told that that the United States would not kidnap the exiles.18 
Such ridiculous demands could never be accepted, and the exiles’ destination 
remained uncertain; Orléans thought Italy, Saxony or the Netherlands all likely. But 
the latter two would have posed a ‘serious inconvenience’ to France, and Stuart thus 
sought ‘to induce [Charles] to abandon that intention, whilst preventing the 
appearance of contact.’19  Although this communication threatened to imply that 
Britain supported the ex-monarch, Stuart wanted Charles to seek asylum across the 
Channel to prevent conflict elsewhere, and on the 15th, eight days after receiving the 
British offer of asylum, Charles agreed to sail for Spithead to consider his options.20  
 
However, the government feared that the exiles could become a diplomatic problem. 
Upon landing, Charles wished ‘at least to remain in England [until] he had an answer 
from Austria’ and ‘escape from the surveillance he was under.’  Wellington replied 
that ‘it was most desirable the King should not establish himself here’ and again cited 
the ‘Old Pretender’; but he felt that a temporary residence ‘could not be objected to.’21 
The Prime Minister remained wary that France might fear exile plots, and Peel agreed 
that Charles should only be offered asylum if he considered his abdication ‘complete’. 
Peel also advocated loaning the exiles the royal palace of Holyroodhouse in 
Edinburgh, at a safe distance to stop them from ‘disturbing the order of things now 
established in France.’22 The two statesmen hoped to reconcile hospitality with 
preventing exile intrigues in France, and because Charles was ‘desirous of continuing 
exclusively private[ly]’, the cabinet concluded that there was ‘no reason’ to refuse a 
temporary asylum.23  
 
This welcome declaration of abstention from politics appeared to preclude French 
protests about an émigré threat, and allowing the fallen court to settle in Britain 
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satisfied concerns about their future comfort. As Aberdeen noted, leaving the exiles to 
‘seek an uncertain refuge, from port to port, would have afforded a spectacle little 
honourable to’ Britain. The government also hoped that they would ‘fix their abode... 
at a distance from the metropolis’, in ‘privacy and seclusion’.24 The offer of a 
conditional asylum (which had no legal basis) was calculated to avoid causing offence 
throughout Europe. 
 
The royal exiles were simultaneously execrated and pitied. In a display of sympathy 
from the government, customs officers were ordered not to interfere with their 
baggage, and their confessor was swiftly granted the necessary licence.25 Meanwhile, 
several British aristocrats offered the exiles accommodation, and they accepted 
Lulworth Castle on the Dorset coast from the Catholic Cardinal Thomas Weld.26 
Weld’s offer alone was tinged with political sentiment. Whereas the exiles had been 
met with revolutionary tricolores at Portsmouth, Weld was a committed legitimist.27  
As a secluded and apparently safe location, Lulworth appeared an ideal residence. But 
although personal and political sympathy had ensured that the fallen court entered into 
a relatively comfortable exile, many British friends refused to visit Charles. The ex-
king was a political outcast.28 
 
The exiles’ residence at Lulworth quickly produced a clash with France. The new 
French Ambassador, Prince Talleyrand, argued that Britain should honour its close 
relationship with France by assigning the exiles ‘a residence fifty miles in the 
interior’, away from any intrigue which might be launched from the French coast.29 
The British government had no right to make such a demand, but it did hint to Charles 
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that residing on the south coast ‘gave a pretext to numerous intriguers’ to cross.30 The 
slightest suggestion that Britain would tolerate exile intrigues had to be quashed, 
albeit without compulsion and within the confines of the law. Rather than leave 
Lulworth, Charles again applied for asylum in Austria, and although it was rumoured 
that he would ‘quit the seaside’ for the Catholic Lord Arundell’s ‘magnificent 
mansion’, Charles decided to remain.31  
 
The ex-King had ignored British suggestions, and more dangerously for British 
diplomacy, he also broke his promise to abstain from politics. Because Louis Philippe 
had received the new title “King of the French”, the French throne was left legally 
vacant, and on 24 August, Bordeaux was quietly proclaimed “King” of France.32 
Rather than accept exile, Charles had begun to plot his grandson’s restoration within a 
week of his arrival, and he soon sought to influence British policy. On 6 October, 
Charles asked Wellington to save his arrested former Ministers from execution, and 
although he had no desire to compromise the government, he thought that the Duke 
would respond.33 The government did not adopt Charles’ suggestion.  
 
Instead, they were forced to guarantee the Charles’ freedom. When walking in the 
grounds of Lulworth Castle, Charles found himself surrounded by creditors, to whom 
he had owed money since the emigration. The ex-King’s rank was deemed to 
necessitate radical measures. Wellington believed that ‘the proceedings’ would ‘be 
commenced’ before Charles received an answer from Austria, and thus sought to 
prevent his arrest.34 The Duke suggested that a sympathetic diplomat such as 
Neapolitan Minister Count Ludolf could announce that Charles was attached to a 
diplomatic mission, and thus ensure his immunity.35  
 
However, Peel did not see how the government could ‘interfere’, and thought it 
‘unworthy’ of Charles to ‘evade the law’ by doing this. The Home Secretary instead 
sent a Metropolitan Police Constable to protect Charles from this ‘malicious and 
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wanton annoyance’, and calm fears that Bordeaux could be kidnapped. The assistance 
which the government could provide was extremely limited; the policeman was 
cautioned against interfering with the course of the law, and Charles was told to seek 
legal advice.36 Although unsympathetic towards exile ambitions, senior ministers 
thought that arrest was beneath the dignity of an ex-monarch, and did what little they 
could to preserve his liberty. 
 
The exiles proposed a solution. They asked the British court for ‘the same refuge 
which had been granted’ during the emigration: apartments at Holyrood, a royal 
palace, inside which nobody could be arrested .The request, which satisfied the 
government’s concerns, was quickly granted. It both maintained the exiles’ dignity 
and, owing to the distance from France, restricted their scope for intrigue, which had 
become a serious concern.37 As early as 17 September, Stuart had reported that the 
exiles had begun to communicate with ‘their friends in France’.38 The further the 
exiles were from France, the more difficult it would be for intriguers to meet them.  
 
The Bourbons’ arrival in Edinburgh elicited a muted response. They arrived before 
they were expected, and the few well-wishers who welcomed them did so 
respectfully. Yet the press was hostile, and it took the intervention of the Tory 
novelist Sir Walter Scot for them to be widely welcomed. A letter which Scott sent to 
the Edinburgh Weekly Journal transformed the exiles’ reception from one that was 
‘rough and insulting’, worsened by the Whig Edinburgh Review, to one of sympathy, 
out of respect for Scott.39 Scott acknowledged that Charles’s experiences had ‘taught 
him anything but wisdom’, but added that he had resided in Edinburgh during the 
emigration, sent substantial relief for the victims of a devastating fire in 1824, and had 
done ‘nothing to forfeit’ their goodwill. Furthermore, the exiles would bring 
‘excellent custom’ to local tradespeople.40  
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The exiles largely endeared themselves to Edinburgh society. The Duc and Duchesse 
d’Angoulême were praised for their charity, and some courtiers later ‘praised the 
hospitality of the Scotch’, who gave them ‘the most marked attention and respect.’ 
The expenses of their ‘very large establishment’ indeed ‘conciliated’ the 
‘tradespeople’, and during outbreaks of cholera, Charles allowed the poor to visit his 
two doctors for free.41  However, Berri attracted great opprobrium.42 Whilst the exiles 
were largely well-received, Scottish hospitality had its limits. 
 
Despite their relocation, the exiles’ became a source of contention in Anglo-French 
relations.  The French Consul in Edinburgh was ordered to observe them closely, and 
Talleyrand believed that Berri attracted too much attention when she visited London 
in November.43 The French government also began to spy on the exiles and their 
French adherents.44 The twin problems that the ex-court retained supporters in France 
and attracted curiosity in Britain bred suspicion about both the stability of the Orléans 
regime and British intentions regarding the exiles. Even the most benign contacts 
threatened controversy. After Queen Adelaide accepted a donation for a charity 
bazaar from them, she apologised to Talleyrand’s niece, and a reception held in 
Berri’s honour by Ludolf in October 1830 gave especially ‘great umbrage’ because 
Wellington was invited.45  
 
Stuart was also suspicious about exile ambitions. On 1 November, he sent Aberdeen a 
report which warned that Brittany was a ‘barrel of gunpowder’, and that Berri had 
rejected overtures to lead a rebellion there.46 Yet in spite of these concerns, Britain 
was more worried about the exiles’ protection, and a few sentries were provided to 
guard Holyrood. As Mary Cosh notes, the government thought Charles was too old to 
be actively plotting.47 Once the exiles had reached Edinburgh, the British government 
had ceased to consider them a threat to the French regime.  
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Their successors would make the same mistake. Wellington resigned on 16 November 
after a combination of Ultras, Whigs, Radicals and liberal Tories rejected the civil list, 
and the leading Whig Lord Grey was asked to form a government. The exiles feared 
that the new government, composed of supporters of parliamentary reform, would 
restrict their freedom, but Grey and Palmerston agreed to communicate with the exiles 
through the same intermediary as Wellington.48 British policy towards the exiles 
continued to be based upon the principle of providing asylum to all who sought it. 
 
The degree of support which the exiles received from British politicians also remained 
static. The day before Wellington’s fall, ‘all of the great people’, attended another 
reception held for Berri.49 But despite this social interest, exile appeals were ignored. 
On 20 December, Charles wrote to Wellington that he wanted to ‘enlighten’ Europe 
about the ordinances, Bordeaux’s claim to the French throne, and his status as 
Bordeaux’s regent. He thus asked Wellington to make this known to King William 
and the government.50 Wellington does not appear to have replied, but in January 
1831, Charles sent both him and Grey a pamphlet about the July revolution.51 Grey 
ignored it, and sent it to the King, whose secretary thought that the Queen would have 
been interested.52 The pamphlet was otherwise overlooked. Although French 
Legitimists ‘abounded’ in Britain, they kept to themselves and regularly quarrelled; 
Berri consequently quit Holyrood in 1831, and the French government recognised that 
the exiles had little influence.53 The vast gulf between Bourbon absolutism and British 
constitutionalism rendered the exiles’ views ridiculous in the eyes of British 
politicians. 
 
This pattern was repeated in Scotland. Admiral Sir Philip Durham shot with Charles, 
but this was a courtesy for Durham’s kindness during the emigration, and in 1831, 
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Durham told the ‘noble’ Louis Philippe that he was the ‘fittest man to rule France’.54 
Although a Tory and an old friend, Durham did not receive Charles on political 
grounds, and the Whig Lord Rosebery also shot with the exiles.55 Other Scottish 
aristocrats similarly received the exiles for reasons independent of politics. Bordeaux 
spent time with the Earl of Morton’s children, and the Duke and Duchess of Hamilton 
befriended the exiles despite their ‘distasteful politics’, as did the Duke of Buccleuch. 
The exiles even discouraged the few displays of support they found. Although 
progresses through the Highlands were arranged for Bordeaux, and he was received 
by minor Lairds who were privately Jacobites (traditional allies of the French 
Bourbons), the exiled court discouraged sympathetic demonstrations.56 Neither the 
exiles nor their hosts wished to attract attention.  
 
The exiles took little interest in British politics, although some courtiers visited local 
Tories including Scott.57 Involvement in politics was anathema to many of the exiles, 
but curiously, the Duc d’Angoulême later noted that his family would ‘never forget 
the sentiments.... testified to us’ by Lord Dalhousie and his ‘excellent compatriots.’ 
Sir John Hope, Lords and Ladies Melville, Morton, Wemyss and Rosebery, and the 
Duke and Duchess of Buccleuch were ‘particularly’ singled out.58 Whether these 
sentiments were political or merely friendly is unclear. For the most part, these figures 
were Tories, and Dalhousie was ‘a somewhat old-fashioned’ one, his politics ‘largely 
fixed’ by the excesses of the French revolution.59 However, the Whig Sinclair also 
had private ‘interviews’ with Charles, and although the exiled court’s governess 
claimed that the July Revolution was an Orleanist conspiracy, her comment appears to 
have been treated as a curiosity.60 Edinburgh’s social elite was simply intrigued by the 
fallen court.  
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Meanwhile, the French government became increasingly concerned by exile 
ambitions to interfere in French politics. On 16 March, Lord Granville, the new 
British Ambassador to France, was warned that the French Foreign Minister, Count 
Sébastiani, remained opposed to the exiles’ continued presence.61 Because the exiles 
had encouraged Legitimist protests, Sébastiani read Granville a letter he had written 
for Talleyrand, which instructed him to ask the British ‘to remove’ Charles. Louis 
Philippe had filed the letter away, ostensibly because ‘persecuting’ his cousin was 
‘most repugnant to his feelings’. The King suspected that Sébastiani had sent 
Talleyrand a copy anyway, and asked that Charles might be ‘induced’ to leave for 
Austria without apparent ‘compulsion’.62 Although they disagreed as to how, both the 
King and his Foreign Minister wanted the exiles to leave Britain. But when 
Talleyrand urged the Home Office to keep watch over them, he was told that Britain 
was a hospitable nation which only registered foreigners’ arrivals.63 Even in the wake 
of serious French concerns, British hospitality was not watered down. 
 
However, the British ambassador to Russia, Lord Heytesbury, was worried about 
potential exile intrigues. On 23 February, Heytesbury reported that a member of the 
exiled court, Baron Damas, had arrived in St. Petersburg to announce that Charles 
would continue to abstain from politics and that the Duc d’Angoulême had renounced 
his abdication from the French succession. Heytesbury concluded that the exiles 
deceived themselves in believing that they had Russian support.64 He soon changed 
his mind. On the 28th, the Ambassador sent Palmerston copies of the document Damas 
had presented, which was ‘something more than an act of abdication’, rather ‘a protest 
against the usurpation of Louis Philippe and a proclamation of the rights of… 
Bordeaux.’65  
 
Another secret dispatch included further revelations. Damas had presented a letter 
from Berri, exhorting Nicolas to remember Bordeaux, ‘despoiled of his inheritance, 
and abandoned by the sovereigns of Europe’, whilst Charles’s letter had 
recommended Bordeaux to Nicholas’s ‘protection’. Heytesbury was sufficiently 
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worried to approach the Russian government, and was assured that Nicholas had told 
Damas that he would ‘lend himself to no intrigue’ unless Louis Philippe broke any 
treaty. This was the limit of Russian assistance; Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode 
refused to fund an uprising and implored Damas’ ‘speedy’ departure.66  The prospect 
of Russian support for exile plots threatened to complicate relations with France, and 
transformed British nonchalance towards the exiles’ activities into concern.  
 
French complaints continued into May, when Sébastiani began daily to ask Granville, 
apparently on Louis Philippe’s behalf, whether Berri had given birth to an illegitimate 
son.67 Grey was not surprised that the French ‘should be rather jealous; the exiles 
were ‘certainly always endeavouring to intrigue both at Paris and in the provinces’. 
He would have been ‘glad if they could be induced to’ leave, but rejected coercing 
them as excessively harsh.68 Palmerston agreed that it seemed ‘ungracious’ and 
‘almost ungenerous’ to force the elderly Charles out ‘without some better ground...  
than these verbal communications.’ However, he was interested in Berri’s departure 
to Bath, and speculated that her health was a mere ‘pretence’.69 Although concerned 
by exile machinations and sympathetic to French complaints, Grey and Palmerston 
strongly defended the right to asylum. 
 
Palmerston consequently delivered a warning to the exiles. On 24 May, he met an 
exiled courtier, the Duc de Blacas, who was passing through London, and after Blacas 
denied sending arms to France, or that the exiles could even afford to, Palmerston 
warned him that King William had ‘two duties to perform’: hospitality to Charles, and 
‘good faith and friendship’ towards Louis Philippe. In short, abuse of their asylum 
would not be tolerated. However, British policy remained unchanged, and Granville 
was reminded that if the exiles’ communications with supporters did not ‘go beyond a 
certain point, they ought not to excite any serious uneasiness’. The British Consul at 
Hamburg was nevertheless ordered to help French investigations into the apparent 
purchase of arms.70 While exile plots were again downplayed – Palmerston having 
chosen to believe Blacas - some concession was made to French concerns.  
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The exiles were also execrated in Parliament. Perhaps most notably, the Whig MP and 
historian Thomas Macaulay’s famous speech of 2 March 1831 in favour of 
parliamentary reform invoked Charles’s fall and flight.71 He was not alone in doing 
so, and even Tories were critical of the exiles. On 4 August, Aberdeen suggested that 
recognising Doña Maria as Queen of Portugal (whom the British government wished 
to replace her usurping uncle Dom Miguel) would be as nonsensical as recognising 
Bordeaux as King of France.72 However, the Tories continued to be associated with 
the fallen Bourbon regime. So offensive was this notion that when Lord Chancellor 
Brougham accidentally implied that Lord Strangford had ‘any particular affection for 
the Bourbons’, he was met with an angry response.73 It is unsurprising that in 
October, Wellington merely acknowledged a letter from Moritz von Haber, a 
Legitimist financier who had fled Paris in 1830, which concerned the July 
Monarchy’s ‘attack’ on the French peerage.74  
 
Nevertheless, Legitimist exiles began to publish a French-language newspaper in 
London. Entitled Le Précurseur, its first issue declared its independence, but its tone 
was incredibly reactionary. It denounced Parliamentary reform and condemned the 
Orléans regime as a republic in disguise.75 It was also deemed suspicious by the 
Times, the most influential paper in Britain, which the Précurseur’s second issue 
condemned for alleging that it had received £2000 from Holyrood.76 Unsurprisingly, 
the Précurseur attracted little interest, and embroidered the slightest suggestion of 
British sympathy for legitimism.  On 12 March, it printed the ‘Opinion of Lord 
Stanhope in favour of the restoration of Henri V’ (i.e. Bordeaux) – quoting a speech 
the eccentric Ultra had made about legitimism in 1818.77 The Précurseur similarly 
lavishly praised a letter from ‘A French Royalist’ to the Editor of the Times.78 Even if 
it was free from the exiled court’s subsidy, the Précurseur certainly supported them, 
but utterly failed to engage with British politics. 
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Berri’s departure in July created some debate. On the 2nd, Palmerston heard from a 
Courier journalist that she had left for southern France at the request of certain 
military units, ‘furnished with money by Russia’. This news was communicated to 
Grey, whilst reports of ‘important events’ were expected ‘in a few hours’.79 Although 
the latter report proved untrue, Palmerston had certainly been concerned, and Grey 
feared that Berri had departed for more than the European summer.80 Berri seemed 
intent on rebellion, and her departure appeared to pose a serious threat to France.  
However, British diplomats in Italy largely dismissed anxieties about Berri’s 
ambitions, and when fears of Russian support for the exiles resurfaced in March 1832, 
Granville dismissed the idea.81  
 
British diplomats instead worried about exile intrigues elsewhere. On 16 February 
1831, after a series of Legitimist protests in Paris, Granville warned his colleague at 
Madrid, Henry Unwin Addington, of Sébastiani’s fear that Berri and Bordeaux would 
be permitted to enter Spain (which under the rule of the reactionary Ferdinand VII had 
delayed recognition of Louis Philippe), an eventuality which could cause serious 
disagreement.82 Although a Franco-Spanish dispute, Granville hoped that Addington 
could defuse it. Sir Charles Bagot, the British Minister to the Netherlands, was 
similarly worried by the activities of a French financier named Ouvrard, whom he 
feared could do ‘a world of mischief’. By March 1832, Bagot was ‘nearly satisfied’ 
that Ouvrard was an ‘agent’ of Charles X, and cooperating with the Dutch 
government in an attempt to stall negotiations on Belgian independence.83 Although 
the French shared these concerns, it transpired that Charles had rejected an overture 
from Ouvrard.84 Bagot’s fears were nullified by the ex-King’s circumspection. 
   
Meanwhile, Charles’ fall was increasingly invoked as a lesson by British politicians. 
As debates over reform intensified in 1832, radical journals ‘frequently reinforced’ 
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their own belief that reformers would triumph by referring to Charles’s flight to 
Holyrood, and so desperate was Queen Adelaide’s opposition that she ‘suggested it 
might be better for King William to join him there.’85 She was not the only Tory to 
make such a comment; Lord Stormont publicly stated that he would rather see 
William ‘take his chop’ with Charles at Holyrood than a reformed Parliament.86 This 
harsh rhetoric was quietly reciprocated by Palmerston, who authored newspaper 
articles which accused the Tories of collusion with both Charles X’s regime and the 
exiles.87 Charles’ opposition to reform was now considered a display of conservative 
principle as well as derided as political suicide. 
 
Amidst these debates, the refugee banker Haber and one of Charles’ ex-ministers, 
Baron d’Haussez, attempted to engage with British politics by writing a pamphlet 
with the novelist Benjamin Disraeli, entitled England and France: Or, a Cure for the 
Ministerial Gallomania, a critique of the Whig government’s Francophile foreign 
policy. Haber and Haussez ‘plied Disraeli with documents’ including French cabinet 
papers and Dutch diplomatic dispatches. Haber offered further Legitimist assistance, 
but the pamphlet was unsuccessful. As Jane Ridley notes, it was censured by the 
Times for being ‘coloured with absolutism’, and Disraeli (by then a Tory MP) later 
repudiated it.88 Despite the influential paper’s criticism, Haber thought the review a 
‘great step forward’, and asked his publisher to persuade the Tory Standard and 
Morning Post to reprint it.89 Even this virulent criticism was of a heavily-edited 
publication; comments left by the Tory critic John Wilson Croker on a proof of 
Gallomania rejected Legitimist sentiments.90 Haber’s absolutist views were rejected 
out of hand. Even when the exiles found British collaborators and tailored their 
propaganda to appeal to Tory sentiments, it still had little appeal. 
 
Suspicions that Berri would launch an insurrection finally emerged among British 
diplomats in May.91 Berri, whom British law had allowed to leave freely, struck on 
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the 15th. Anglo-French relations appeared threatened, and Grey thought Granville’s 
return to Paris ‘very desirable’, owing to his knowledge of ‘the principal persons’ 
there.92 Without the presence of a popular ambassador, there was a serious threat of 
Anglophobic sentiment influencing the French government’s response. Soon after, 
Palmerston heard that a ship was suspected of ‘being destined for the Thames… to 
receive a cargo of arms to be disembarked on the French coast’, and the French were 
duly informed.93 The apparently serious threat which Berri’s revolt posed to both 
France and Anglo-French relations transformed Britain’s passive attitude towards 
exile activity into an active one. 
 
After Berri’s insurrection collapsed, British diplomats speculated about her next act. 
A.J. Foster, the British Minister to Sardinia, reported Berri’s supposed arrival in Spain 
on 23 May, and on the 26th that she would not be allowed to reside in Sardinia.94  
More seriously, fears of Tory-Legitimist cooperation emerged. On 1 June, the British 
Chargé d’Affaires in Paris speculated that the insurrection had been intended to 
coincide with the appointment of a Tory government in Britain, as had been 
threatened when King William refused to create Whig Peers to ensure the passage of 
the Reform Bill.95 Although the idea may well have appeared ridiculous, this 
coincidence might have invited strong French protests, and Berri’s potential return 
was considered worrying; the British Consul at Nantes even sought ‘instructions… in 
the possible event of the Duchesse de Berri demanding an asylum in his house’.96  
However, Sébastiani confided in Granville that she would probably attempt to 
‘embark for Britain’, and that ‘secret orders’ had been given to allow her escape, 
because Louis Philippe wanted her to avoid punishment.97 Whereas British diplomats 
were worried by what might happen if Berri attempted to return, her failure and Louis 
Philippe’s magnanimity tempered the dispute. 
 
In the autumn, the fallen court left Britain. Rumour credited their departure to the 
spread of cholera to Edinburgh, but as Talleyrand informed Lord Holland, there was 
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no such outbreak.98 Diplomatic pressure was also rumoured to have forced their 
departure. The diarist Thomas Raikes recorded that 
 
‘In consequence of representations … that the exiles were plotting rebellion and 
assisting the Carlist party in France…our Ministers intimated [that]… they must 
give up all correspondence with their old adherents or quit [Britain].’ 99   
 
The British Minister to Tuscany provided another explanation. After the Duke of 
Reichstadt (Napoleon’s son and heir, and also the Austrian Emperor’s grandson) died 
in July, Austria was ‘no longer sorry to have little Bordeaux as a pledge’.100 Neither 
of these stories are borne out in archival sources. As Blacas told Palmerston, Charles 
decided to leave because of the damp climate and the continued ‘annoyance’ of his 
creditors. 101 Although French protests appeared the most likely cause, the exiles 
departed by choice. 
 
They also demanded substantial government assistance. The Duchesse d’Angoulême 
was a poor sailor, and the exiles wished to borrow two government vessels; one for 
her via London and Rotterdam, and another to allow the court to depart from Leith.  
Palmerston feared that this would offend the French by raising the threat of her entry 
into France.102 Grey rejected Palmerston’s reasoning, and saw no reason for French 
objections, because they would probably prefer that the exiles resided in Austria.103 
Although happy to be rid of the exiles, the British feared that mismanaging their 
departure could seriously offend the French. Even during the last days of their exile, 
the fallen court remained a potential block to good Anglo-French relations. 
 
Further concerns about the exiles threatened to upset Louis Philippe. Austria would 
only offer them asylum with the other powers’ consent – and Louis Philippe would 
apparently only allow Charles’s departure after Berri ‘had quitted France’.104 
Although Louis Philippe accepted that the British government could not prevent 
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Charles’ departure, he suggested that they should ‘use their influence’ to delay it, 
whilst stories of Austrian connivance in Berri’s uprising emerged.105 It now appeared 
as though Britain would have to persuade them to remain to appease France, an 
incredibly unlikely prospect. Additionally, in late August, the Austrian Chargé, 
Philipp von Neumann, presented Palmerston with a draft note to be signed by British, 
Prussian, Austrian and Russian representatives, affirming that there was no political 
motivation behind Charles’s departure.106 Although Grey and Palmerston wanted 
Charles to leave (and feared that Metternich wanted to have Bordeaux ‘in his 
possession’), they opposed showing ‘any active interest’.107 They could not make 
Charles remain, and accession could have implied ‘a joint interest’ in assisting the 
exiles.108 The British government had no interest in being dragged into a dispute 
concerning the troublesome exiles.  
 
However, its attempts to ease their departure failed. On 6 September, Palmerston 
promised Blacas that the exiles would receive the required ‘facilities’, and although 
Blacas complained, he admitted that’ it was ‘hardly possible’ for Charles to leave 
without a guarantee of asylum in Austria.109 Palmerston did his utmost to secure two 
suitable vessels, but the impatient Angoulême was prepared to ‘go by the common 
packet’. Although Neumann had ‘suspended the delivery of passports’, she acquired 
passports from the Dutch and Hanoverian Ministers, and left just before she could be 
told that the steamship Lightning was ready. 110 It was instead sent to Leith, but the 
other exiles had already departed, cheered by local notables including Lord 
Cathcart.111  Whereas exile impatience had nullified government efforts to be rid of 
them, the people of Edinburgh were sad to see their benefactors depart. 
  
The exiled Bourbons and their supporters had proven to be a nuisance to successive 
governments, simultaneously condemned and graciously received, even at the risk of 
                                                 
105  Granville to Palmerston, 31 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/335 
106  draft memorandum, Ibid., PP/GC/NE/10/encl.1 
107  Grey to Palmerston, 26 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/2139/1-2; Palmerston to Grey, 16 
September 1832, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/288/1 
108  Palmerston to Grey, 29 August 1832, Ibid., GRE/B45/1/281; Grey to Palmerston, 31 August 1832, 
BP, PP/GC/GR/2142/1 
109  Palmerston to Grey, 6 September 1832, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/284/3-4 
110  Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 13 September 1832, FO 27/460; Palmerston to Grey, 14 September, 
Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/287/5; Palmerston to Admiralty (draft), 14 September 1832, FO 27/460; 
Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 14 September 1832, Ibid. 
111  Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 17 September 1832, Ibid.; Morning Post, 26 September 1832 
 46 
a breach with France. Although their status was respected, they very rarely formed 
political connections, and whilst their plight found considerable sympathy – enough 
for the British government to loan them a property - their ideals found little interest. 
However, they had found a germ of support, and saw their fate regularly invoked as a 
lesson by British politicians. More importantly, their presence created a great deal of 
concern among British diplomats and politicians, to the extent that British officials 
feared far more French complaints about the exiles than were actually received. Yet 
no change was made to Britain’s liberal asylum policy. Whilst the exiled court did not 
exercise any influence over British politicians, and its presence did not force a change 
to government policy, the exiles’ liberties had been defended. Their activities had 
certainly influenced the course of both British politics and Anglo-French relations.
 47 
3: Carlist and Miguelite Refugees, 1832-51 
 
After the French Bourbons left Britain, another group of reactionary refugees began to 
affect British politics; associates of the Spanish pretender Don Carlos and Portuguese 
usurper Dom Miguel, who were joined by Carlos himself in 1834. This chapter first 
explores these refugees’ roles in British politics during the 1830s, concentrating upon 
Carlos’ brief exile, refugee attempts to secure the support of British politicians, and 
the impact of their activities upon British diplomacy. It then considers further 
controversies which occurred after Carlos’s son and successor Count Montemolin and 
then Miguel fled to Britain in 1846-47, focusing upon responses to Miguel’s plans to 
exploit civil war in Portugal, and Palmerston’s interest in Montemolin as a potential 
ally against French influence in Spain. Albeit from the fringes of party politics, these 
refugees influenced the course of British diplomacy, debates inside and outside the 
cabinet and even conflicts in the peninsula.  
 
Refugees in Britain and Warfare in the Peninsula 
 
Before considering the role which these refugees played in British politics, it is 
necessary to outline the disputes in which they took a part. After King João VI of 
Portugal died in 1826, the Portuguese succession was disputed between his sons: the 
relatively liberal Pedro, Emperor of Brazil, and his reactionary brother Dom Miguel. 
Pedro engineered a compromise whereby his daughter Maria II became Queen under 
Miguel’s regency, but Miguel usurped the throne, and in April 1831, Pedro left Brazil 
to support Maria’s claim by force of arms. The liberal forces, or ‘Pedroites’ 
subsequently obtained British and French support, and by late 1833 had secured a 
series of beachheads in Portugal.1  
 
In September 1833, Ferdinand VII of Spain died and was succeeded by his infant 
daughter Isabella II under the regency of her constitutionalist mother Maria Christina. 
Reactionaries including Ferdinand’s brother Don Carlos rejected Isabella’s 
succession, ostensibly over the ‘Salic Law’ which had previously prevented females 
from inheriting the throne; and while Britain and France supported the ‘Christino’ 
government, ‘Carlist’ rebellions broke out in support of the pretender, who had been 
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exiled to Portugal. Carlos and several loyal military units supported Miguel, but in 
April 1834 Britain, France and Spain entered into a ‘Quadruple Alliance’ with Pedro, 
which soon triumphed.  Miguel was banished to Rome and Carlos fled to Britain, 
‘adamantly refused’ to surrender and then escaped to Spain. The Carlist rebellion 
escalated into a violent proxy war between absolutism and constitutionalism, and as 
Sir Charles Webster noted, Palmerston made a ‘capital blunder’ in allowing Carlos’ 
escape.2 The pretender’s brief exile, which failed to pacify Spain, was a notorious 
one.  
 
While Carlos’ family and his adviser the Bishop of León accompanied him into exile, 
other absolutist refugees in Britain supported the Carlist and Miguelite causes. The 
refugee banker Haber funded their campaigns; Baron Capelle, a former French 
Minister who had arrived in 1830, recruited troops for Carlos; and another French 
refugee, Louis Auget de Saint-Sylvain, became Carlos’s ‘most active’ diplomat. 
Saint-Sylvain, who had fled France to Madrid in 1831, accompanied Carlos into exile, 
and was “ennobled” as the Baron Los Valles for helping him escape Britain.3 These 
efforts were also supported by a Portuguese refugee and former diplomat named 
Antonio Ribeiro Saraiva.4 United by their support for Carlos and Miguel, the exiles 
were often referred to as Carlist ‘agents’. This definition did not apply to refugees 
alone, because a network of unofficial Carlist ‘diplomats’ had been established by 
1834.5 Nevertheless, refugees were among the most active supporters of peninsular 
absolutism in Britain. 
 
They were supported by few British politicians. Palmerston feared that absolutist 
victories would transform Spain and Portugal into Austrian puppets, and he actively 
supported constitutionalism in the Peninsula.6 This policy was accepted by liberals, 
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but many Tories, non-interventionists by nature, also favoured Miguel’s rule in 
support of “order”. In July 1833, the exiled legitimist officer Marshal Bourmont, who 
had fled France after Berri’s revolt, arrived in Britain en route to lead Miguel’s forces 
and met Wellington and Lord Beresford.7 Meanwhile, although Aberdeen was 
initially tempted to support Carlos, most Tories came to distrust the pretender. 
Wellington’s meeting with Bourmont was the sole display of support which a 
mainstream Tory offered to an absolutist refugee during these years; unlike Carlism, 
Toryism offered order and ‘peaceful progress without the risk of... counter-
revolutionary violence.’8 There was little ideological similarity between the two 
parties, and as Foreign Secretary for a brief period in 1834-35, Wellington followed a 
largely neutral course towards Spain on the grounds that the Carlist war was a dispute 
between Spaniards.9  
  
However, a reactionary current continued to flow in conservative politics. The 1833 
Commons contained around 50 Ultras, ‘reabsorbed’ into the Tory (or as it was 
increasingly known, Conservative) Party, and after Tory electoral gains in 1835 and 
1837, perhaps 100 of 319 opposition MPs were ‘Ultras’.10 This current sometimes 
manifested in supporting the Carlists. With the assistance of Carlist refugees, Lords 
Carnarvon and Londonderry, and the MPs Samuel Grove Price, Donald MacLean and 
Peter Borthwick campaigned in the Carlists’ favour. The Morning Post and Morning 
Herald also supported Carlos, and some Tory officers such as Lord Ranelagh even 
fought for him.11 The sympathies of a minority allowed liberals to conflate Toryism 
with Carlism, a viewpoint which was shared by the Spanish Minister to Britain, Count 
Miraflores. At the time of Carlos’s arrival, Miraflores feared that Carlist exiles would 
abuse British hospitality, abetted by Tory sympathisers.12 Carlist and Miguelite 
refugees indeed exploited British liberties, but found little Tory assistance. 
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As the war in Portugal turned against Miguel, Haber was thrust into involvement in 
the conflict. By late 1832, Miguel was desperate for funds, and consequently turned to 
Haber. Haber was an unreliable financier, and even Tories rarely invested in his 
schemes, citing precepts of non-intervention. But despite this difficulty, Haber 
secured the support of a London Merchant Bank, Gower and Nephew.13 This was no 
political or financial coup; in contrast to the limited funding Haber secured, both the 
British government and British financiers generously supported the Pedroites. 
Nevertheless, Haber’s promise of a 10 million franc loan funded the expansion of 
Miguel’s forces.14 It proved to be too little too late, and Haber’s fortunes subsequently 
declined with those of Carlos and Miguel. By October 1833, he was reportedly at his 
‘wits’ end’, failing to raise money in London.15 British financiers and politicians alike 
refused to support the absolutist princes, and Haber began a more successful venture. 
From March 1834, he ‘entrusted’ Saint-Sylvain and an Englishman named William 
Bollaert to carry dispatches and money between the pretenders and the absolutist 
courts. On one occasion, Bollaert carried £4000 for the Carlists’ immediate use.16  
 
This too was a lost cause, for on 26 May, Miguel surrendered. Under the terms of 
what became known as the Convention of Évora Monte, Carlos and Miguel were 
banished from the peninsula, and Miguel soon left for Italy.17 Meanwhile, the new 
Portuguese government disclaimed responsibility for paying back Haber’s loan.18 
Constitutionalist victory threatened to ruin Haber, make his operations obsolete, and 
dissuade investors from supporting any future loans he might arrange. But as George 
Villiers (who had replaced Addington at Madrid) warned Palmerston, the treaty had 
not deterred the Carlists.19 Carlos’ flight did not herald the end of the absolutist threat 
in the peninsula. 
 
According to correspondence put before Parliament in 1838, Carlos had suddenly 
asked unprepared British representatives in Portugal for passage to Britain. Yet ‘much 
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was always omitted’ from ‘blue books’, often to absolve government error, and this 
was no exception.20 The edited dispatches imply that on 27 May 1834, the British 
Minister to Portugal, Lord Howard de Walden, reported that if Carlos wished to ‘be 
conveyed to England’ or elsewhere in northern Europe, he and his suite would be 
received aboard HMS Donegal. This was agreed to by representatives of the 
Quadruple Allies, and was such a sudden development that Howard feared that the 
refugees might arrive before his dispatches.21 Carlos’ departure was thus a work of 
improvisation, organised without time to consult the allied governments. However, 
Britain had long contemplated sending Carlos into exile. The Spanish government had 
sought to persuade Carlos to settle in Italy as early as June 1833, and although he 
refused transport there, Britain adopted a modified version of this policy. In 
September 1833, Rear-Admiral Parker, commanding a British flotilla off Portugal, 
acknowledged plans to ‘place a warship’ at Carlos’ disposal, ‘should he express a 
wish to proceed to England’.22 The British government had considered the eventuality 
of Carlos seeking asylum for some months, and was willing to facilitate it. 
 
Despite Carlos’ previous refusal to leave, military defeat seemed to guarantee his 
departure, and 12 days before Miguel’s surrender, Howard and Parker decided to offer 
Carlos passage to Italy. Howard believed that Carlos’ life ‘now depends upon his 
speedy departure’, for the Spanish commander in Portugal, General Rodil, wanted 
him shot; if presented with the choice of exile or death, Carlos would almost certainly 
choose the former. Yet Howard had to admit that the Quadruple Treaty left Carlos ‘at 
liberty to proceed whither he may choose’.23 This was a fatal mistake on the part of its 
signatories. Indeed, Palmerston later admitted that Britain and its allies ‘had forgotten 
to take precautions’ against this eventuality.24 Rather than guarantee Carlos’ 
banishment, the Treaty allowed him to choose his destination – including countries 
which would allow him to either intrigue or leave for Spain, namely liberal Britain 
and sympathetic Holland.  
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On 17 May 1834, Saint-Sylvain, Parker and Howard agreed terms for Carlos’ ‘escape’ 
and ‘safe passage’ to Portsmouth. Carlos had no desire to go to Italy, and instead 
wished to reach the Netherlands. As Howard had initially feared, Carlos would find 
asylum without punishment. But although Howard was disgusted by this settlement, 
he was confident that Carlos’ plans were ‘not very defined’, because ‘the idea or 
rather necessity of escape’ had come to the pretender ‘so suddenly’.25 Despite Carlos’ 
defiance, Howard hoped that the pretender might yet accept defeat and exile. It is 
therefore unsurprising that Palmerston prevented the publication of passages which 
described Carlos and his supporters’ desperation, and referred to Howard and Parker’s 
decision to ‘receive’ them ‘in accordance with the general instructions... to protect 
persons whose lives might be in danger.’ 26 Although Howard underestimated Carlos’ 
resolve, had he not been hamstrung by the Quadruple Treaty and able to present 
Carlos with the choice of exile in Italy or death, then the pretender’s disastrous 
sojourn in Britain might have been avoided. Meanwhile, Palmerston gloried in the 
Treaty’s success. In an article for the Globe, he boasted that Alliance’s formation 
alone had precipitated Miguel’s surrender and Carlos’ departure. Despite the Treaty’s 
shortcomings, the Foreign Secretary was optimistic that Carlos was resigned to exile 
in England.27  
 
Even without the hindsight that Carlos would escape, the British government did not 
allow Carlos to land as a refugee. After the Donegal reached Portsmouth, Miraflores 
and the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Sir John Backhouse, 
attempted to persuade Carlos to accept the ‘same engagements as Miguel’ and a 
‘handsome’ pension of £30,000. This plan had royal support; King William refused 
contact with Carlos unless he accepted Miraflores’ terms.28 Bribery and royal pressure 
appeared useful means of persuading Carlos into exile, but the pretender refused to 
negotiate.  
 
Palmerston’s hope to persuade Carlos to accept defeat had failed. Carlos’ rebuff 
prompted Miraflores to request the pretender’s arrest, but Palmerston refused, because 
Carlos had not broken any British law. Instead, Carlos was granted asylum, ostensibly 
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to make it easier to ‘keep an eye’ on him, and Palmerston promised Miraflores that he 
would prevent Carlos’ escape.29 Yet Britain could not restrict Carlos’ movements. He 
was free to leave and completely undermine Palmerston’s promise. Although 
controlling Carlos was a vital element of British policy, it was completely impossible 
without the pretender’s acquiescence. 
 
Palmerston was confident that Carlos was a weak man who would not call his bluff, 
and reassured Villiers that the pretender’s character was ‘a security against much 
danger from him.’ Palmerston believed that Carlos would remain ‘for some time’, and 
had refused a pension because of the influence of his sister-in-law Princess Beira, and 
his advisor the Bishop of León. This was wishful thinking. Carlos’ refusal to negotiate 
attested that he retained his ambitions, and Grey thought Backhouse’s failure ‘a 
matter of regret rather than surprise.’ The Prime Minister doubted whether Carlos 
should be allowed to remain at Portsmouth, and wanted him to be told that ‘no 
attempts to disturb the peace of Spain’ would be tolerated. Unlike Palmerston, he 
recognised that this was a matter for ‘very careful consideration’.30 Grey was right to 
be concerned, for other exiles had made financial agreements with Carlos. Haber, 
‘accredited and recommended’ by A.L. Gower, agreed a £5,000,000 loan on 14 June, 
and Saraiva provided a million francs, apparently from Charles X.31 Rather than force 
him to accept exile, Carlos’s sojourn at Portsmouth had allowed him to prepare to 
return to Spain.  
 
The treatment meted out to Carlos occasioned a British supporter to protest in the 
House of Lords. On 20 June, Londonderry asked Grey (soon to step aside in favour of 
Melbourne) ‘in what manner… Ministers intend to receive the illustrious Prince’ and 
how long Carlos would be ‘detained’, and protested that asking him to ‘renounce the 
rights he possessed’ was ‘beyond anything that had ever been heard of in history’. 
Carlos had ‘the same right to protection and good treatment’ as Queen Maria (who 
had visited in 1831) and Charles X, and Londonderry castigated the government’s 
attempts to ‘seduce men in their misfortunes from the path which their duty... required 
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them to follow.’ Grey could only answer that Backhouse had been sent to treat with 
Carlos, who would thereafter be received as a Prince. Despite this concession, 
Londonderry subsequently asked whether Carlos had been subjected to the ignominy 
of using ‘hackney coaches’, and again whether Backhouse and Miraflores had 
attempted to force Carlos to abandon his ‘just rights’. Grey replied that papers 
explaining the government’s actions would be published ‘when the proper time 
arrived’.32 Whereas Whigs condemned Carlos, the reactionary Londonderry supported 
his right to asylum and entitlement to the privileges usually reserved for fallen 
royalty. 
 
Carlos’ fellow-exile General Moreno was also subjected to argument and controversy. 
When Governor of Malaga in 1831, Moreno had ordered the execution of a Briton 
named Boyd, who had joined a group of liberal rebels. In the Commons, Whig MP 
William Hutt condemned the ‘bloodthirsty… cruel tyrant’, who had used corpses as 
‘steps... to ascend to power and favour.’ The difference between Londonderry and 
Hutt’s attitudes towards Carlist refugees could hardly have been starker, and such was 
the controversy surrounding Moreno that his right to asylum was questioned; in a 
series of articles attacking Palmerston, the Times argued in favour of Moreno’s arrest. 
Yet there were no grounds to arrest him, and Palmerston forcefully replied in the 
Globe that whilst Moreno was a brute, Boyd had brought misfortune upon himself.33 
The Times’ criticism was easily dismissed, but its campaign found attention. Moreno 
consequently wrote a letter to the Courier which asserted that he had acted upon 
orders.34 Although the government supported Moreno’s right to asylum, the refugee 
General was thoroughly execrated. 
 
However, Londonderry was not alone in his support for Carlist refugees. Carlos 
rented Gloucester Lodge in Brompton, where he received French and Portuguese 
supporters and ‘a few Tories’ including Londonderry and Cumberland (now an 
increasingly peripheral figure).35 Whilst Carlos was ‘surprised and delighted at the 
idea of a foreigner and a perfect stranger’ defending him when he met the Carlist 
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pamphleteer William Walton, many visitors were ‘greatly annoyed at Carlos’s 
ignorance of his rightful position and interests’.36  
 
Even supporters were unimpressed, and Wellington baulked at assisting him. When a 
Thomas Morgan suggested founding a state under Carlos in the Canaries to improve 
British commerce and Tory prospects, Wellington replied that he could not endorse 
‘any counsel given to Don Carlos to attack’ a British ally.37 Wellington favoured 
neither the Carlists nor foreign adventures, and he visited Carlos to persuade him to 
accept exile. The Duke deplored Carlos’ warlike intentions, and explained that escape 
was impossible, that a Tory Ministry would not recognise him as King, and that he 
did not have ‘a large party’ of British supporters. Wellington thought that proffering 
his customary bluntness was ‘the best service [he] could do’ to prevent Spain from 
descending into chaos, and even warned that details of their conversation would reach 
‘Downing Street in two hours’.38 Yet the Morning Chronicle accused him of 
supporting Carlos.39 Despite being intended otherwise, Wellington’s visit was 
interpreted as a display of favour.  
 
A week after he reached London, Carlos escaped with Saint-Sylvain, who had 
procured Mexican passports under false names.40 As Donald Southgate notes, ‘there 
was no means of keeping’ Carlos in Britain, ‘and he slipped away’.41 Carlos’ escape 
made Palmerston’s promise to Miraflores look ridiculous, and on 10 July, the Spanish 
Minister warned Palmerston that Carlos had fled ‘incognito’ to return to Spain. He 
added two days later that Moreno had left for France.42 This was followed by a further 
blunder. Both were headed for France, but this news was not effectively 
communicated to the French. 
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Although Wellington had told Carlos that ‘the first tidings of his departure would be 
communicated to France’, Talleyrand was not told anything until Grey mentioned it to 
him four days later. According to Lord Ellesmere, ‘Talleyrand was furious, for though 
Lord Palmerston wrote to the French Government, had he told Talleyrand, the news 
would have reached Paris earlier.’43 The blame for Carlos’ escape could not be laid at 
Britain’s door alone; ‘somehow or another’, St-Sylvain had obtained French visas.44 
Nevertheless, British liberties had allowed their departure, and Palmerston had 
prevented France from quickly arresting the pretender. Painfully aware of the 
government’s failure to prevent Carlos’ escape, Palmerston waited ‘impatiently’ for 
news, worried that the Catholic Weld family had helped Carlos escape – a potential 
cause for further Spanish complaint - and remained uncertain of his whereabouts until 
at least 27 July.45 But as early as the 7th, Carlos had assumed control of a growing 
army.46 Palmerston’s complacency had helped Carlos to escape.  
 
Moreover, en route, Carlos, who had ‘high hopes of receiving’ Haber’s promised 
funds, authorised a ‘royalist banker’ to ‘undertake negotiation of Haber’s loan in 
France’.47 Rather than weaken his cause, Carlos’ brief exile had allowed him to 
strengthen his hand financially, and after two Radical MPs, G.F. Young and George 
de Lacy Evans, fruitlessly asked Palmerston whether Carlos ‘was in Spain or not’, a 
Carlist gloated to Young that Carlos was ‘no longer enjoying English hospitality’, and 
that a Christino General and 3000 troops had defected.48 Whereas Palmerston thought 
that Carlos would be rendered harmless in exile, British liberties had allowed Carlos 
to reinvigorate the Carlist cause. The British Ambassador to France even warned that 
French Legitimists were ‘absurdly elated’ by Carlos’ arrival in Spain, and might 
‘excite disturbances’ if Carlos had ‘any success whatever.’49 Fortunately for the 
British government, no rebellion broke out in France. However, Carlos’ escape bound 
Britain to send arms and warships to Spain, for the Quadruple Allies were pledged to 
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defeat him.50 The pretender’s brief exile had proven completely counterproductive, 
and forced Britain into an expensive commitment. 
 
Carlos’ escape unsurprisingly attracted virulent Spanish criticism. On 16 August, 
Miraflores protested that Howard’s ‘amiable but fatal’ offer of ‘a philanthropic and 
humane asylum’ had been ‘eluded in an unworthy and disingenuous manner’, and that 
more blood would be spilled than ‘was intended to be spared’. Although British 
hospitality was deemed counterproductive, the Spanish government was confident of 
victory, and only sought British moral support.51 However, Carlist victories ‘rapidly’ 
undermined the Christinos, and obliged Britain to send further materiel to Spain. 
Carlos’ sojourn in Britain had led to the severe weakening of a British ally, and in 
August 1835, Palmerston ordered British ships to refuse Carlos protection.52 In 
recognition of the chaos he had created, Carlos’ unwillingness to accept exile was 
rewarded with the loss of a right routinely granted to fleeing royalty. 
 
Some sympathy was shown when Carlos’ Portuguese wife Maria Francisca died near 
Portsmouth in September. Stuart de Rothesay, the former Minister to Portugal, shared 
the front carriage of her funeral procession with Capelle and the Bishop of León, and 
King William sent his condolences.53 Two journals dismissed this display because she 
had been ‘neglected... whilst living’; it was an act of courtesy rather than heartfelt 
grief. 54 Nevertheless, Palmerston was disgusted by an attempt to make political 
capital out of her passing. When the Tory paper John Bull blamed the government for 
Maria Francisca’s demise, the Foreign Secretary responded savagely in the Globe. 
The public, he contended, had not forgotten that Britain had saved Carlos and his suite 
from becoming ‘marked prisoners’. Whereas he would later deny it to avoid censure, 
Palmerston now (anonymously) admitted complicity in their escape. This had 
‘perhaps’ been overgenerous, but Carlos had not admitted defeat in return for his life, 
as a ‘man of honour’ should. Palmerston added that the stress caused by Carlos’ 
escape would have hastened Maria Francisca’s death.55 Rather than ignore this 
scurrilous article, Palmerston turned its argument on its head. 
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Carlos’ family otherwise lived relatively quietly.56 As Miraflores informed 
Palmerston, Maria Francisca had avoided other Carlist refugees ‘as much as possible’, 
because they wanted money.57 The refugees who sought her assistance did, however, 
inspire two British officers to join Carlos’s ranks.58 Beira, who ‘held her court 
periodically in Duchess Street’, found minimal support, and among the exiles’ few 
British defenders were the Henningsen family, devout Catholics whose home became 
a rendezvous for ‘Legitimist émigrés’. Amelia Henningsen thought the Carlist 
refugees ‘fine fellows and good Catholics’, and one, the ‘clever, kind-hearted’ 
Chevalier Ossense, a former Inquisition judge, ‘took down all our prejudices against 
that much vilified institution’.59 Yet these views were untypical of Britons. Although 
Bollaert advised Beira, he provided information concerning British politics which was 
‘more truthful than pleasing’, and few invested in Haber’s loan.60 
 
Exile fortunes did not improve under a Tory government, underlining the lack of 
support which they could rely upon.  In November, after several cabinet ministers 
resigned, King William appointed a minority Tory government, initially led by 
Wellington before Peel could return from Italy. Wellington then served as Foreign 
Secretary. He pursued a largely non-interventionist course, and accepted the ‘liberal 
regimes in Spain and Portugal’.61 The exiles were ‘anxious to know how far they 
could depend upon the Tory government’, but correctly suspected that it would 
neither assist nor persecute them. Soon after Wellington assumed office, he ignored 
requests from the Bishop of León that he prevent the departure of British Christino 
recruits.62 This pattern continued throughout the Tories’ ‘Hundred Days’. 
 
Although Tories were more sympathetic to the Carlists than the Whigs, Wellington 
officially favoured neither side. By April 1835, he had ‘reprimanded’ Londonderry 
and Strangford for involvement in Beira’s affairs, and told a Miguelite agent that a 
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projected expedition would be sunk.63 Wellington had ruined the exiles’ hopes, and in 
February 1835, he rejected a suggestion that he should employ Haber as an 
intermediary with Carlos.64 Haber’s disreputable reputation had probably preceded 
him. However, a week later, Haber sought Wellington’s assistance in saving the lives 
of 27 Carlist officers who had been arrested aboard a British ship.65 Intrigued, and 
concerned by the fact that both sides had committed atrocities, Wellington asked 
whose authority Haber wrote upon.66 Wellington repeatedly insisted that Haber 
demonstrate his credentials, and Beira’s verbal authorisation was deemed 
insufficient.67 Although willing to regulate the conflict in Spain, Wellington was wary 
about collaborating with Carlist refugees. 
 
Soon after, Beira made another approach via Londonderry, written by the pamphleteer 
Walton. Wellington unsurprisingly rejected it. Humanity, he contended, was not 
unilateral, and he could not sanction the release of prisoners unless both Christinos 
and Carlists did so.68 Wellington rejected a further appeal, even though Beira 
dissociated herself from it, because it would ‘compromise the dignity of the King’.69 
Whether the exiles found the support of Ultra-Tories or otherwise, Wellington was 
incredibly cautious, and angered by their persistence. Although Wellington sent 
Villiers a dispatch concerning the 27 officers, Villiers and the Spanish Prime Minister 
had already discussed their fate. The officers’ lives were spared, but they were not 
allowed to rejoin the war.70 Whilst the officers were saved, it was without 
collaboration with the exiles, and not to the Carlists’ advantage.  
 
In spite of exile intrigues, the royal status of Carlos’s family was respected. 
Wellington facilitated communication between Beira and King William, and after the 
Whigs resumed office in April, Palmerston organised the departure of Carlos’s 
family. In a letter to William, Carlos thanked him and the British people for their 
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hospitality, and explained that his family had to leave for their health, whilst he had 
departed to pursue his ‘legitimate rights’ and share the perils of warfare with his 
‘subjects’.71 The appeal was accepted, probably because it ensured their departure. 
They were loaned a government vessel, and £20 was spent on their ‘conveyance and 
entertainment’.72 Carlos’s family had not proven popular; although an ‘English 
capitalist’ (probably Gower) instantly paid £1500 contracted in Beira’s name when 
she was arrested for debt, she retained few British supporters.73 On her and Carlos’ 
birthdays, ‘Carlist Spaniards’, especially ‘emigrants’ whom she supported, rather than 
Britons, had paid their respects to her.74 Attended by mostly Spanish sycophants, they 
attracted little praise. As the Age commented, Beira’s ‘sojourn here, owing the 
company she kept’, did the Carlists ‘no service’.75  
 
To Carlos’s anger, neither did Haber’s fundraising. Additional loans were floated in 
Paris and The Hague, and when it was reported that Carlos had refused to receive 
loans in April 1835, the Morning Herald published a letter from Haber asserting 
otherwise.76 Carlos remained reliant upon subsidies from his allies, and British 
indifference forced Haber to make up the shortfall himself; by August 1835, he had 
sent £70,000.77 Although Tory papers willingly published Haber’s protests, he found 
little support. 
 
Tories were nevertheless accused of collaborating with the exiles. In mid-1835, 
Carlos issued the ‘Durango Decree’, which declared that foreign prisoners would be 
shot, and it was widely denounced in Britain. The Chronicle urged the Bishop of León 
to leave, before he was hurt for being among Carlos’s advisers.78 However, de Lacy 
Evans, the commander of the British Legion raised to fight the Carlists alongside the 
Christino army, later recalled that Beira and the Bishop had been ‘in intimate 
communication with the English Carlists’, and that the Decree’s ‘primary objective’ 
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was ‘to check the recruiting of men and officers’ whilst giving Tories ‘a convenient 
weapon of attack’.79 According to this argument, the brutal Durango Decree was both 
an example of Carlist barbarity and a document concocted by the exiles and their Tory 
sympathisers to dissuade British volunteers from joining the Christino forces.  
 
One instance of Tory-Carlist collusion lends some support to this theory. In July 
1835, Londonderry embarrassed Melbourne in the Lords when he asked the Prime 
Minister whether the Durango Decree was ‘compatible’ with the Eliot Convention (a 
localised agreement between the belligerents not to kill prisoners.) After Melbourne 
dismissed the Durango Decree as a fake and added that the convention covered the 
Legion, Londonderry ‘produced a copy of the decree signed by’ Carlos, and 
‘authenticated... by the Bishop of León’. With the Bishop’s support, Londonderry had 
revealed that the Decree existed, and that British recruits to the Christino army were 
in greater danger than the government admitted. John Bull noted that Melbourne was 
‘constrained... to hold his tongue, and look remarkably silly’.80 In light of this 
exchange, Evans’s charge appears more credible, because the decree suited both the 
exiles and the Tory opposition, who were opposed to the Legion’s existence on non-
interventionist grounds. Wellington and Lord Hill, the conservative Commander-in-
Chief, even acted to prevent eligible officers from volunteering.81 However, it should 
be noted that Palmerston initially believed that the Durango Decree was a fake, ‘a 
menace to deter people from enlisting’. 82 Evans could well have embellished the idea 
that the decree was a forgery to exaggerate the links forged between Tories and the 
exiles. 
 
The exiles also propagated their cause in print. Haber claimed to have ‘advised’ 
sympathetic newspapers, and apparently ‘did his best to apologise for Carlos’s 
political shortcomings’.83 Although Carlos’s absolutism undermined Haber’s efforts, 
Palmerston could not ‘conceive how the Chronicle… came to suggest a marriage 
between Carlos’s son and Isabella’ in May, unless Haber had persuaded the editor to 
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print it.84 It was entirely unexpected that a Whig newspaper might promote a plan 
advocated by the Carlists’ allies as well as Tory newspapers, the latter possibly owing 
to Haber’s advice.85  
 
Los Valles’s biography of Carlos, published in August, was praised by Tory 
journals.86 But the book was accorded little value by its publisher, who had paid £180 
for the English copyright of a work by Charles X’s ex-Minister d’Haussez, and paid 
Los Valles a mere £20.87 These rare instances of exile opinion finding publication 
were hardly propaganda coups, and when Palmerston warned Howard that two of his 
staff were believed to have distributed Miguelite pamphlets for Saraiva, both 
strenuously denied the accusation.88 No further action appears to have been taken.  
 
Palmerston created a greater sensation by humiliating the Bishop of León. When the 
Bishop requested British help to free the 27 Carlist officers (who were now held at 
Coruña) in October 1835, Palmerston could ‘not refrain from expressing the greatest 
surprise’. He had not expected to ‘hear the principles of humanity and the precepts of 
religion invoked by the representative and adviser’ of a Prince who thought 
slaughtering prisoners a ‘military duty’. The Bishop, he scathingly continued, would 
have been ‘better entitled to appeal to the humanity and religious feelings of the 
British government’ if he publicly appealed to Carlos to retract the ‘disgraceful’ 
Durango Decree.89 Palmerston would only negotiate after its repeal, and he agreed to 
an ‘indiscreet’ publication of the exchange, implored by Queen Christina and her 
Prime Minister.90 It soon appeared in the British press, and while Palmerston’s riposte 
amused liberals, a Tory paper used it as an opportunity to abuse the British Legion.91 
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Although the Bishop’s overture was easily condemned as hypocritical, Palmerston’s 
response was not universally praised.  
 
The Bishop’s overture was subsequently defended in Parliament. On 5 February 1836, 
Grove Price announced that the Bishop had written in ‘the mild spirit of a clergyman,’ 
and charged that Palmerston had sneered at a petition for mercy. Palmerston admitted 
using harsh language, but added that the appeal had been made after Carlos had 
spurned calls to rescind the Durango Decree. His reply had been proportionate, and he 
had already acted ‘in favour of the prisoners.’ Grove Price, he concluded, had been 
‘wholly misled’.92 Meanwhile, Londonderry derided Palmerston’s letter as ‘most 
useless and uncalled for’, and wanted the exchange published for the Lords to ‘judge 
for themselves as to the success of the application’. Melbourne agreed, because the 
prisoners had been captured legally.93 Londonderry’s attack was easily dismissed, and 
subsequently censured by Peel and Wellington.94 These attempts to extract political 
advantage neither influenced British policy nor found the backing of the Tory 
leadership, although on 12 December 1837, Borthwick, Grove Price and Maclean 
secured the publication of further papers concerning the prisoners.95 Exile arguments 
were easily dismissed, and the prisoners became a cause célèbre for Carlist refugees 
and Carlist Tories alone. 
 
A Series of Desperate Overtures 
 
In the summer of 1836, Los Valles attempted to negotiate with the British 
government. On 16 June, the Standard reported that ‘some sensation’ was ‘excited in 
the City’ when Los Valles visited the Foreign Office, and it was rumoured that he had 
presented terms for an armistice.96 Whilst financiers welcomed the prospect, 
Palmerston suspected that Los Valles wished to arrange a marriage between Isabella 
and Carlos’ eldest son.97 Los Valles was turned away, and again rebuffed on 20 June, 
when he appealed on behalf of the 27 prisoners. Palmerston explained that he could 
not receive letters from him, for reasons which had since ‘acquired additional force’; 
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Carlists had ‘deliberately assassinated’ six Legionary prisoners.98 This unlikely 
scenario (probably deliberately) precluded any discussion.  
 
Undeterred, Los Valles ‘contrived to get admission’ to Backhouse’s home. Los Valles 
argued that ‘cold-blooded massacres’ were as ‘odious’ to Carlos as they were to 
Palmerston, and that if Britain offered to guarantee the Elliot convention to cover all 
Spain and foreign combatants, he would use ‘all the means in his power’ to gain 
Carlos’s signature. Backhouse thought that Palmerston would consider this appeal, 
but Palmerston adamantly refused; he could not communicate ‘upon any subject 
whatever either directly or indirectly’ with Carlos or his agents. Villiers was 
instructed to inform the Spanish government of this exchange, lest they heard ‘any 
erroneous report’.99 The politically damaging idea that the government had negotiated 
with the Carlists could not be tolerated.  
 
As the Standard’s report of Los Valles’s interview indicates, the exiles continued to 
find support from conservative journalists. Saraiva became a ‘regular correspondent 
for the Morning Post’, and by late 1836, Haber had apparently befriended J.G. 
Lockhart of the Quarterly Review, Thomas Barnes of the Times, and other journalists 
from the Courier and Sun.100 But when Haber suggested in a letter to the Morning 
Post that the great powers should impose an armistice in Spain, his call was echoed by 
John Bull rather than any of the papers which he claimed to have links with.101 
Haber’s influence over supposedly sympathetic titles was not guaranteed, and by 
placing ‘great emphasis’ upon Carlist atrocities, liberal publications claimed ‘a 
monopoly of moral virtue’.102 The brutality of the Carlist forces ensured that exiles’ 
limited contacts in the press were of little use. 
 
However, in March 1837, Haber achieved a notable coup. When Palmerston heard 
that Haber (whom he had ‘frequently declined’ to meet) had a scheme to overthrow 
Carlos, who had ‘behaved ill to him’, it piqued his interest. Haber believed that by 
publicising Carlos’s debts, he could prevent him from borrowing money and 
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purchasing supplies; that if Britain guaranteed the pardon and promotion of Carlist 
officers, he could ensure their defection; and that a marriage between Carlos’ son and 
Isabella, accompanied by terminating Maria Christina’s regency, could end hostilities. 
Haber also hoped that Carlos’ debts to him would be repaid by Spain – a ‘trifle’ of 
£300,000.   
 
Palmerston thought Haber’s suggestions unworkable. Because Carlist materiel largely 
came from Russia and Austria, choking Carlos’s access to credit would have achieved 
little. Furthermore, Britain could not guarantee any defections, although Palmerston 
thought that the Christinos would sponsor such an arrangement. This point alone was 
accepted. Palmerston thought that marrying Isabella to her adult cousin was politically 
impossible, and would undermine the concept of legitimacy – especially if he was 
substituted for a younger brother who could be brought up as a liberal, which Haber 
suggested as an alternative.103 Desperate for money, Haber had failed to impress the 
curious Palmerston. 
 
Meanwhile, the exiles continued to find limited Tory support. In early 1837, ‘a few 
Tory underlings’ were alleged to have received ‘speeches ready-made from the 
financial agents of Don Carlos’ (i.e. Haber.)104 But although Saraiva had intrigued 
with Tories whilst a diplomat, this had since ceased; that October, he unfavourably 
compared Aberdeen with the pro-Carlist Lord Carnarvon.105 Reactionaries alone 
remained supportive of the exiles’ efforts. Haber later recalled that a London 
newspaper had praised him for his ‘intercessions’ and for expressing ‘great sorrow 
and regret’ at the Durango Decree, and in April 1837, MacLean told the Commons 
that Haber had persuaded Carlos to spare six British prisoners, which supposedly 
proved that Carlos was not a ‘cruel despot’. Similarly, in May 1838, Los Valles 
ensured the inclusion of two British officers in a prisoner exchange.106 Yet such praise 
stemmed from rare magnanimity rather than continued demonstrations of principle. 
The Carlist Tories’ statements would have hardly troubled Whig publicists. 
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Indeed, when Carnarvon published an account of earlier Iberian travels with an 
appendix describing the ‘Basque Provinces’ in late 1836, he and the exiles lost a 
pamphlet war. Villiers produced a reply, and in response, Carnarvon revised his book 
with exile assistance. Charles Henningsen, who was ‘intimately acquainted’ with the 
Bishop of León, offered to consult him prior to his departure for Spain, and Carnarvon 
received letters from the Bishop which apparently proved that Carlos would not renew 
the Inquisition.107 Carnarvon’s pamphlet consequently referred to these sources and 
other correspondence written by the refugee Bishop, and he was not alone in 
deploying exile professions against Villiers’ work. 108 
 
In a separate reply, Walton asserted that the Bishop had told him that Carlos fought 
for tradition; that he had witnessed him ‘declare’ his opposition to the Inquisition; and 
that contrary to Villiers’s narrative, a French Carlist shot by the Christinos was not a 
combatant – he had left Britain for Spain after the Bishop told him that Carlos 
disliked commissioning foreigners.109 Exile testimony appeared compelling, but in 
another pamphlet, Villiers dismissed it as insufficient evidence of what Carlos ‘might 
do’ in power; the Inquisition had to ‘reign...and well the Bishop knows it’.110 
Moreover, Carnarvon’s ‘friend’ would not have allowed the publication of the New 
Testament in Spanish as the Christino government had.111 Simply reminding Tory 
Carlists of their friends’ alien values was sufficient argument to nullify exile claims, 
even in 1837, when Carlist forces marched to within 15 miles of Madrid.112  
 
These military successes ensured that exile activity concerned the British government. 
On 28 April, a James Henderson warned Palmerston that Capelle was Carlos’s ‘most 
prominent and indefatigable agent’ in London, ‘minutely acquainted’ with his ‘wants 
and circumstances’, and had ‘dispatched’ at least one officer to the ‘ranks of Don 
Carlos’. Carlos was also making ‘great assertions’ to obtain funds, and intended to 
march on Madrid, Seville and Cadiz with 40,000 men, which Capelle believed 
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possible with sufficient funding.113 Capelle (who had openly travelled to Rotterdam in 
August 1836, probably to secure funds) had unintentionally revealed the Carlists’ 
plans.114  
 
When Los Valles visited Holland in December, the British Minister, E.C. Disbrowe, 
promised Palmerston that he would ascertain Los Valles’ ‘object’, and what turned 
out to be a mission to the reactionary King Willem I occasioned further 
intelligence.115 Upon meeting Willem, Los Valles confidently claimed that Carlos 
could have entered Madrid ‘had he chosen to’.  Los Valles also claimed to have met 
Louis Philippe, who was ‘decidedly friendly to Don Carlos’, although the Czar was 
‘the only sovereign really attached to the cause’. More importantly, Willem promised 
to consider a ‘proposal’ from Carlos.116 Like Capelle’s boasts, Los Valles’ mission 
attracted attention and exposed new Carlist ambitions. 
 
After Los Valles returned to London, he left for Vienna to explain Carlos’ failure to 
take Madrid, and ‘obtain more funds from the northern courts’.117 Los Valles’s infamy 
preceded him, and exposed the apparent futility of his exertions. On 15 January 1838, 
the British Minister to Prussia reported that Los Valles had ‘made no impression’.118 
Los Valles had failed, and the same appeared to happen in St Petersburg. The British 
Ambassador, Ralph Milbanke, reported that on the advice of Carlos’s suite, Los 
Valles had not asked to meet Czar Nicolas, and had been told that Russia could 
neither provide more money, nor recognise Carlos unless he triumphed. It was also 
rumoured that Los Valles had been ‘commissioned’ to secure support if the Quadruple 
powers held a conference on Spain. Milbanke supposed that this was ‘not... far from 
the truth’; yet he had been deceived.119  
 
As Philip Mosley notes, Los Valles secretly met Nicholas, and convinced him to offer 
Carlos 3 million francs if Prussia and Austria did the same. Although these figures 
were subsequently reduced and Palmerston was warned that Russia was funding 
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Carlos, this initiative realised vast sums.120 Los Valles had succeeded, and upon his 
return to Britain, he continued to proselytise. On 7 April, the Morning Post published 
a letter from him which condemned parliamentary criticism of the Durango Decree.121 
He remained committed, and as Carlos Marichal argues, it ‘would not be an 
exaggeration’ to say that these funds kept Carlist forces active.122 Their final 
campaigns owed much to his efforts. Villiers, on leave in London, observed that 
although ‘Carlist agents here’ thought these sums inadequate compared to what the 
Christinos received, they remained optimistic.123 The freedom of movement accorded 
to Los Valles had served only to help the Carlists. 
 
Los Valles had hoodwinked Milbanke, but Disbrowe remained suspicious. Although 
he was shown letters which demonstrated ‘a complete failure of a new Carlist loan in 
London, Paris and Belgium’ in May, Disbrowe warned Palmerston that Carlist agents 
intended to state otherwise, to raise the value of either Haber’s original loan or a new 
one.124 Haber’s loan cast a long shadow, but when Palmerston sought to moderate the 
war in 1838, he turned to the absolutist courts.125 Carlos’s allies remained a greater 
concern than Carlist refugees, and in June, Los Valles was reportedly sent to warn 
them that without ‘speedy and efficient assistance’, Carlos would be ‘compelled to 
give up’.126 Even as the conflict came to an end, Carlist refugees continued to foster 
suspicion. However, during 1839-40, the Carlists were defeated, and over 30,000 ex-
combatants fled into France. Carlist refugees now became a French problem on a 
much larger scale.127 
 
Carlist refugees were of little consequence under Peel’s Tory government of 1841-46. 
Capelle, Los Valles and Haber all left, and although ‘the Saraiva of London notoriety’ 
remained, his attempts to influence Portuguese politics through pamphleteering were 
mocked.128 In May 1842, the Portuguese Minister, Baron Moncorvo, sent Foreign 
Secretary Aberdeen one of Saraiva’s pamphlets to consider. He could not explain 
some ‘very extraordinary declarations’ it made, and believed that its publication 
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would give Portugal ‘a good pretext to act with great severity’ towards Miguelites.129 
Only the pamphlet’s extraordinary nature created concern, and other appeals similarly 
fell flat. When a Carlist officer who guarded Maria Fernanda’s grave fell into poverty 
in 1841, he appealed to Aberdeen, invoking British hospitality and the charity of a 
Protestant congregation; but although Aberdeen lamented his ‘distressed situation’, he 
added that he could not help.130 Saraiva was even seemingly ignored when, in 1843, 
he offered Aberdeen an opportunity to influence Carlist policies.131 The Foreign 
Secretary was uninterested in both refugees’ misfortunes and their schemes.  
 
One final influx of Carlist refugees did find assistance. In 1844, France began to land 
Spanish refugees in Britain; and whilst a former Legionary organised assistance for 
recently-arrived liberals, certain Tories assisted the Carlists.132 Ranelagh provided 
them with financial assistance and paid for their passage to the Netherlands where 
King Willem ‘provide[d] for them’, and the Tory Whip Lord Beverley likewise 
provided relief, because they had received little ‘sympathy and consideration’, and 
‘deserved more attention… than their adversaries’.133  Aberdeen rejected Ranelagh’s 
appeals for assistance, and a petition in these refugees’ favour was consequently put 
before the Commons on 13 March 1845. It pleaded that the refugees relied upon the 
charity of ‘a nobleman and his friends’, and sought either ‘subsistence’ or conveyance 
‘to other countries which may afford them a less terrible fate’, but fell upon deaf ears. 
Thousands of petitions were submitted annually, and further attempts to attract 
attention failed. Although Ranelagh paid for legal assistance, the refugees obtained 
neither relief nor Spanish passports.134 Carlist refugees still only found support from a 
few devoted Tories. 
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A different Don Carlos? 
 
Don Carlos’ eldest son and successor as Carlist pretender appeared to have the 
potential to transform this situation. As a charming young man, Count Montemolin 
was an ideal propagandist for Carlism, and anxious to obtain British support, Carlos 
(who had ‘abdicated’ in 1845) ordered Montemolin to escape from house arrest in 
France in September 1846.135 Montemolin was welcomed to Britain. He was allowed 
to visit the Royal Naval Dockyard at Portsmouth, and even joined a club, albeit the 
Travellers’, which welcomed foreigners.136 The refugee pretender was treated as a 
distinguished visitor, and he found support from Tory Carlists, whose leading lights 
now comprised Peter Borthwick and Lord John Manners, both members of ‘Young 
England’, a faction which favoured a strong monarchy and church.137 Whilst 
Borthwick had supported the Carlists since the 1830s, the younger Manners had a 
romantic ‘passion for… legitimate monarchy’.138 Yet earning the confidence of other 
British politicians presented a rather more difficult task.  
 
Whigs and mainstream Conservatives alike continued to abhor Carlism, and it had 
also lost newspaper backing; the editor of the Morning Post, Charles Eastland de 
Michele, was a lone steadfast supporter.139 In these circumstances it appears 
surprising that the refugee prince might have attracted the interest of Britain’s 
aristocracy. However, Montemolin’s views appeared sufficiently moderate to garner 
wider support. The pretender espoused liberal beliefs, and in 1844, an acquaintance 
had claimed in a pamphlet that Montemolin was an Anglophile constitutionalist. 
Although this assessment has not stood the test of time, Montemolin’s liberal 
affectations intrigued Britons outside of Carlism’s existing constituency. Most notable 
among them was Palmerston.140 
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Palmerston’s interest in Montemolin was driven by both the pretender’s apparent 
moderation and diplomatic expediency. Soon after the conflict in Spain had ended, the 
great powers began to consider the marriages of Queen Isabella and her sister Luisa in 
what became known as the ‘Affair of the Spanish Marriages’; and Montemolin, as the 
‘legitimate’ successor, was the absolutist courts’ preferred suitor.141 Aberdeen sought 
to ensure the selection of a compromise suitor acceptable to Britain and France, the 
only great powers which recognised Isabella; but Peel’s government fell in June 1846 
after it repealed the Corn Laws with the assistance of opposition MPs. The 
Conservative party split into free trade (‘Peelite’) and Protectionist factions, and a 
minority Whig government was appointed under Lord John Russell. With the 
belligerent Palmerston back at the Foreign Office, Anglo-French relations worsened, 
and after Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister François Guizot engineered the 
Spanish marriages in France’s favour, Palmerston and the British Ambassador to 
Spain, Sir Henry Bulwer, began to consider cooperating with Montemolin to check 
French influence in Spain. As an apparently liberal prince with the support of the 
absolutist courts, Montemolin appeared to have the potential to unite the enemies of 
the French government.142 
 
Montemolin was championed by Tory supporters. On 14 November, Borthwick 
announced Montemolin’s arrival in London to Michele, which he thought should be 
published ‘as a leader’, for Louis Philippe ‘dreaded nothing so much … and he would 
not like to read [it] in the Morning Post.’143 However, Borthwick’s triumphalism was 
tinged with a degree of fear. On the 17th, he arrived at the Foreign Office to announce 
that the pretender was at risk of assassination.144 This concern for Montemolin’s 
safety was complemented by an attempt to capitalise upon his charm. Manners 
concluded that although ‘many people’ ‘would be happy to receive’ Montemolin, they 
might not do so ‘if he [were] paraded as a king’, and that it would be ‘much better… 
if the regal title be dropped’, because there was ‘something absurd in the idea of a 
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King receiving half a dozen English gentlemen’.145 Montemolin could accordingly 
enter society and promote his claims. This small group had quickly organised 
publicity, access to political circles and (as Borthwick hoped) protection for 
Montemolin. 
 
More significantly, Manners, Ranelagh and Borthwick organised a subscription to 
fund a Carlist uprising. On 8 October, Manners wrote to Carnarvon, and although they 
had never met, Manners thought that their ‘agreement and sympathy on nearly all 
matters’ would elicit a response. Carlist guerrillas were ‘determined to make another 
vigorous effort to restore the legitimate King and free Spain from French influence’, 
but were constrained by the Carlist General Ramón Cabrera’s ‘detention’ in England, 
and a lack of funds. £200 or £300 would allow Cabrera to ‘reach the scene of action’, 
and Manners was confident that Britain would ‘take no part whatsoever’ against it.146  
 
Carnarvon was alarmed. Although he offered a ‘liberal contribution’, he preferred to 
‘assist in the good cause’ rather than to ‘produce it’. The idea that a few Tories and 
exiles might start a war threatened to be an embarrassing and bloody failure. Manners 
acknowledged that aiding rebellion was ‘unquestionably a very grave matter ’, but 
believed that Cabrera could attain ‘a speedy success’. ‘A lady’ provided the funds, 
and within weeks, Manners wrote on 23 October, it would become clear whether 
Spain favoured Montemolin. Manners’ optimism knew few bounds; he predicted that 
once the rebellion ‘assumed a definite shape and substance’, he could easily procure 
‘a city loan’, because it would be ‘midsummer madness’ to fund civil war by 
subscription.147 Such was the Tory MP’s enthusiasm for Montemolin that he was 
willing to support a rebellion in his favour. 
 
In spite of Manners’ enthusiasm, both subscription and rebellion faltered. Whilst 
subscribers demanded results, refugees demanded money; and the subscribers did not 
know whether their money was spent upon arms, or to save ‘a mob of Spaniards from 
starvation.’ Costs continually increased, and tensions divided its organisers after a few 
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weeks.148  The ‘new Carlist war organised in England’ itself soon degenerated into a 
series of dawn guerrilla raids.149 A few Tories and exiles had, as Carnarvon feared, 
created an unsuccessful insurrection. 
 
Other Tories were horrified. Manners’ biographer claimed that the subscription 
revitalised Carlism in Britain, and that some Tories were impressed by Montemolin, 
including Londonderry and the former minister Lord Lonsdale. But the Protectionist 
leader in the Commons, Lord George Bentinck, was dissuaded from meeting 
Montemolin by Russian Ambassador Baron Brunnow, and Bentinck’s lieutenant 
Benjamin Disraeli was dismayed.150 Bentinck was ‘sorry’ to hear that Manners had 
started ‘the Montemolin subscription with a view to a Carlist movement in Spain!’, 
and that ‘Peter, our Peter’ (Borthwick) was its treasurer. 151 The Tory leadership, 
which continued to advocate non-interventionist foreign policies, also remained 
opposed to Carlism. Although Manners argued that Louis Philippe had acted ‘quite 
disgraceful[ly]’ towards Montemolin over the Spanish Marriages, Disraeli rejected an 
invitation to meet him.152 Tory support for Montemolin remained limited, but 
Brunnow had to persuade Manners not to ‘go to sea with Cabrera and be hanged as a 
pirate’.153 Even the most enthusiastic Tory Carlist conceded that joining a rebellion 
was inherently dangerous. 
 
However, Montemolin also met and impressed Palmerston, who was ‘most agreeably 
surprised’ by his intellect and appearance. Whilst this interview ‘almost appeased’ 
Manners’ ‘Carlist indignation’, it enraged Whigs.154 The idea that the Foreign 
Secretary had met the Carlist pretender was unacceptable to his colleagues, but 
Palmerston was not alone in forming a positive view of the refugee pretender; his 
close ally Bulwer had adopted the idea of uniting the Carlists and liberal Progresistas 
under Montemolin’s leadership.155  
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Although Montemolin’s apparent moderation made him appear an attractive means of 
uniting anti-French forces in Spain, Guizot rejected the idea that Palmerston could 
effectively cooperate with the pretender. After Montemolin’s escape, Guizot had 
feared that the Carlists and Progresistas would unite under Palmerston’s patronage, 
and his suspicions were raised by the unlikely news that the exiled Progresista regent 
Espartero had met Cabrera.156 Soon after Montemolin and Cabrera reached Britain, a 
French diplomat saw Espartero at the Foreign Office.157 But by 6 October, the French 
Foreign Minister had concluded that the heterogeneous nature of Palmerston’s 
coalition rendered it impossible.158 The idea was little more than wishful thinking. 
 
Montemolin was nevertheless thrust into British calculations. Owing to French 
pressure, on 10 October, Queen Isabella married her cousin the Duke of Cadiz; the 
same day, her sister Luisa married the Duc de Montpensier, one of Louis Philippe’s 
sons. This arrangement was meant to ensure that Isabella would not have any children 
with an allegedly incapable husband, and that after Isabella’s death, either Luisa, 
Montpensier or their offspring would inherit the throne.159  Palmerston had to find a 
means of restoring British influence in response, but in early November, Bulwer 
rejected supporting a revolt in Montemolin’s favour. He added that although Cadiz 
and his father wanted to marry Cadiz’s sisters to Don Carlos’ sons, this could ‘never’ 
be arranged, and suggested that Palmerston sought ‘a husband who might assist us 
here’.160 Days later, Bulwer warned that the French had ‘promised to aid’ this 
search.161 Louis Philippe and Guizot were determined to entrench French influence, 
and the opportunity to utilise Montemolin would have disappeared if French influence 
secured the marriages of Cadiz’s sisters.162 In these difficult circumstances, it 
appeared that securing Montemolin’s marriage to one of Cadiz’s sisters could restore 
some British influence at Madrid. 
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As a consequence, Palmerston again met Montemolin. This interview attracted 
criticism in Spain, and on 26 November, he explained it to Queen Victoria as ‘only an 
attention which he thought due to a [Spanish] Prince’. But he was ‘very agreeably 
surprised’ by Montemolin’, who appeared ‘quite liberal in his political opinions.’ 
Roger Bullen characterises these meetings as an attempt to assess ‘Montemolin’s 
character and his willingness to fall in with whatever plans Palmerston might evolve’; 
‘the short term tactical consideration seems to have been uppermost in his mind.’ Yet 
Palmerston was remarkably candid about how impressed he was by Montemolin. He 
even told the British Ambassador to France, Lord Normanby, that Montemolin would 
make ‘a very good sovereign’.163 Palmerston saw great potential in Montemolin, and 
was intrigued by the pretender’s claim that he had twice rejected French requests to 
marry Isabella and become King, with the Salic Law restored.164 He subsequently 
advised one of Montemolin’s attendants that the prince should reconcile with the 
ruling branch of his family and marry one of Cadiz’s sisters, to reunite ‘all the 
political parties in Spain’.165   
 
Even if this idea was a mere contingency, Palmerston’s retelling of these meetings 
suggests that he thought Montemolin an ideal ally. In reply to Bulwer’s request for ‘a 
husband for one of’ Cadiz’s sisters, Palmerston consequently argued in favour of 
Montemolin. The Foreign Secretary was deeply impressed by the refugee pretender; 
he was ‘very sorry for Isabella, for Spain, and for Europe’ that Montemolin was ‘not 
Isabella’s husband.’ Palmerston argued that if Montemolin married an Infanta and the 
Salic Law was restored, the refugee prince would become third-in-line to the throne. 
This would apparently lead ‘the eastern powers to acknowledge Isabella’ and 
practically exclude Montpensier and his future offspring from the succession. 
Although wary of Montemolin’s absolutist allies, Palmerston thought that with British 
support, the Carlist pretender could undermine French ascendancy at Madrid.166 
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Meanwhile, Manners contemplated how ‘to place the young prince favourably among 
English society.’ Montemolin was ‘everything we could wish [for]’, having ‘made a 
gratifying impression upon all who ha[d] seen him’; ‘most intelligent and quick’, he 
also spoke English ‘very well’.167  Another Carlist Tory, Lord Strangford, described 
Montemolin as a ‘bright fellow, very sensible’ and ‘admirable’.168  Like Don Carlos, 
Tory Carlists considered Montemolin’s a propaganda tool, and the Duke of 
Devonshire, the Duchess of Somerset, Lord Dillon, Lord Lonsdale, Lord Brougham 
and Lady Dinorben all invited Montemolin to receptions.169 The personable pretender 
easily attracted attention. 
 
Montemolin also received support from the Morning Post, which regularly reported 
his activities.170 Brief articles recorded meetings with several politicians, including 
Carlist Tories (Strangford, Ranelagh, Carnarvon, Manners, Borthwick and Lord 
Combermere), Tory MPs Lord Pollington and Quintin Dick, and the Radical MPs 
Thomas Anstey and David Urquhart.171 Although these men were largely insignificant 
and/or eccentric, these meetings demonstrated that Montemolin found support from 
British politicians. Montemolin’s supporters even arranged royal visits, including a 
visit to Hampton Court. An official report even cited Montemolin amongst the foreign 
notables who had visited Pentonville prison.172 Yet these activities were also 
ridiculed. Punch mocked the Post’s fawning, and caricatured ‘ye King’ receiving 
‘Jenkins of ye Post, ye Under-Sheriffs and ye other [minor] fashionables’.173 By 
March 1847, Montemolin had made ‘no progress’, because people ‘only’ thought ‘of 
Ireland and domestic affairs’.174 Despite his early promise, a lack of interest in Spain 
precluded Montemolin’s chances of obtaining widespread support. 
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Enter Dom Miguel 
 
Meanwhile, Miguel threatened to embroil Britain in a foreign conflict. Miguel fled 
Rome in January 1847, and hoped to reach Portugal via Britain to take advantage of 
the Patuleia (‘Little Civil War’) of October 1846 to June 1847. A ‘Septembrist’ junta 
hoping to restore the liberal 1822 constitution occupied Oporto, and suspicions that it 
would ally with the Miguelites drove France and Spain to consider military 
intervention. British opposition subsequently ensured that Queen Maria was instead 
persuaded to ‘agree to a joint mediation of Britain, France and Spain between the 
belligerents.’175 This compromise was engineered because had Miguel reached 
Portugal, Britain would have had to intervene militarily, a policy which was anathema 
to the Radicals and Peelites upon whom the government relied for survival.176 Miguel 
presented Britain with a problem, and both his manners and objectives were 
considered objectionable; even British Carlists recorded their dislike of Miguel after 
meeting him.177 
Once Miguel reached Britain in February, the government began to fear the prospect 
of him leading loyal troops. Perhaps owing to memories of Don Carlos’ escape, the 
government took the extraordinary expedient of monitoring him; after a ‘private 
informant’ told Palmerston that Miguel was residing at his supporter Captain Bennet’s 
Islington home, it was put under police surveillance, because Miguel intended to join 
the loyal General MacDonnell once he had ‘a sufficient force under his command’. 
Meanwhile, the Miguelite exile Saraiva invited Palmerston to meet Miguel, ‘to hear… 
how liberal his views and opinions were.’ Palmerston dismissed the offer. Any 
contact was unacceptable, because Miguel had arrived ‘with hostile intention towards 
the Queen of Portugal’, and Saraiva was ‘strongly’ recommended to ask Miguel to 
‘consider the difficulties of his enterprise, and the extent of the assistance which the 
Queen may possibly receive from her allies’.178  
Any Miguelite adventure would have been immediately repulsed, but Britain would 
not intervene in Portugal. As Russell reminded the Queen, Britain was bound only to 
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protect Portugal against foreign invasion or Miguel. He and Palmerston similarly 
rejected their colleague Lord Lansdowne’s view that intervention would be possible 
without Miguel’s departure.179 The exiled usurper was at the centre of arguments 
between Victoria and her government; whereas the Queen wanted to uphold the 
Portuguese throne, the government insisted that Miguel’s return alone could incur 
British intervention.  
Further disagreements soon erupted. On 13 February, Palmerston announced to the 
cabinet that Miguel was in London, and had sent Saraiva to him in the belief that they 
would be supportive. It was eventually decided that Palmerston should warn Miguel 
to expect no British support, that it would be dangerous for him to go to Portugal, and 
that ‘the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty would [then] authorise interference’.180 
However, Victoria and Albert remained concerned about Maria’s regime. On the 15th, 
Russell told the cabinet that the royal couple were ‘exceedingly anxious about 
Portugal’ and that he had corresponded with Victoria on ‘the difficulty of 
interference’. Russell recommended guaranteeing Anglo-Spanish intervention if 
Miguel reached Portugal or if Miguelite forces entered the war, and Victoria hoped 
that the cabinet would not ‘alter this scheme’. It instead met strong opposition. 
Although Home Secretary Sir George Grey argued that Carnarvon was ‘in 
communication’ with Miguel, and Palmerston knew that Montemolin had visited 
Miguel, suggesting Carlist interest, both the Queen’s concerns and Russell’s 
compromise were rejected. The cabinet insisted that Miguel’s appearance alone would 
justify British intervention. 181 
Palmerston took the threat of Miguel’s departure seriously. The next day, having been 
informed that Miguel had been overheard saying that he ‘contemplated leaving for 
Oporto on the packet of Wednesday next’, Palmerston requested that it was detained 
‘till the arrival… of the morning mail of… the 18th ’.182 The First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Lord Auckland, subsequently told Admiral Parker, commanding a fleet off 
Lisbon, that ‘Bennet’s voyage to Portugal’ was ‘indefinitely suspended’; ‘the owners 
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of the steam packet would knowingly have nothing to do with him’.183 Bennet 
appeared to have ‘shown the white feather’ upon being told this.184 This news did not 
assuage the Portuguese government. Although Bennet’s departure had been 
prevented, Palmerston’s actions convinced them that he shared their heightened 
concerns.185  
 
Nevertheless, Britain continued to reject precipitate action. On 27 February, Auckland 
warned Parker that Bennet intended to embark for Portugal, and although sceptical of 
Miguelite strength, Auckland suggested that Parker prevented the Miguelite Captain 
from ‘doing mischief’ by intimating that ‘there would be danger in his going ashore 
and he might be induced to go on to Gibraltar’.186 Parker agreed, and added that 
Portuguese emissaries had apparently been sent ‘to communicate with Miguel on the 
subject of his landing ’.187 Auckland remained alive to the threat of Miguel’s return, 
and sought to ensure that Bennet would not serve his master.  
 
Even outlandish rumours of Miguelite activity on British soil spurred government 
action. On 23 February, Moncorvo sent the Foreign Office what he deemed ‘a great 
insight into the future plans of D. Miguel & its [sic] party’. A Miguelite junta had 
supposedly been formed in London to raise materiel, and profit from Septembrist 
successes. These Miguelites apparently sought Montemolin’s support, and thus the 
services of Carlist officers. The letter also claimed that Miguel’s supposed conversion 
to liberalism was both a ploy to court Montemolin and proof that the junta wanted 
Miguel at its head. Miguel could even supposedly levy 1800-2500 troops in London 
and Morocco, who could reach Portugal within 25 days of grouping at Gibraltar.188  
 
This startling information, which seemingly threatened a serious breach with Portugal 
and an escalation of hostilities, was relayed to Lieutenant-Governor Wilson, and 
Colonial Secretary Lord Grey wanted confirmation of Miguelite activity.189 This 
concern was reflected in Wilson’s own response to the conflict; he was forced to 
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‘assure’ the Portuguese Consul at Gibraltar that Miguel had not ‘clandestinely 
embarked’ upon a Septembrist vessel.190 Meanwhile, the political dangers of British 
intervention had become apparent. Fearing parliamentary questions from former 
Minister to Portugal Lord Beauvale, Lansdowne asked Russell whether he thought it 
‘expedient’ to ‘say that Miguel's appearance in Portugal would put us in a difficult 
situation as to interference’, ‘inclined to think that it would’.191 British intervention in 
Portugal, even if Miguel returned, appeared politically impossible. So long as Miguel 
remained in Britain, the government would be safe, and consequently even the most 
unlikely plots attributed to Miguelite exiles were taken seriously. 
 
The report of Miguelite forces being prepared in Gibraltar and Morocco was 
subsequently dismissed. Wilson thought it ‘difficult to conceive a more inaccurate 
notion’. If there were any European troops in Morocco, they consisted of a few 
deserters, and ‘the fallacy with regard to Gibraltar’ was ‘equally preposterous’.192 
This news was passed to Moncorvo with an assurance that plotting would not be 
tolerated at Gibraltar, and a warning against rumour-mongering.193 However, 
Palmerston happily accepted intelligence provided by Saraiva. France had apparently 
resolved to support Maria as her fall would result in the ‘certain destruction of all 
their Spanish schemes’, and had sent agents ‘of name and note’ to the British court, 
apparently finding the support of Queen Victoria and Aberdeen.194 While Palmerston 
would not tolerate the slightest hint of intrigue by Miguelite exiles, he welcomed 
rumours from them which signalled French support for the Portuguese regime. 
Miguel’s significance was quickly discounted. By 6 March, he was reportedly 
‘anxious to return’ to Italy, and to ‘cover the truth of… his feelings… [said] that he 
must return to Genoa... from whence his invading expedition will accompany him!!!’ 
The Belgian government promised to prevent Miguel from reaching Germany, and 
Palmerston was ‘convinced that his being so well-watched and the incident of 
Bennet’s at Southampton must have made a great impression on his weak and not 
very courageous mind’.195 Even Moncorvo thought that Miguel had given up, 
‘deceived in his expectations of countenance and support in England’, while 
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Palmerston’s Undersecretary welcomed the news, which would moderate the war and 
rob the Spanish of a reason to invade Portugal.196 Palmerston agreed that Miguel 
would make ‘no attempt’, although the British Minister in Lisbon, George Hamilton 
Seymour, thought that Miguel ‘might yet give… a good deal of trouble’, because the 
‘lower orders... look[ed] to him’.197 Whilst Miguel retained support in Portugal, the 
likelihood of his departure was increasingly written off. 
However, reports that Bennet had smuggled Miguel into Oporto were taken seriously. 
On 13 May, Bennet brought a group of Miguelites to Portugal, apparently to ‘assist’ 
the Junta, and a week later, Parker reported that these agents had met Miguel in 
London.198 This escalated into reports that Miguel was aboard Bennet’s vessel, and 
the British consul at Oporto warned him ‘against taking any part in the contest... or 
harbouring’ exiles.199 Bennet unconvincingly replied that only Britons had been 
aboard, and Seymour was sufficiently apprehensive to warn Auckland that ‘suspicions 
were afloat that Dom Miguel himself was amongst’ them.200 Once these reports 
reached London, The Times printed a letter from Saraiva which stated that Miguel had 
not left.201 Nevertheless, Bennet’s involvement had made the threat credible, and 
deeply concerned British officials. 
Preventing Miguel’s departure unsurprisingly remained a priority for Britain.  On 14 
May, having heard that Miguel had entered into negotiations ‘under the sanction… of 
Her Majesty’s Government’, Seymour expressed support to Palmerston, although he 
thought that negotiations would be more effective post-war, especially as Maria 
sought to conciliate Miguelites.202 Palmerston replied that ‘no such negotiation’ had 
begun, but he had spoken to ‘persons interested’ in Miguel’s fate, was aware of 
Miguel’s destitution, and had been told that Portugal would grant Miguel a pension if 
he renounced his claims. If Miguel obtained money before agreeing terms, it could be 
used ‘to create and organise disturbances’.203 Even in poverty, Miguel continued to 
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threaten British objectives. The slightest threat of Miguel’s return appeared dangerous 
while tensions continued to simmer. 
 
Montemolin Ascendant? 
As Miguel’s prospects fluctuated, Montemolin’s intentions were debated. On 29 
March, having obtained a copy of a Spanish proclamation ordering reprisals against 
Carlist guerrillas, Borthwick defended Montemolin in the Commons. Borthwick 
declared that when it was issued, nothing close to an insurrection had existed, and that 
Montemolin had ordered his followers to refrain from violence. That Borthwick might 
defend Montemolin’s intentions would have been expected; but in reply, Palmerston 
lent qualified praise to the refugee prince. ‘[J]udging from the conduct which’ 
Montemolin had ‘pursued’ in Britain, Palmerston opined that civil war ‘would not 
meet [Montemolin’s] approbation’, and hoped that he would ‘restrain his followers’. 
These remarks irked Major-General Evans, the former commander of the British 
Legion, and Palmerston consequently added that ‘it would be a great abuse of’ of 
British hospitality ‘to... excite war’. 204 Palmerston had publicly declared that so long 
as Montemolin demilitarised Carlism, he had no criticism for the refugee prince. 
Privately, Palmerston was convinced of Montemolin’s moderation. Upon being 
warned that the Anglophile Spanish prince Don Enrique might be exiled in February, 
Palmerston told Bulwer to ‘hint’ that Montemolin had impressed many in Britain with 
his constitutionalist views, in ‘striking contrast’ to ‘the conduct of Queen Isabella.’205 
Montemolin’s example contrasted with Isabella’s behaviour, and Palmerston even 
opined that ‘if Montemolin had come here three years ago, and had made himself and 
his opinions known, he would by this time have been King of Spain.’206 This was a 
remarkable admission; that had British statesmen known of Montemolin’s apparent 
constitutionalism before, Britain and the absolutist courts would have ensured his 
marriage to Queen Isabella. Palmerston even thought that because Spain would 
eventually be forced to choose between Montpensier and Montemolin as king, a new 
Carlist movement would emerge, backed by ‘Spaniards of all parties’.207 As far as 
Palmerston was concerned, Montemolin could unite and pacify Spain.  
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However, supporting Montemolin remained a controversial idea. As the diplomat 
Lord William Hervey informed Irish Viceroy Lord Clarendon (the former George 
Villiers), Montemolin was not favoured in Spain because it was thought that he had 
British support, strengthening Montpensier’s position.208 According to Hervey, 
Bulwer and Palmerston’s intrigues were counterproductive, and on 31 July, Russell 
suggested to Palmerston that the infant son of Queen Maria would be a better British 
candidate if Isabella died; whereas the Portuguese prince would find Progresista 
support, Montemolin was an ‘odious’, banished ‘symbol of absolute monarchy’, 
supported by a ‘violent party’.209 Having failed to break taboos about Carlism, 
Montemolin was unable to secure widespread support, and neither Manners nor 
Borthwick were elected in the general election of July-August 1847.210 Without a 
Tory champion in the Commons and still a controversial figure among Whigs, 
Montemolin’s advance had stalled. 
 
Miguel Debated 
 
Although the British government had rejected intervention in Portugal unless Miguel 
returned, in May, British forces joined France and Spain in a display of force to 
impose a peace settlement upon the Junta, which proved controversial at Westminster. 
Tories and Radicals pushed for a ‘motion of censure and affirmation of the principles 
of non-intervention’, and as E.J. Feuchtwanger notes, ‘the situation was not without 
danger’, for the two parties could ‘force a premature general election’. Palmerston 
consequently ‘had to keep his head down and did not speak’. The Radical Joseph 
Hume submitted a motion in the Commons while Protectionist leader Lord Stanley 
sponsored another in the Lords.211 Miguel almost seemed to have found a friend prior 
to the debates; on 2 June, Saraiva asked Disraeli for an interview on the matter of 
intervention in Portugal.212 Disraeli appears to have been intrigued, and Saraiva 
informed Miguel of Disraeli’s ‘kind intention of visiting him.’ Saraiva’s flattery knew 
few bounds. He begged Disraeli to attend ‘as a sort of political charity’, and provide 
‘the support of your powerful logic and talent’. He even offered ‘any notes or data’ 
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which Disraeli might need for his ‘piercing and cutting eloquence’.213 However, 
Disraeli did not speak, perhaps having decided that association with Miguel 
threatened severe criticism. Contact with Miguel remained a political liability. 
 
During the debates, the government was attacked for considering a foreign 
intervention on the grounds of Miguel’s likely return rather than his actual 
appearance. The attacks were fuelled by published dispatches. Hume condemned the 
idea of British intervention, and was also deeply critical of the Portuguese 
government; their ‘unconstitutional measures’ had ‘united the Miguelites and 
Liberals’. However, he reserved some praise for Palmerston, who had ‘stated again 
and again that Dom Miguel was in England, living in retirement, and not likely to 
leave.’ Instead, Palmerston was at fault for tolerating Portuguese tyranny.214 
According to Hume, only Miguel’s return should have justified intervention. This was 
echoed by Conservatives.   
 
On 15 June, Lord Stanley quoted the same passage as Hume, and added that the war 
did ‘not turn upon the question who shall be Sovereign of Portugal, but upon the 
question who shall be the responsible Ministers of the Crown… and by what 
principles... the country shall be governed’.215 Peel similarly argued that Britain was 
only bound to intervene if ‘Miguel were to reappear in Portugal, or a descendant of 
Don Carlos in Spain’, rather than to establish ‘a particular party in the domestic 
government of either country’ as the government appeared to have wanted.216 
Borthwick commented in the same vein that ‘there was no such thing as a movement 
on the part of Don Miguel’.217 The lack of any mention of Miguel’s attempted 
departure in the blue book made the government appear to have acted unnecessarily 
rashly. 
 
In the government’s defence, Russell and Lansdowne also invoked Miguel’s potential 
return. To Lansdowne, there had been ‘three chances which this country had to 
contemplate if they did not interfere… the despotism of Doña Maria... a republic… 
and the despotism of Don Miguel.’ Although the junta had ‘carefully disowned 
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anything like an adherence to Don Miguel’, they had been ‘favourable’ to him.218 
According to this statement, Miguel’s return had been paramount amongst the risks 
posed by Maria’s defeat. Yet in the Commons, Russell declared that had the Junta 
succeeded, the Spanish Government ‘naturally supposed’ that Miguel ‘would have 
been raised in [Maria’s] place’, and that if Miguel ‘reigned in Portugal...  the 
Carlists... would be strengthened’; Spain ‘could not and would not permit’ this. He 
added that ‘the idea that Miguel was to succeed, if the Junta triumphed’ was 
exaggerated, as perhaps were the ‘fears of the Spanish Government’.219 Whilst 
Lansdowne defended Britain’s policy of contemplating intervention to prevent a 
Miguelite regime, Russell defended it as a means of preventing Miguel’s return and 
Spanish invasion. The government avoided censure after Bentinck had the Commons 
‘counted out’ and the Lords decided to allow Stanley a ‘triumph’ without defeating 
the government; but its Portuguese policy and perceived interventionist ambitions had 
come under significant scrutiny.220 
 
Meanwhile, the idea of pensioning Miguel off remained appealing to Palmerston. 
Were Miguel bribed into inactivity, his followers might disarm; and in an attempt to 
gain the Portuguese support for this plan, Palmerston explained his reasoning to 
Seymour. Miguel had been persuaded to reach Britain because it might ‘afford him 
some favourable opportunity’, and because his hopes were ‘extinguished’, he now 
merely sought asylum.221  By 20 October, it appeared ‘very likely’ that Miguel had 
instead accepted a pension from Prussia, and Palmerston reassured Moncorvo that it 
would ‘only be enough to enable [Miguel] to live in decent comfort’, rather than ‘get 
up an insurrection’.222 With the civil war over, Miguel no longer posed any threat, and 
his wellbeing superseded diplomatic concerns. 
 
Montemolin Eclipsed 
 
By the autumn, Montemolin had begun to trouble the government instead. Although 
the Carlist pretender had become the sole potential British candidate for the Spanish 
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throne if Isabella were to fall, this was ‘not a happy’ conclusion for Bulwer.223 
Clarendon was also worried, and told the Times journalist Henry Reeve that ‘we ought 
not... under any circumstances, support the pretensions of Montemolin’. It ‘would be 
disgraceful to us and useless to him’, throw the Progresistas ‘into the arms of the 
French’, and cause ‘another civil war in which we should be ranged on the side of 
fanaticism’.224 Whatever ‘his own wishes’, Montemolin would always be ‘the 
instrument of the absolute and fanatical party’. Moreover, the French had spread 
rumours of British support for Montemolin to undermine the Progresistas’ anglophile 
tendencies.225 As far as Clarendon was concerned, supporting Montemolin actually 
reduced British influence in Spain. Meanwhile, Bulwer feared that Montemolin had 
sanctioned a ‘slaughter’ committed by Carlist guerrillas in August.226 Bulwer still 
considered Montemolin a potential ally, and wanted the prince ‘to make some public 
disavowal’ to shame his supporters ‘into mere humanity’; but only in October did 
Palmerston receive one via Borthwick.227 By then, it was too late. 
 
By 12 September, Palmerston had decided that Isabella’s marriage should be annulled 
so that she could re-marry and produce an heir, which would require the election of a 
Progresista government.228 This new plan to prevent a Montpensier succession did 
not require Carlist support. After Normanby claimed that ‘Montemolin would win in a 
canter’ if Progresistas had to choose between him and Montpensier two weeks later, 
Palmerston replied that this was highly unlikely, and that Louis Philippe had urged 
‘Carlist bands’ to commit ‘acts of revolting cruelty’ and prevent any agreement with 
the Progresistas.229 Without any chance of success, Palmerston no longer supported 
Montemolin. The pretender had been eclipsed, and alive to Clarendon’s concerns, 
Russell warned Palmerston in November that Progresistas would probably prefer the 
Infanta Luisa (now Duchesse de Montpensier) to succeed Isabella, and that Britain 
should not object.230 Whig views of Montemolin remained overwhelmingly negative. 
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As Anglo-French tensions increased in December, Bulwer returned to considering the 
Spanish succession. Montemolin remained an anti-French candidate, and Britain 
could no longer ‘rely wholly on the Progresistas; the great thing [was] to form a party 
that may serve as a link between’ the Carlists and Progresistas. Bulwer believed that 
‘such a party’ could be formed from ‘five or six’ Spanish aristocrats, who could 
ensure the election of 80 to 100 deputies. He was even close to establishing a cheap 
newspaper to encourage ‘the national odium against [the] French … preparing the 
way for…  Montemolin’.231 But when Isabella fell ill in January 1848, Palmerston did 
not want ‘a vacancy in the Spanish throne’.232  
 
Bulwer’s enthusiasm for Montemolin far outweighed Palmerston’s. Whereas 
Montemolin’s chances of regaining Palmerston’s support evaporated when Louis 
Philippe fell in February, Bulwer felt that Spain had to be saved from misrule. ‘The 
more I see of poor Spain, the more I am convinced that nothing but a deluge can save 
it’, he lamented.233 On 10 April, he reported that respectable ‘parties’ had begun to 
consider a republic, while others thought that ‘the dynasty must be changed - some 
turning their eyes.... to Count Montemolin and the [liberal] Constitution of 1812’.234 
Bulwer now believed that as the most likely leader of a constitutionalist movement in 
Spain, Montemolin deserved British support. 
 
Bulwer even considered recognising Montemolin if a coup in his favour succeeded. 
Whereas the Spanish government’s increasingly authoritarian policies troubled him, 
Bulwer thought it ‘very probable that Count Montemolin might show himself, 
supported by the liberal party’.235 On 14 May, he reported that ‘many schemes were 
going on for bringing [Montemolin] forward’, and even wondered whether he should 
support a ‘military despotism in opposition to a prince advocating constitutional 
doctrines’.236 Had Montemolin arrived promising parliamentary government, Bulwer 
would have at least considered supporting him. However, within weeks Bulwer’s 
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support for Montemolin and his comments – which had since been published amidst 
his expulsion from Spain – had become an embarrassment for the government.237 
 
Montemolin also found little attention in society. Whilst the heiress Angela Burdett-
Coutts was willing to meet him, he generally only attended receptions held by Tory 
hostesses.238 Although Montemolin was among the ‘interesting’ figures Frédéric 
Chopin met on a visit to Britain, they met at a reception hosted by Lady Combermere, 
a Carlist like her husband.239 Lord Combermere himself was present at ‘more than one 
curious scene in which …Montemolin, his family and followers cut a ridiculous 
figure’.240 Whereas Bulwer still believed that Carlists and Progresistas could ally to 
enthrone Montemolin, Britain’s political elite had otherwise lost interest.241 
Montemolin retained British supporters, and received several on 28 July, one of 
whom thought that Montemolin might soon leave if ‘things [were] well in Spain’.242 
But the refugee pretender attracted further opprobrium when he was arrested in 
France for attempting to join a Carlist revolt in April 1849.243 Palmerston decried this 
‘foolish expedition’, and his undersecretary’s wife castigated Montemolin for 
‘amusing himself’ whilst others fought for his ‘hopeless’ cause.244  
 
British Carlists thought otherwise. On 22 May, the Duchess of Inverness, a minor 
member of the royal family, held a ‘large’ reception for Montemolin, and the Morning 
Post remained supportive.245 Montemolin retained a germ of support, and prior to 
Inverness’s reception, Palmerston dined with her and Montemolin. It is entirely 
possible that Palmerston still considered Montemolin a potential ally, for the Foreign 
Secretary met Borthwick, Merry and Michele soon after.246 However, these meetings 
could equally reflect Palmerston’s growing influence over the Morning Post.247 The 
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most likely explanation would be that Palmerston hoped to retain contact with 
Montemolin as a contingency. 
 
The refugee pretender left Britain soon after. Montemolin wished to marry a Miss 
Adeline Horsey, but their engagement was rejected by both her family and 
Montemolin’s suite, and Combermere persuaded them to end it in favour of a ‘royal 
alliance’. Montemolin thus departed for Italy.  Although Miss Horsey ‘may have 
suddenly’ become uninterested when Montemolin threatened to ‘abdicate’ in order to 
marry her, Don Carlos did send a personal letter of thanks to Combermere for the 
services he had rendered.248 Whereas Don Carlos had hoped that Montemolin would 
exercise some influence in Britain, it appears likely that Montemolin was now 
persuaded to depart by a British follower.  
Miguel remained in Britain until 1851, ‘living in retirement’ near Bexhill by 1849, 
and ceased to concern Palmerston.249 By January 1850, he had ‘no information about 
Don Miguel or his proceedings’, and had heard ‘nothing about him for a long time’, 
although he thought it ‘not unlikely that he may be planning some attempt on 
Portugal’.250 The usurper’s final departure caused some consternation. On 15 August 
1851, Lord Howden, the British Minister to Spain, learnt that the Spanish government 
believed Miguel had left to ‘make an attempt in Portugal’, and had ordered his arrest 
should he land in Spain. If this were true, Howden contended, it would give the 
Spanish Foreign Minister ‘an opportunity’ to resurrect the Quadruple Alliance.251 
Because Miguel’s departure seemingly provided an excuse for Spain to invade 
Portugal, Palmerston replied that Miguel had left either to take the waters at Spa or 
Aix, or to reside in Germany.252 He had actually departed to marry a minor German 
Princess. The British Minister at Frankfurt, Lord Cowley, dismissively reported that 
Miguel and his suite ‘talk[ed] with certainty of his being shortly again upon the 
throne’.253 Previously important factors in British foreign policy, Montemolin and 
Miguel had passed into near irrelevance.  
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Nevertheless, both had influenced the course of British politics and diplomacy, albeit 
in divergent ways. Whereas Montemolin obtained some support which shaped British 
policies towards Spain and led some Britons to briefly reconsider their views about 
Carlism, Miguel’s ambitions influenced both the course of Britain’s Portuguese policy 
and the critique it received. That Miguel’s departure for Germany occasioned some 
concern demonstrates that whenever he threatened to leave Britain, he could cause 
diplomatic and political controversy. In contrast, throughout Montemolin’s sojourn in 
Britain, Palmerston and Bulwer recognised his potential to secure shared goals in 
Spain.  
The activities of earlier Carlist and Miguelite refugees similarly influenced the course 
of British diplomacy. Although their entreaties to British governments were 
consistently rejected, these refugees often frustrated British objectives. Both Don 
Carlos’ escape and refugee fundraising allowed the continuation of the Carlist war in 
Spain, and the former incident was compounded by Palmerston’s failure to effectively 
liaise with British allies or understand Carlos’ determination. The freedom accorded 
to these exiles allowed them and their British collaborators to intrigue across Europe, 
and thus present a serious hindrance to British foreign policy. 
 
However, only a residue of support for both Miguel and the Carlists existed in Britain. 
Few Britons were willing to offer these refugees practical support, and the rare 
exceptions to this rule - such as Gower’s willingness to fund Haber’s efforts, Bennet’s 
support for Miguel, and Manners’ funding for Montemolin’s rebellion - achieved little 
for absolutist forces in the peninsula. Meanwhile, parliamentary speeches made on the 
exiles’ behalf created little sensation, and were criticised by mainstream Tories. Not 
even Montemolin’s apparent commitment to constitutional government could secure 
him sustained support; indeed, Palmerston and Bulwer’s interest in him owed much to 
geopolitical considerations.  Carlist and Miguelite refugees struggled to obtain 
sustained support outside of the most reactionary circles, and thus achieved little in 
Britain.
 91 
4: Conservative Political Networks, 1848-49  
 
In the wake of the European revolutions of 1848, numerous fallen rulers and 
politicians fled to Britain, and formed or strengthened existing political relationships 
with Tory politicians which endured throughout the turbulent years of 1848-49.  The 
exiles exerted a strong degree of influence over the course of Conservative politics in 
myriad ways: they provided information to shape perceptions of revolutionary Europe 
and encouragement for attacks upon the government; attempted to reunite the divided 
Conservative party, and shaped numerous writings and newspaper articles. In return, 
Conservative politicians collected intelligence for the exiles and acted as 
intermediaries in their communications with continental Europe. The most tangible 
results of these relationships were Tory attacks upon Palmerston and attempts to 
reunite the shattered party. Although the Protectionists and Peelites never reunited, 
these exiles’ influence over Conservative politicians and journalists threatened to 
defeat the struggling Whig government, and represent a high-water mark of refugee 
involvement in and influence upon party politics in mid-Victorian Britain.  
 
By April 1848, London, remarked Lord Malmesbury, resembled a Congress.1 
Metternich, Princess Lieven, the Prince of Prussia (later Wilhelm I of Germany), 
Louis Philippe, and former French ministers including Guizot had all fled to Britain; 
and so many right-wing refugees arrived that the term ‘illustrious exiles’, given to 
French émigrés in the late eighteenth century, was revived in the press.2  They had 
fled from a flurry of revolutions sparked by the French revolution of 1848, a great 
shock and the culmination of several years of economic misfortune and political 
unrest.3 The revolution in France had been precipitated when, after the right to protest 
was curtailed, opposition politicians began to organise ‘Reform Banquets’. Once these 
were subsequently banned, Parisians took to the streets, and on 23 February, ‘full 
revolt’ ensued after 40 or 50 people were shot by panicking troops. The next day, 
unable to rally the army or commission a liberal ministry, Louis Philippe abdicated 
and fled. An attempt to proclaim his 10 year-old grandson, the Comte de Paris, as 
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King failed when crowds ‘invaded’ parliament. Radical Deputies then declared a 
republic.4   
 
News of Louis Philippe’s flight reached London on 26 February, and guests at Lady 
Palmerston’s reception that evening were ‘troubled and melancholy’, worried about 
the ‘fugitives’.5 The fall of a constitutional monarchy was a terrific shock, and not 
only to Britons. Politicians and foreign diplomats alike were worried about the French 
royal family’s fate, and desperate for news. The Prussian Minister, Baron Bunsen, 
informed Angela Burdett-Coutts that Louis Philippe had fled, and that Guizot’s life 
was ‘certainly in danger.’ (Lieven, he added, had ‘already decamped on the 19th!’)6 
The news that Louis Philippe had safely arrived in Britain on 2 March was greeted 
with relief, and a sympathetic welcome followed the first French refugees’ arrival. 
‘[E]very demonstration of sympathy and respect’ was shown, and over 400 people, 
including the entire cabinet, Sir Robert Peel and Lord Stanley, paid their respects to 
the first arrivals, the Duc and Duchesse de Nemours.7 Guizot even reckoned that as 
Ambassador in 1840 and exile in 1848, he ‘received… the same welcome, except that 
it was more earnest and friendly in the days of my adversity’.8 In the wake of another 
French revolution and the birth of a new French Republic, personal sympathy 
overwhelmed political considerations. 
 
Tory politicians were especially forthcoming in volunteering moral and practical 
support for these refugees. Peel offered the Orleans family £1000 when it was 
reported that their estates could be seized; Aberdeen ‘surreptitiously’ donated as 
much; Disraeli expressed grave concern, and Sir James Graham offered to do all that 
he could.9 Guizot’s children, who arrived after him, were welcomed by Antonio 
Panizzi of the British Museum and Lady Alice Peel, the wife of Peel’s brother 
Jonathan.10 Even the elderly Duke of Newcastle recorded a deep sympathy for Louis 
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Philippe.11 Although these demonstrations of support might appear to have been made 
free from political considerations, the favours which Whig politicians granted to the 
exiles were rarely on the same scale. Rather than offer funds or practical assistance, 
the Whig MP and wit Richard Monckton Milnes agreed to deliver a parcel to Paris for 
Louis Philippe, and his colleague John Evelyn Denison offered Guizot the use of his 
library.12  
 
Moreover, British Conservatives quickly began to cooperate with the exiles in the 
hope of weakening the Whig government and discouraging the spread of 
revolutionary sentiment. Lord Brougham, once considered a radical but now 
practically a Tory, corresponded with Metternich; Lady Beauvale, whose reactionary 
husband was a staunch opponent of Palmerston, began to send Lieven political 
advice; and Stanley’s ‘publicist’, John Wilson Croker, offered his influence over the 
Quarterly Review to his former enemy Guizot.13 Desperate times called for personal 
differences to be put aside, and these relationships soon bore fruit. For example, 
Croker quickly published an article on the revolution based upon an interview with 
Louis Philippe, which defended the ex-King’s wisdom and moderation, and Louis 
Philippe was so impressed that he wanted it to be published in France.14 Whereas 
Whigs sympathised with the refugees on a personal level, Conservatives sympathised 
with the new arrivals on both personal and political grounds, and soon engaged with 
them. 
 
Of all the refugees who reached Britain in the spring of 1848, Metternich perhaps 
found the most Tory support. The news of Metternich’s fall produced ‘general 
satisfaction’ and optimism in London society, but Aberdeen was shocked, and 
thankful that ‘the whole animosity of Vienna’ had turned against Metternich rather 
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than the entire regime.15 Whereas Whigs despised Metternich as the figurehead of 
Austrian absolutism, Tories sympathised with his obsessive fear of upheaval. Upon 
Metternich’s arrival in April, old ‘friends of the Napoleonic days’ (such as 
Wellington, Aberdeen and Londonderry) delighted in seeing him, and several British 
landowners offered to loan  him properties. This surpassed the ex-Chancellor’s 
expectations.16 Metternich remained interested in politics; as Karl Obermann notes, in 
exile, he promoted counter-revolution and wrote memoirs which proudly recalled his 
life’s work.17  
 
Metternich’s interest and engagement in politics steadily increased.  On 6 June, he 
wrote a speech with his ‘pupil’ Disraeli, and stressed the disunity of Italy to 
Aberdeen; by August, he was sending his son to Westminster to gauge the parties’ 
moods; and by January 1849, Palmerston apparently believed that Metternich was 
‘governing Austria from Brighton’.18  Both European affairs and British debates upon 
foreign policy interested him, and although Tories apparently tried to hide it, many 
were interested in Metternich.19 Indeed, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik described 
Metternich’s residence as a centre of Tory opposition to Palmerston, and in October 
1849, Aberdeen congratulated Metternich on the ‘impression’ he had left ‘upon all 
those who had the good fortune to approach’ him. ‘[E]veryone must have admired’ 
his equanimity, ‘composure of mind’ and ‘large and philosophick [sic] views... during 
a time of great trial’.20 Metternich’s presence was not merely appreciated by Tories; 
rather, they inspired each other during a difficult time.  
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It should not be underestimated how the restive state of Europe made the exiles’ 
ideals amenable to Tories. Revolutionary fervour appeared to grip Europe throughout 
1848-49, and as Bulwer later recalled, the ‘threatening aspect’ assumed by British 
workers destroyed ‘almost all sympathy amongst the upper classes for liberal 
doctrines, and created a sort of enthusiasm in favour of an extreme policy of 
conservative resistance’. This was often manifested in opposing Palmerston, allegedly 
‘the head of the liberal party on the continent’.21 Both revolutionary turmoil and 
Palmerston’s interventionist policies appeared to threaten the ‘social order’ 
throughout Europe. This created an audience for reactionary ideals and placed the 
exiles in an influential position with regard to the divided Conservative party.  
 
The Protectionists were themselves divided; Disraeli, their leading orator in the 
Commons, was widely distrusted, even by their leader Stanley, who sought a reunion 
with the Peelites, not least over foreign policy.22 In spite of these schisms among 
Conservative politicians, reconciliation in opposition to Palmerston appeared possible, 
and the exiles, who associated with Protectionists and Peelites alike, were ideally 
placed to encourage one. Such a reunion was likely to cause difficulties for the 
government. Despite winning the previous summer’s general election, Russell’s 
Ministry relied upon opposition disunity to survive because of the difficulty of 
guaranteeing Radical or Irish support.23 In this febrile situation, the exiles’ continental 
links and encouragement could be exploited in opposition to the government, and 
even help foster Conservative reunion. 
 
This placed the exiles in a potentially influential position. Lieven revived her salon, 
and by late March, she was doing ‘very well’; it was ‘full all day long’ with Russell, 
Peel, Palmerston and Aberdeen often in attendance.24  Although ill and ‘almost blind’, 
she also devoted herself to sharing European news. She even regarded it her duty to 
supply Lady Alice Peel with news from Paris.25 Lieven did not do this for altruistic 
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reasons. The former Russian Ambassadress wanted to alter the composition of the 
government by isolating Palmerston and influence British thinking upon foreign 
affairs. She remained formidable; as one historian noted, ‘people were still frightened’ 
of her in old age.26 As a forceful character with links to numerous British and French 
politicians, she was well-placed to encourage Tory opposition to Palmerston. 
 
Her fellow-exiles also regularly associated with Conservative politicians. Whilst 
Guizot was equally comfortable in society as a former French Ambassador to Britain, 
Metternich met Wellington daily at the start of his sojourn in Britain, and Guizot met 
Aberdeen almost daily throughout his.27 Although Harold Temperley suggested that 
Guizot and Metternich were both politically ‘dead’, Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
observation that Guizot remained politically ‘active’ in exile is more accurate.28 
Whilst friendships between British politicians and right-wing refugees were not 
necessarily politicised, personal relationships allowed exile integration into British 
politics.  
 
Not all of these refugees intervened in British politics. The Austrian diplomat Philipp 
von Neumann, who fled to London on what was branded a special diplomatic 
mission, occupied himself with the affairs of the Habsburg dynasty, and Louis 
Philippe was ‘not unhappily absorbed in accounts and legal questions’. However, the 
ex-King ‘talked frankly and at length’, especially to ‘defend his peaceful foreign 
policy’ and ‘passive departure’.  Peel, Wellington and Croker all visited him 
regularly.29 Conservative politicians took an interest in the fallen monarch, and 
despite his professed disengagement from politics, Louis Philippe’s loquacity 
suggested to observers that he exercised influence upon his visitors. On 12 April 
1848, Brougham apologised to the ex-King for not visiting because he had intended to 
speak in the Lords, ‘to Paris rather than England’, and had wanted to ensure that 
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‘what I should say might be known entirely to come from myself’.30 Barely a month 
after Louis Philippe’s arrival, opposition politicians had begun to fear criticism for 
being under exile influence. 
 
The press quickly picked up on the support which the exiles found, especially from 
the opposition. Punch lampooned the refugees’ preferred hotel with a joke 
advertisement appealing to exiled princes, and suggested that Brougham had 
established a school for them.31  It was not alone in making such accusations. A 
republican newspaper later recalled that ‘the tongue of Brougham did the work of 
Metternich’, that Russell ‘learned to talk the principles and language of Guizot’ and 
that Louis Philippe contributed to the Quarterly Review, while The Times was under 
Austrian exiles’ influence.32 These suspicions of widespread exile influence were 
shared by liberal and conservative newspapers. The Morning Herald referred to 
Metternich as an ‘active diplomat’; the Daily News called the Times ‘his’ paper; and 
the Examiner suggested that the Times may well have been under Louis Philippe, 
Guizot and Metternich’s influence.33 The exiles’ prominent status and presence in 
political circles ensured that they attracted suspicion.  
 
These fears became pervasive because the press was an important extension of 
partisan politics, and even diplomacy. As David Brown notes, Palmerston believed 
that ‘his policy abroad carried more weight’ with press approval, and was especially 
‘well-informed in the use of the opinion-making media’. Additionally, in early 1848, 
a Peelite consortium bought the Morning Chronicle.34 Insinuations surrounding the 
Times are particularly notable; considered to have been either Aberdeen or 
Clarendon’s organ, it had by far the largest circulation of the London papers, was 
thought representative of British public opinion, and regarded as semi-official 
abroad.35 By distorting British journalism, the exiles could seemingly turn both public 
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opinion and European governments against the Whig government. This viewpoint 
was not mere speculation, but reflected the active interest which these refugees took 
in British politics, especially in the state of the Conservative Party, and Tory attempts 
to defeat the government upon questions of foreign policy. 
 
The Emergence of Conservative Political Networks 
 
As soon Guizot arrived in Britain, he expounded upon the events leading to his fall. 
On 3 March he discussed the revolution with Aberdeen, and on 5 March they spoke at 
length. He detailed which members of the French Provisional Government would be 
the most difficult for Britain to work with, and predicted an Orleans restoration.36 
Aberdeen was not alone in his interest. Many visited Guizot, who predicted open 
warfare between moderate and radical republicans in France.37 He consistently 
blamed his enemies, ‘imputed no blame’ to Louis Philippe, and reckoned Palmerston 
‘had done it all’.38 Guizot’s testimony was well-received, and the other refugees’ 
commentaries also attracted interest. British politicians were desperate for news, and 
each exile provided a different narrative. Whereas Louis Philippe spoke of Guizot’s 
resignation, Guizot spoke of his dismissal. Lieven also provided an explanation, and 
the only common element was the revolution’s suddenness.39  
 
This interest in refugee testimony soon transformed into a desire to acquire 
intelligence concerning subsequent further events in France. Understanding the 
French Republic was highly important, for as Geoffrey Hicks notes, in strategic terms, 
France remained both Britain’s ideal ally and the greatest threat to her security.40 In 
mid-March, the Peelite MP Lord Mahon recorded that Guizot expected a ‘sanguinary 
scene’ when the Paris National Guard was to make a demonstration; and although 
Louis Philippe had expressed a desire to live as a mere country gentleman, he was not 
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immune from the temptation of politics.41 When Disraeli visited Louis Philippe in 
March, the ex-King offered him a selection of papers which he thought might be of 
interest. Disraeli did not decline the offer, but it transpired that the papers had been 
lost in Louis Philippe’s flight.42 The exiles willingly divulged information about the 
course of French politics, and Tories took great interest.  
 
The exiles were also defended in the Times. As early as 1 March, the Belgian 
Minister, Sylvain van de Weyer, protested to its editor, J.T. Delane, that contrary to 
reports, he had not given his ‘suburban villa’ to the Orleans. A retraction was swiftly 
published, and on 14 March, Guizot thanked Reeve for its denial that the ex-Minister 
had written its leader on the revolution in France. The Times willingly corrected 
reports about the exiles, in part to disavow accusations of their influence. However, 
Guizot happily accepted an offer from Reeve to use his influence over the press in his 
favour.43 The ex-Minister had acquired another outlet for his views.  
 
Aberdeen similarly ensured that the exiles’ views were supported in the Times. On 8 
April, he sent Delane a letter to be ‘inserted’, which ‘would give great pleasure’ to the 
exiles; it was ‘a sort of justification of Louis Philippe’, and ‘in truth the only plausible 
explanation of that proceeding’.44 The exiles’ previous close contacts with Aberdeen 
and Reeve ensured that they would be defended in the press, and Guizot appreciated 
the occasional articles born of this relationship. In August, he was cheered by the 
publication of a letter from Aberdeen on the Spanish marriages, written in response to 
the Globe’s attacks (which were likely made on Palmerston’s behalf).45 Aberdeen 
provided Metternich with the same assistance before his arrival. When Delane sent 
the former Foreign Secretary a draft article announcing the Vienna revolution, 
Aberdeen objected to an assertion that Metternich’s flight would pacify Europe.46 
Despite Metternich’s unpopularity, Aberdeen was determined to defend the ex-
Chancellor. Although many came to fear exile influence over the press, these 
relationships were initiated by British allies rather than the exiles themselves. 
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Upon his landfall in Britain, Metternich was uninterested in politics. He sought a 
‘quite private’ life, and declined to visit Wellington at Stratfieldsaye because of the 
Prince of Prussia’s presence, in fear of ‘speculation and conjectures’. The uncertain 
state of Europe precluded anything resembling political activity, and Aberdeen opined 
to Lord Londonderry that their old friend Metternich, ‘deposed and depressed’ in the 
words of one historian, would only remain for ‘a few months’.47 The threat of political 
controversy and the fallen Chancellor’s own wellbeing threatened to render his 
sojourn in Britain a short one.  
 
Despite his age and illness, Metternich soon engaged with old Tory friends. On 3 
May, he sent Wellington news of the Austrian army, namely that Marshal Radetzky 
was on the offensive against Sardinia, which had declared war in March in the name 
of Italian unity.48 This was encouraging news for European and British conservatives 
alike, and although he rarely spoke in the Lords, the aged Wellington paid attention to 
such reports – in March 1849, he corrected Lansdowne on the progress of Austrian 
forces.49 Metternich’s German correspondents guaranteed that the ex-Chancellor 
knew about important developments, and he was not the only exile to whom 
Wellington paid attention; in May 1848, the Duke was surprised by Louis Philippe’s 
belief that France was too weak for war.50  
 
One overture from Metternich was an abject failure. On 22 May, Metternich brought 
two Times articles to Wellington’s attention, concerning the Frankfurt Diet and King 
Charles Albert of Sardinia. One had praised the Sardinian troops, disparaged the 
Austrians, and predicted a French intervention on the side of Sardinia. Although 
sympathetic, Wellington replied that he knew neither its proprietors nor editor.51 Had 
Metternich asked this favour of Delane’s friend Aberdeen, it might have been granted. 
Despite being willing to provide each other with political favours, effective political 
networks comprising the exiles, their Tory friends and European allies were yet to 
fully develop.  
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Metternich’s commentaries found a more receptive audience. Although his lengthy 
perorations bored almost everyone except Disraeli, Metternich’s knowledge was 
valued. He encouraged the circulation of his correspondence, and sent information 
which British correspondents provided to contacts in Austria.52 Aberdeen sent 
Metternich papers mentioning him ‘relative to the intervention of the King of 
Sardinia’ on 9 May, and in August, Beauvale, a former Ambassador at Vienna, 
explained the vast British opposition to Anglo-French intervention in Italy to him in 
detail, news which was in turn sent to Austria.53  In Beauvale’s opinion, the peace 
terms which France and Britain sought to impose upon Austria and Sardinia were the 
best possible, and the only possible danger was the declaration of a Sardinian 
republic, which would seek French assistance in a renewed war.54 These letters could 
contain sensitive information, and were evidently of great interest to Metternich, who 
could pass information on to further Austrian and British correspondents.55 At the 
centre of communications between Protectionists, Peelites and Austrian contacts, the 
coachman of Europe was transformed into a sort of Austrian mailcoach. 
 
The Prince of Prussia’s brief exile followed a similar pattern. Society was 
‘exceptionally friendly’, and Lady Westmorland, wife of the British Minister to 
Prussia, sent him German newspapers.56 The Prince had fled owing to events beyond 
his control (he was wrongly blamed for the shooting of protestors), and this ensured 
that he was received sympathetically. He too rejected an invitation to Stratfieldsaye, 
concerned that Metternich’s presence would make it resemble a ‘diplomatic 
conference for reactionaries’.57 The idea of implying any relationship between 
conservative refugees and Tory politicians appeared too controversial to risk 
attending.   
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However, Wilhelm soon entered into discussions with British conservatives. By 8 
April, the Prince had discussed the Prussian military with Wellington and former 
Indian Viceroy Lord Hardinge, and on 12 April, Reeve, Peel and Graham dined with 
the Prince, who afterwards spoke to each guest. ‘Everything he said vindicated the 
deepest distress and gloomiest anticipations’, and his Aide-de-Camp added that ‘the 
[Czar] had 400,000 excellent troops’ and a further 150,000 in reserve, which could 
‘be at Berlin in six weeks’. This left Reeve distinctly ‘nervous’.58 Whilst the Prince 
attracted interest, his pessimistic commentary also created concern. Nevertheless, 
according to Lieven, the Prince saw plenty of society, much to Bunsen’s joy.59 He had 
successfully transformed his exile into a chance to promote his viewpoint. 
 
Lieven similarly provided Tory politicians with European news. In late June, she 
warned Aberdeen that war could erupt while France offered to mediate between 
Sardinia and Austria, and that a change in the Pope’s ‘front’ (having previously 
supported Sardinia) would have a great effect. She explained the proposed Anglo-
French mediation between the belligerents to him in great detail, and even warned that 
Stanley was not sufficiently active in the Lords.60 These communications appear to 
have been intended to encourage a Tory reunion over foreign policy, and 
Conservatives came to value exile intelligence. Such was the reliance Wellington 
placed upon Metternich’s reports that after his departure, the Duke admitted ignorance 
of German affairs.61  Guizot also shared information coloured with his own opinions; 
Disraeli accepted Guizot’s explanations for the revolution, and promoted them in 
Parliament on 16 August. Palmerston angrily replied that Disraeli was ‘not correct in 
his history’.62   
 
More significantly, Guizot supported Aberdeen in an attack upon Palmerston, which 
was itself coordinated between Protectionist and Peelite peers. After Bulwer read a 
critical dispatch concerning constitutional government to the Spanish Prime Minister 
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verbatim, he was expelled on trumped-up charges.63 The resulting Parliamentary 
debates provided an opportunity to condemn Palmerston and Bulwer, whom Stanley 
made a scapegoat, and the Protectionist leader sought Aberdeen’s cooperation. 
Although initially sceptical, Aberdeen accepted Stanley’s invitation, and consequently 
sought Guizot’s assistance.64  
 
This was an ideal opportunity to unite Conservative peers against Palmerston, and as 
Palmerston’s former enemy in Anglo-French disputes over Spain, Guizot appeared a 
valuable ally in acquiring potentially damning evidence against the Foreign Secretary. 
On 5 May, Aberdeen asked Guizot to ‘have a word from’ Spanish Minister Javier 
Isturiz whether the dispatch which became Bulwer’s fateful lecture ‘was 
communicated to the Spanish government in the form in which it has been published’, 
suspicious that ‘the dispatch itself was not intended to be communicated’.65 Aberdeen 
subsequently mentioned that he had ‘no doubt whatever that [Bulwer] knew perfectly 
well what [Palmerston] was about when he made that communication’, and appeared 
‘to have felt with perfect confidence, that he should meet with the approbation of this 
Government’.66 With Guizot’s assistance, Aberdeen confidently attacked 
Palmerston’s encouragement of Bulwer’s careless, high-handed behaviour. 
 
This was not the only collaboration between the exiles and British politicians during 
the debates concerning Bulwer’s expulsion. Brougham appeared to speak on Guizot’s 
behalf, and when the Commons debated the issue in turn, so clear was the hand of 
Metternich in Disraeli’s speech that Palmerston immediately condemned him for 
being under the ex-Chancellor’s influence.67 Although these attacks on Palmerston 
were not jointly coordinated between the exiles and the Tory leadership, the exiles 
had provided individual members of the opposition with information and 
encouragement. When the Bulwer affair was again debated by the Lords in early June, 
Aberdeen needed to ‘meet more than one person’, perhaps implying that he spoke to 
Guizot in search of information, in addition to Stanley to coordinate the attack.68 This 
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possibility is reinforced by the fact that Guizot remained interested in the Bulwer 
affair, and hoped to meet Isturiz again on 1 June.69  
 
However, the exiles’ and Tories’ hopes were dashed by the Spaniards’ ridiculous 
rationale for Bulwer’s expulsion (involvement in armed plots against the Spanish 
government), which rendered it ‘a national affair’, and the Tories failed to win over 
wavering liberals.70 Even with exile assistance, Aberdeen and Stanley could not 
defeat Palmerston, and they also failed to hide the exiles’ role.  Lord William Hervey, 
a diplomat who was close to Palmerston, suspected that ‘the species of alliance 
formed between the partisans of Guizot in France and Aberdeen in England’ had not 
‘been without its effect upon the latter, upon the subject of this… squabble’.71 Rather 
than defeat the government or censure Palmerston, cooperation between 
Conservatives and exiles had simply aroused Whig suspicion. 
 
Whereas Guizot and Aberdeen had been close collaborators when they had been in 
office earlier in the decade, Disraeli and Metternich’s friendship had only recently 
been formed. Although the two men had been unacquainted before 1848, Disraeli had 
praised Metternich in his novels.72 As J.P. Parry notes, Disraeli cast himself as a new 
Metternich or Burke, fighting an ideological war, and in Disraeli, Metternich saw an 
ally and protégé.73 The Protectionist orator had held Metternich in high regard for 
some years, and Metternich gladly reciprocated by providing encouragement and 
information.  Disraeli was obsessed with Metternich’s words, and shared his grave 
warnings about Germany, Italy and France with his patroness Lady Londonderry as 
early as 30 April.74 Metternich’s influence can perhaps also be seen in Disraeli’s 18 
August speech, which condemned the French government’s revolutionary tendencies 
and poor finances, reflecting the contents of a letter Metternich had sent to him the 
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previous month;75 and Disraeli even adopted Metternich’s fear of revolutionary secret 
societies, a subject which he mentioned in Parliament as late as 1876.76   
 
Although Hicks has only described this relationship as possibly influencing ‘some of 
[Disraeli’s] parliamentary contributions’ and providing him with ‘a new supply of the 
gossip in which he loved to indulge’, their collaboration was hardly frivolous. Indeed, 
Charles Snyder asserts that Disraeli’s language in their correspondence indicates a 
strong sense of admiration.77 Disraeli’s relationship with Metternich was arguably of 
profound importance to him, and in return, Metternich encouraged the Protectionist 
politician. They often spent mornings discussing politics, and Disraeli was inspired 
even further by the ex-Chancellor’s praise.78 This viewpoint appears to have endured, 
for Metternich later described Disraeli as ‘foremost among the present leaders’ of 
Britain.79 Their friendship was characterised by mutual admiration and political 
cooperation. 
 
Disraeli was not alone in receiving Metternich’s encouragement. In August 1848, 
Beauvale advised Metternich to encourage Brougham to speak in upcoming debates, 
hopeful to see ‘our line’ [i.e. British foreign policy] checked before the Lords 
divided.80 He would have needed little encouragement. A week before, Brougham had 
written to Aberdeen of the ‘joy’ among the Metternichs ‘and others of the faithful’ 
upon hearing of the Sardinian defeat at Custozza, implying that Metternich already 
had a circle of supporters.81 By the end of the Parliamentary session, the exiles had 
established working relationships with several British politicians, and with the express 
aim of defeating Palmerston. 
 
Meanwhile, Metternich and Guizot founded a newspaper, Le Spectateur de Londres. 
The Spectateur was not a success. It was edited by Georg Klindworth (a spy who had 
worked for them both and was now also a refugee in London), and failed after three 
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months.82 The paper initially impressed its founders. Guizot praised the first issue 
lavishly, and Metternich was also proud of the paper; however, the attention it gained 
was almost entirely negative from the outset.83 The exiles had catastrophically 
overestimated its potential appeal. Despite its deeply conservative tone, the paper’s 
foreign ownership had rendered it suspicious in the eyes of Tory journalists. Although 
Klindworth persuaded Disraeli to write an article, the Morning Post proclaimed that 
the Spectateur was backed by Guizot and therefore dangerous, and even Croker was 
suspicious.84 Guizot thus had to explain to Croker that Klindworth was politically 
reliable and had proven useful to himself and Metternich.85  
 
Metternich received the Spectateur’s demise poorly. On 27 August, Klindworth 
informed him that due to a lack of demand, he would end publication in October.86 
After a mere month and a half of publication, the paper appeared to have no future, 
but Metternich thought otherwise, and appealed to the Russian Chancellor, Carl 
Robert Nesselrode for assistance. Metternich explained that the paper, which he 
described as a sensation in Germany and France, was run and financed by English 
friends, and needed further financial assistance. Metternich probably appealed to 
Russia because Czar Nicholas had provided him with funds for his personal upkeep, 
and his plea was couched in exaggerated, politicised terms to ensure that it was 
successful. But the Spectateur suffered from myriad problems.87  
 
The same day, Klindworth noted that English compositors struggled to arrange the 
newspaper’s French type, and that sixteen issues had cost £749 (~£60,000 today).88 
The paper was both incredibly expensive to produce and difficult to print. Metternich 
was very angry, and subsequently warned Klindworth’s daughter that it had to 
continue, because a large sum was coming from St Petersburg. She replied that it 
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could not, because her father had left Britain.89 Klindworth’s unreliability and the 
paper’s lack of appeal had ensured that this appeal failed, and Metternich’s 
confidence in Nesselrode was misplaced. Neither anonymous friends nor Nesselrode 
supported the publication, and the Spectateur retained a negative reputation amongst 
London’s refugee population for many years.90 Without an audience or sustained 
funding, the paper was a total failure.  
 
However, one contact made through the Spectateur had lasting consequences. 
Disraeli, who met the ‘mysterious Klindworth’ through his collaboration with the 
paper, was highly impressed by the German, who acted as his informant from July 
1848, and continued to provide him with intelligence concerning European and 
British politics into the 1870s. Rather than destabilise the Whig government in 1848-
49, Klindworth allowed Disraeli to plot intrigues against his colleagues and the 
Liberal opposition a decade later.91 
 
By the summer, the exiles had become bolder. Lieven sought to introduce Peel to the 
Legitimist Duc de Noailles, then visiting London, and Metternich returned to his 
previous confidence. In July, he extolled the virtues of ‘le système Metternich’ to 
Wellington, who agreed that a social revolution was occurring in Italy.92 Wellington 
did not only find agreement with Metternich’s assessment of European affairs. He 
also wanted Metternich to inspire his fractured party, and upon Metternich’s failure to 
visit Stratfieldsaye in August, Wellington replied that it would have been an honour; 
they could have discussed numerous subjects, notably Germany, and he could have 
introduced Metternich to the Tories’ leading speakers.93  Although Metternich 
rejected this opportunity to expand his audience and potentially strengthen the Tory 
opposition, perhaps owing to illness, he remained deeply interested in politics. 
Throughout the summer of 1848, he talked ‘almost exclusively on the news of the 
day’, and British friends sought and valued his viewpoints.94 Brougham applied to 
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both Metternich and Guizot alike for information on suffrage and reform, and Disraeli 
ensured that an article written for Metternich was printed in the Times.95 The ex-
Chancellor had cemented his place in Tory counsels. Metternich’s ambition to 
influence the British press had finally found assistance, and while his words were 
considered inspiring, he was considered a fount of information.  
 
Lieven actively demonised the French Republic prior to its first Presidential Election. 
In September, she told Lady Alice Peel that the election of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte 
(the future Napoleon III) would be a disaster. Although the information Lieven 
provided often changed - in less than two weeks, Bonaparte was transformed from 
finished into the most likely President - her negative opinion of him did not.96 She 
even revealed the likely composition of Bonaparte’s government to Aberdeen, news 
which she had received from a French general. Thiers would not be included, and 
would visit Louis Philippe, whilst another Orleanist, Odilon Barrot, would become 
Prime Minister.97 This apparently demonstrated Bonaparte’s weakness, for one of 
France’s leading politicians was instead treating with Louis Philippe. Lieven’s 
opinions, which detailed likely developments in French high politics, easily found an 
interested audience. 
 
Meanwhile, Guizot contributed two articles to the Quarterly, ‘On the State of 
Religion in France’ in June, and ‘Public Instruction in France under M. Guizot’ in 
December.98 Guizot’s first article, the authorship of which became an open secret, has 
been described as accusing the French government of practising the ‘class politics of 
annihilation’, and was largely devoted to clerical involvement in French politics.99 He 
also described the February Revolution as unwanted, and bizarrely blamed the 
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Jesuits.100 This appealed to the basest Tory prejudices against Roman Catholicism as 
well as their fear of upheaval, natural subjects for a Protestant victim of a revolution. 
Guizot’s second article, although written in the third person, was outright self-
promotion, concerning his tenure as Education Minister in the 1830s, and what 
‘England… would do well to imitate or avoid in the system and practice of her 
neighbours’.101 According to The Economist, it did not have the effect it was intended 
to.102 Even when anonymised, exile-inspired works drew criticism. Nevertheless, 
Guizot hoped to shape the contents of other publications, and was pleased when, in 
late October, Reeve offered to introduce him to his colleague Henry Woodham, who 
also contributed to the Edinburgh Review.103 Although his articles in the Quarterly 
failed to attract positive attention, Guizot’s friendship with Reeve allowed him to 
obtain further contacts within the British press. 
 
In late 1848, Brougham wrote a pamphlet which defended the ‘illustrious exiles’ and 
blamed the British government for the recent French revolution. It was reasonably 
successful, and soon ran to six editions.104 However, Brougham’s manuscript did not 
meet Guizot’s expectations. After reading an initial draft, Guizot sent the author some 
brief, constructive suggestions; that Brougham should have acknowledged that 
opposition to both dynasty and government had existed, and that France had not been 
peaceful in the 1830s. He instead suggested arguing that the July Monarchy had 
protected liberty from radicalism.105 This polite critique masked Guizot’s highly 
critical opinion of Brougham’s proposed work. Guizot sent Aberdeen a copy of his 
suggestions, and complained about the pamphlet’s ‘rash and inconsiderate’ content. 
Croker also received a copy of Guizot’s complaints, and replied that one of 
Brougham’s main faults was that ‘he does not read the other side of the argument’. 
Croker showed the letter to Lords Hardwicke, Stanley and Strangford, all of whom 
were ‘very much interested and pleased with it’.106 Rather than side with Brougham, 
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this cross-section of Tories supported Guizot’s contentions, which the author 
accepted; he subsequently edited his pamphlet.107  
 
However, Brougham’s argument was not his own. His main contention - that the 
British press had contributed to the February revolution - reflected the opinion of 
Louis Philippe. Hobhouse had noted on 31 March that the ex-King ‘attributed his fall 
to the discontent… brought by the press, and chiefly the English press, accusing Lord 
Palmerston of encouraging the clamour’.108 Louis Philippe’s argument and Guizot’s 
suggestions had shaped a pamphlet designed to discredit the government. Once again, 
exile critique, although this time of their ally Brougham, rather than the government, 
was supported by a cross-section of Tory politicians. Conversely, Erzsébet Andics has 
suggested that the pamphlet betrayed Metternich’s influence.109 Little evidence exists 
to substantiate this, but a sketch written by Brougham in 1848, concerning 
revolutions, does include Metternich’s favourite sentiment that Italy had never been 
united.110  
 
Soon after, Guizot published a pamphlet of his own, entitled Democracy in France. 
Confident that it would be successful in Britain, Guizot sent copies to Peel and 
Aberdeen, and further copies to Lieven for her to give to Metternich and Mahon, who, 
like her, were wintering in Brighton. Guizot asked which Ministers he should send 
copies to (he suggested Russell, Lansdowne and Palmerston), but Lieven replied that 
he should just send Lansdowne a French edition, probably owing to his French family 
connections; she was scared to offend Russell and Palmerston.111 Although the exiles 
were engaged in often savage criticism of the British government, the loss of social 
relations with government ministers were not worth risking.  Guizot’s pamphlet 
otherwise earned ‘great merit and success’ among Britain’s elite, although Brougham, 
while praising it, ‘asked him to add a page to tell us what the deuce he would be at’.112 
This was probably because the pamphlet was intended for a French audience – 
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Macaulay thought that it gave ‘matter for thought’, but was ‘too abstract for [his] 
English notions.’ He felt that it would ‘fall quite dead… in London’.113  
 
Whilst Guizot’s pamphlet was accorded a mixed reaction by British politicians, the 
support of British friends was vital to its production. Guizot’s liberal friend Sarah 
Austin pressed him to publish, and according to a thankful Guizot, it would never 
have appeared without Croker’s advice. The experienced publicist had advised Guizot 
that his pamphlet could be published in 24 hours, that printing it in French would limit 
its appeal in Britain, and that its export to France might be prevented by the French 
government.114 Guizot was reliant upon the advice of British friends, and he was also 
helped to promote the pamphlet in Britain. On 21 February, Aberdeen wrote to 
Delane that the Times’ review should provide a ‘dignified medium between the 
unqualified admiration of the Standard and the affected indifference of the 
[Palmerstonian] Globe’, and explain that it was ‘addressed to France’. Aberdeen 
wanted to subtly ‘give credit to so great a master of his art’.115 Had the Times’ review 
been comprised solely of platitudes and praise, unwelcome rumours of exile influence 
could well have proliferated. While the pamphlet was Guizot’s work alone, British 
collaborators were vital in both its production and promotion.  
 
The Exiles and the Tory Leadership 
 
In late 1848, the exiles again turned their attention towards the Conservative party. 
Although Disraeli’s forceful rhetoric had brought him to the fore of the Protectionists, 
he ineffectively shared their Commons leadership with the elderly J.C. Herries and 
Bentinck’s brother Lord Granby.116 After the divisive Bentinck’s sudden death in 
September, the question of his successors caught the exiles’ attention. Lieven reported 
Bentinck’s death to Guizot on 22 September, and Guizot discussed it with Croker and 
his publicist J.G. Lockhart the next day; he was told that it would not make rallying 
the party any easier, although Peel was anxious for a reunion.117 Despite their strong 
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interest in reuniting the Conservatives, the exiles could seemingly do little to help 
them. However, Bentinck’s death spurred Metternich, who was interested in 
Disraeli’s advancement.118 Prior to Bentinck’s death, Metternich had written to 
Disraeli concerning an article upon the Conservative leadership, which ‘asked many 
questions’ and gave Disraeli advice on pursuing the position of Tory leader in the 
Commons. This interest persisted, and in January, Metternich requested a 
‘confidential dispatch’ on the matter from Disraeli, and for news of political 
developments to be sent to Brighton, where he often discussed politics with Mahon.119 
While Metternich requested news about Tory prospects from a Protectionist, he 
discussed it with the Peelite Mahon. The ex-Chancellor was as interested in the 
party’s reunion as Guizot and Lieven, but unlike them, he was willing to intervene, 
and wanted to support his British protégé. 
 
Metternich greatly underestimated the problems which Disraeli and his party faced. 
Disraeli replied to him that it would be a ‘great anomaly’ for a non-aristocrat to lead 
the Tories, and he would willingly follow anyone capable, ‘watch the Whigs, check 
Sir Robert Peel and beat back the revolutionary waves of the Manchester School’.120 
When confronted with this letter, Disraeli’s biographer thought it ironic that an enemy 
of parliamentary government should advise one of the Commons’ leading orators.121  
 
The task of providing advice to the ambitious MP was actually beyond Metternich’s 
abilities. Metternich deferred to Aberdeen, and sent him Disraeli’s letter, which 
Aberdeen thought ‘one most extraordinary ever made to a publick [sic] man’; he 
scarcely knew ‘what answers would have been expected’. Aberdeen warned that 
Disraeli would be a ‘commander whom his troops would not respect, or obey with 
much alacrity’, and should be told to ‘point to the reconciliation and reunion of the 
great body of men by whose united efforts evil may be prevented, and good 
government secured’. Metternich consequently wrote a long letter to Disraeli which 
outlined the need for a united Conservative party.122 The letter was Metternich’s 
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work, but the message was Aberdeen’s – that Disraeli should pursue Conservative 
unity rather than oppose Peel and his allies, in spite of the personal and political 
differences between them. 
 
As Chamberlain notes, Disraeli did not detect Aberdeen’s role.123 Such was the value 
Disraeli placed on Metternich’s opinion that the ex-Chancellor could present 
Aberdeen’s advice as his own, and Disraeli heeded this advice. From 1849 onwards, 
he increasingly spoke of a ‘Conservative’ rather than ‘Protectionist’ Party, and soon 
attempted to create what J.B. Conacher called ‘an alternative system of agricultural 
relief’ to ‘wean his party off the pure milk of protection’.124 Whereas Lieven 
bemoaned the lack of a sole Tory leader, Metternich had actively intervened and 
persuaded Disraeli to seek reconciliation with the Peelites.125 This fitted in squarely 
with Aberdeen’s own ambitions to reunite the Tories and return to power.  On 12 
January, Guizot noted that Aberdeen would be very glad if Palmerston fell, and on the 
28th, Aberdeen’s youngest son recorded that if his father were to ‘seize power it [was] 
now in his grasp’ while Palmerston ‘unwisely’ provoked him with ‘calumnious 
articles in the Globe, one of which he folded up to show Mme de Lieven’. Aberdeen 
subsequently discussed seeking office, albeit with ‘that shifty fellow’ Brougham.126 In 
conjunction with both Metternich and Brougham, Aberdeen had considered the 
formation of a broad-based Conservative government, and sought Lieven’s assistance 
in an attempt to restrain Palmerston. The exiles and Aberdeen’s interests coincided in 
reuniting the Tories and weakening Palmerston, and thereby played an important role 
in the ex-Foreign Secretary’s attempts to secure a united, Conservative government. 
 
This increasingly cooperative atmosphere cheered Guizot, and on 1 February he 
announced to Lieven a widely anticipated attack by Stanley upon the government’s 
foreign policy. However, Guizot was concerned that exile interest might undermine 
any such attack, which would require Tory unity to succeed.  Guizot had recently 
discussed politics with the influential courtier Charles Greville, but not mentioned 
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Disraeli’s ambitions, sure that Greville would repeat anything to Russell.127 Despite 
the exiles’ willingness to help the Tories, any intimation of exile interest in a Tory 
reunion would have galvanised the government in a debate.  
 
However, Guizot’s optimism that the Tories would unite to defeat the government 
was misplaced.  Palmerston survived this ‘mediocre’ attack, and Disraeli’s 
pretensions of leadership upset numerous Conservatives.128 Although Lieven 
commented on 19 March that Peel thought the cabinet was in a bad state, and that he 
would consequently act, exile optimism proved unsound, and exile suggestions 
proved unpalatable.129 Despite their deep interest in the Tories’ reunion and 
friendships with Peelites and Protectionists alike, the exiles’ various uncoordinated 
efforts proved to be in vain. 
 
Meanwhile, Metternich pored over news provided by Conservatives. On January 17th, 
he thanked Mahon for sending him observations he had made in Paris, which 
provided an ‘interesting tableau’ of the ‘modern Babel’.130 This intelligence had a 
conspiratorial tone; it included an extract of a letter from a ‘man of the Whig party, 
but of very good sense’ (probably Palmerston’s opponent Edward Ellice) considering 
the likelihood of a Bourbon or Orleans restoration.131 Mahon willingly provided 
Metternich with information to fuel his interest in European affairs, and Brougham 
went even further, both in geographical terms and provision of information. Mahon 
noted on 15 January that Metternich had shown him a letter from Brougham, in 
Stuttgart, ‘giving some account of German affairs’. Brougham considered himself one 
of Metternich’s oldest English friends, and sent him letters ‘punctually and 
frequently’.132  
 
These networks bridged international borders. King Ernest of Hanover, formerly 
Duke of Cumberland, occasionally corresponded with Lieven, and in July 1848, 
Ernest was glad that she and ‘all [his] friends in England approv[ed]’ his policies. He 
added that nobody had done more to ‘unite Germany together’ than himself – ‘ask our 
                                                 
127  Guizot to Lieven, 1 February 1849, FG, 163MI11/2254 
128  Guizot to Lieven, 3 February 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2260 
129  Lieven to Guizot, 19 March, Ibid., 163MI11/2288 
130  Metternich to Mahon, 17 January 1849, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C350 
131  Mahon to Metternich, n.d. (1849), RAM, AC10/467 ff.5-8 
132  Mahon to Stanhope, 26 April 1848, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C317/15; Mahon to Stanhope, 15 
January 1849, Ibid., f.16. 
 115 
friend Metternich if this is not completely true’.133 The support of the exiles and their 
Tory allies encouraged the reactionary monarch, and on 4 January 1849, Strangford 
provided Metternich with a letter from Ernest, who had asked him to pass copies to 
Metternich, Wellington and Lyndhurst, judged by Ernest to be ‘persons worthy of 
confidence’. Ernest was happy that his policies had Tory approval, and added that ‘the 
majority of English politicians ha[d] no knowledge of the real state of Germany’. He 
accused Palmerston of being ‘as ignorant… as a schoolboy’, and insisted that the idea 
of a sole German state, the subject of vociferous debate in the German Diet, was 
preposterous, useful only to ‘radicals, democrats and bankrupts’.134 Rather than 
simply provide Metternich with intelligence, Strangford became an intermediary 
between the exiled Chancellor and European allies. Tories and exiles alike wished to 
see the restoration of “order” in Europe, and therefore facilitated each other’s 
communications. 
 
Metternich, Guizot and the Tory Press 
 
Metternich also claimed to exercise some influence over the British press.135 Whilst 
this claim may sound preposterous in light of Tory criticism of the Spectateur and the 
Times’ cautious attitude towards exile influence, it is quite possible that Metternich 
held some sway over British journalists. Unspecified journalists were among the ‘men 
of value’ whom Metternich associated with, and he did influence certain writers’ 
outputs.136 An article in the Quarterly on Germany that September was written with 
‘hints and notes’ from him, and its contents reflect his viewpoints.137 The article 
claimed that institutions representing all Germany created after Napoleon’s defeat had 
been impracticable, as were the aims of the federal Diet, then sitting at Frankfurt and 
considering German unity.138 Although unwilling to publicise the assistance it had 
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received from the ex-Chancellor, the Conservative publication utilised his comments 
to attack the idea of German unity.  
 
Metternich even took an interest in who wrote individual articles. In December, he 
asked Aberdeen who had written a leading article in the Morning Chronicle 
concerning the Diet, reflecting his view that Germany was as disunited as Italy, and 
that the ideas discussed at Frankfurt were impractical.139 Aberdeen replied that the 
author was the liberal MP John Macgregor, and agreed that although the British press 
had ‘materially contributed to the revolutionary outbreaks’, it was now ‘making full 
amends’ - or at least more ‘respectable titles’ were.140 Similarly, as Mary S. Millar 
describes, Metternich’s interest in the authorship of another article in the Chronicle, 
which predicted France’s lapse into dictatorship, led him to ask Disraeli who had 
authored it. Upon being told that the author was Strangford’s son, the Tory MP 
George Smythe, Metternich had several of Smythe’s articles translated for German 
newspapers.141 Even if they did not do the exiles’ bidding, Tory publications at least 
sometimes agreed with the exiles. Smythe consequently found both exile praise and 
patronage, and in turn, Metternich used the Tory MP’s words for his own ends.  
 
Metternich continued to write for British audiences throughout his exile. Another 
Quarterly article, The German Confederation and Austria, published in the spring of 
1849, was written under his supervision, and he was acknowledged as the author of 
around a third of its article on Baxter’s Impressions on Europe; Lockhart thought it 
‘queer’ to have articles inspired by Louis Philippe and Metternich in the same 
issue.142 His ideas found an interested audience, and the Quarterly’s publisher had 
further plans concerning the ex-Chancellor. After Metternich read the publisher John 
Murray a draft chapter of his reminiscences, concerning his meeting with Napoleon in 
1813, Murray offered him three or four thousand pounds for the completed work. 
Although Metternich suggested that it was too soon, he clearly sought further 
publicity by promoting the work, and the chapter struck the Tory writer Sir Travers 
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Twiss so profoundly that he could recall it 20 years later.143 As Metternich found 
further adherents among Tory journalists, they were increasingly receptive of his 
writings and willing to share his views. 
 
Metternich’s hope that the Times would cast Austria in a positive light was further 
fulfilled in August 1849, when Delane sought Metternich’s help in publishing reports 
from Hungary, where Austrian forces were combating nationalist rebels. In a letter to 
Aberdeen, Delane complained about the Hungarian revolution of which ‘we have 
lately heard so much and know so little’, and announced that he intended to send a 
correspondent named John Paton, to cover the war, furnished with a letter of 
introduction from Metternich. Although Paton was ‘a good Austrian’, Delane needed 
Metternich’s help to ensure access and prove that his correspondent would produce 
suitably pro-Austrian accounts.144 Rather than directly influence the contents of the 
influential newspaper, Metternich’s approbation was sought in order to produce pro-
Austrian reports. The ex-Chancellor complied, and Paton did as expected; in an 1850 
letter to Aberdeen, Metternich praised Paton’s supposed ‘impartiality’ and 
‘accuracy’.145 Metternich’s intervention was crucial in the publication of these reports, 
and after his departure, Metternich claimed to have had greater influence than he 
could ever imagined over the Quarterly Review, Times and Morning Chronicle, which 
he believed to defend his views and express his opinions.146  
 
Because few traces of his direct influence over the latter two publications exist, it 
might be argued that their output simply reflected agreement with Metternich on 
certain matters. However, at  his suggestion, Austrian diplomats mounted ‘a counter-
offensive in the British press’– one which could not compete with the Hungarian 
refugee Ferencz Pulszky’s influence over liberal titles, but was certainly noticed.147 
When Kossuth visited Britain in 1851, British supporters publicly burned copies of 
the Times.148 Although only directly responsible for a few articles, Metternich met 
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various (unnamed) British journalists, and was also responsible for an Austrian 
propaganda offensive.  
 
Conversely, Guizot was able to insert an article directly into the Times. During an 
attempt to be elected to the National Assembly, on 15 April 1849, Guizot requested 
that Reeve had his manifesto translated and published, confident that Reeve had been 
so kind to him that he did not hesitate to ask.149 The article appeared the next day, 
introduced with a statement that Guizot’s call for conservatives to unite into a ‘Party 
of Order’ was being read avidly and a major topic of conversation. This introduction 
was backdated the 14th, the day before Guizot had written to Reeve. Although Reeve 
remained supportive of Guizot’s ambitions, and even introduced his manifesto with a 
laudatory statement, any implication of exile influence had to be avoided.150 
 
Sympathetic journalists were not necessarily under exile influence. Articles in the 
Times and Chronicle found Lieven’s approval, and Metternich similarly praised the 
Chronicle. But the paper was in fact ‘quite under [Aberdeen’s] direction’.151 Tory 
papers more often reflected the exiles’ opinions than republished them. For example, 
when Strangford sent Metternich a Morning Post article in February1849, he 
commented that Metternich might recognise ‘the hand of someone who studied in 
[his] school’, probably Smythe.152 There were conservative influences upon 
journalists independent of the exiles. Delane was pro-Austrian, and Reeve had ‘not 
inconsiderable influence’ over him.153 Moreover, according to Delane, Reeve was 
often inspired by ‘his dynastic tendencies, or rather those of his patrons’ such as 
Greville, which ‘constantly made us advocates of an unpopular and anti-national 
policy’ - and Greville was a friend of Guizot.154 The exiles could well have influenced 
the contents of other Times articles via their British allies. Although the exiles 
exercised a degree of influence over the British press, many Britons, including 
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journalists, simply came to the same conclusions about European affairs as right-wing 
refugees. 
 
Exile Influence and Tory Struggles 
 
By the summer of 1849, Metternich’s influence over Aberdeen had become obvious. 
The liberal MP Ralph Bernal Osborne savagely commented upon ‘the melancholy 
drone of the Scotch bagpipe, turned out of ... of Downing-street, raising a lament for 
what was called the lost glory of ‘our ancient ally’ (i.e. Metternich).155 This 
accusation is borne out in Aberdeen’s papers.  Before speaking on renewed hostilities 
in northern Italy in March, Aberdeen was ‘very glad to receive’ Metternich’s critique 
of the Sardinians; he later gave ‘a thousand thanks’ for a memorandum on King 
Charles Albert of Sardinia, and asked Metternich to discuss the French intervention in 
Italy;  and after a ‘satisfactory’ debate on Italy in July, Aberdeen returned a selection 
of papers to him.156 Metternich’s views and knowledge inspired Aberdeen’s speeches 
concerning the latest battleground of the revolutions, where Anglo-French attempts to 
broker a compromise peace had again failed. 
 
The ex-Chancellor’s suggestions and links to Austria were of great interest to his 
British allies, and he was encouraged by their efforts in Parliament. Metternich 
lavishly praised a speech made by Brougham on 22 April, especially Brougham’s 
characterisation of Charles Albert as mad to renew hostilities.157  But by 3 April, 
Aberdeen was very sorry that Neumann would soon depart, for the refugee diplomat 
formed ‘the sole link between Austria and England who could be of real use’ in an 
‘official capacity’.158 Aberdeen corresponded with the Austrian Ambassador in Paris 
for the same reason.159 Although Metternich inspired a great deal of Aberdeen’s 
Parliamentary invective, the ex-Chancellor was not an effective channel for 
communication with Austria.  
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The exiles remained interested in a Tory reunion. On 4 July, Guizot announced to 
Lieven that Lord Lincoln, a leading Peelite MP, had told him that Peel would speak 
on Disraeli’s agricultural motion prior to the recess; but Guizot feared that Peel would 
not make concessions to the Protectionists.160 Although willing to see cooperation 
between Peelites and Protectionists, Guizot understood that a reunion could not come 
about over trade, and that foreign affairs offered firmer ground. Such an opportunity 
soon arose. On 19 July, prior to a debate on Italy initiated by Brougham, Aberdeen 
told Lieven that he was confident of success in September, and expected to gain a 
‘respectable minority’ in the debate.161 Aberdeen was confident of eventually 
defeating Palmerston, perhaps with Lieven’s help, and two days later, she 
optimistically announced to Guizot that the debate had ended at 4AM, and that Lady 
Palmerston was worried.162  
 
Although Brougham spoke poorly and at length, Stanley and Aberdeen both excelled.  
This was a major debate, which attracted a great deal of Conservative support. Lord 
Heytesbury, the former Ambassador to Russia and a Tory, made his maiden speech 
aged 70.163 The government majority was a mere 12, and Palmerston condemned 
Aberdeen as being under Metternich’s influence. Yet despite this progress, the result 
was much to Guizot’s regret.164  The exiles’ British friends had inched closer to 
defeating the government with Lieven and Metternich’s encouragement. However, 
Aberdeen blamed Brougham for the defeat.165 While Aberdeen’s patient approach 
exasperated the ambitious Lieven, the Tory reunion and vote of censure against 
Palmerston which the exiles wanted had been scuppered by one of their allies. The 
chance of an exile-inspired Conservative reunion against Palmerston appeared to be 
lost. 
 
Lieven remained confident that she could inspire such a reunion. She continued to 
provide Aberdeen with information on Whig weaknesses, and was overjoyed when 
the Cabinet was divided over colonial policy in August.166 Even during the 
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Parliamentary recess she sent Aberdeen information which implied that the 
government could be defeated.167 This came from multifarious sources; Bulwer 
provided news from Frankfurt, and on 1 August, Beauvale showed her a letter he had 
received from Ponsonby, the British Minister to Austria.168 Lieven had placed herself 
at the centre of intrigues against the government, and her best chance arose in 
September.  
 
Lieven sent Guizot (who had returned to France) a letter from Beauvale dated 18 
September, detailing how Palmerston and Russell had fallen out over the appointment 
of a Catholic governor of Malta. Beauvale expected that if the Maltese government 
and its ‘council of Jesuits’ were sacrificed, the Tories would not be offended, but the 
Radicals whom the government relied upon in the Commons would be.169 This meant 
that the Radicals and Tories might combine to defeat Russell, circumstances which 
could well have led to Russell’s resignation and the possible formation of a Tory 
government. Russell was forced to seek Radical support, and on 23 September, 
Guizot commented that there was no more that the Prime Minister could do.170 
However, the crisis which had threatened to create an exploitable chasm had already 
passed. Palmerston told Lieven that the affair reminded him ‘of Lord Grey, who 
always said let a thing alone; in dropping it, it mends sooner than itself.’171  Although 
both Tory factions could have exploited this break in Parliament while Lieven 
exploited it in society, this crisis was averted as suddenly as it had emerged. 
 
Lieven’s last intrigue in exile did not even receive Aberdeen’s support. In September, 
after the failure of the Hungarian revolution, disagreement erupted between Turkey 
and Russia and Austria over the extradition of defeated rebels who had fled to Turkey. 
While Austria and Russia demanded that the refugees, who were of Hungarian and 
Polish origin, were deported to stand trial, Britain and France supported Turkish 
refusals to do so. This disagreement threatened to escalate into conflict, and Lieven 
was horrified at the prospect. Throughout September and October, she kept Aberdeen 
apace of events.  Lieven informed Aberdeen of Schwarzenberg’s negative response to 
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a British despatch, disgustedly warned him about the ‘mischief’ being encouraged, 
and even suggested that war could only be averted by extraditing the refugees. 
However, war was avoided without the refugees’ deportation, and Aberdeen thought 
the government’s reaction pacific and sensible.172  Although he could have exploited 
Britain’s conduct during the crisis and its support for escaped rebels to unite the 
Tories against the government, Aberdeen agreed with Palmerston’s course, in spite of 
the detailed information which Lieven had provided him with. She returned to Paris 
soon after. But the exiles and their Tory associates continued to hold each other in 
high regard. 
 
Whilst the exiles’ suggestions were sometimes rejected, they had established a 
reasonable degree of influence. Not only did they inspire Tory critiques of the Whig 
government’s foreign policy, but attempted to unify the Conservative party, and the 
failure of the Spectateur notwithstanding, found a great deal of support in the press. 
The exiles of 1848 certainly made an impression amongst British allies, and vice 
versa. Ostensibly, these refugees do not appear to have achieved a great deal. Their 
goal of uniting the Tories proved unattainable even by the Tories themselves. In spite 
of Stanley’s hope to engineer a reunion, political and personal differences with Peel 
and his closest associates ensured that this ultimately failed, even though most Peelite 
backbenchers eventually joined the Protectionists.173  
 
Nevertheless, the exiles had encouraged the Tories, and vice versa, found support in 
the press and even came close enough to defeating the government to embarrass and 
frustrate Palmerston. In terms of influence exercised by refugees of either left or right 
over British politics, theirs was vast, and appreciated by their allies, some of whom 
continued to utilise these relationships in subsequent years and even decades.  It 
should also be noted that the exiles were at the centre of a complex web of 
relationships between Palmerston’s Conservative opponents, revealing a previously 
unknown depth of Tory willingness to reunite over foreign policy. Although the 
Conservative party remained divided, the exiles’ efforts had enabled a degree of 
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strategic cooperation undertaken by the two Tory factions, which historians have 
previously failed to recognise. 
 124 
5: The Whig Government and the Exiles, 1848-49 
 
Although refugee opinion had far less impact upon Whigs than the ideologically 
sympathetic Tories, the exiles’ prominence and political activities ensured that Whigs 
came into contact with their views. This chapter explores the complex relationship 
which developed between the exiles and members of the Whig government, one 
which swung between interest and concern as political necessities dictated. It first 
considers the exiles’ impact upon British foreign policy, and then contemplates the 
exiles’ social relations with Whigs, and how these interactions influenced both 
government policy and Whig perceptions of the course of events in Europe during 
1848-49. The chapter also explores the political importance of the royal refugees’ 
relationships with the British royal family. Although the exiles were often hostile to 
the government, its relationship with them was highly complicated, coloured by 
attempts to both prevent and exploit exile intrigue. 
 
Whereas Tories welcomed the exiles of 1848, members of the Whig government were 
both sympathetic to the exiles’ plight and incredibly critical of them. One junior 
minister, George Cornewall Lewis, reckoned that Louis Philippe would be treated 
respectfully, but without any ‘real sympathy’. Lewis joked that the ex-King had got 
his just desserts for banning dinners, and Guizot feared such a hostile reception from 
Whigs and Tories alike.1  Metternich was subject to especially harsh criticism: 
Palmerston remarked that people ‘say that I should be surprised at what an old 
twaddle he has become’.2 Central to these comments and expectations were the 
exiles’ failures to maintain order or introduce reforms, only to find themselves 
confronted with revolution. However, on 2 May, Palmerston called upon Metternich.3 
Despite the ostensibly polar differences between the two statesmen’s views, 
Palmerston willingly met the ex-Chancellor, and such meetings were a regular 
occurrence. Whereas high society was often divided politically in France, in Britain, 
politicians who often violently disagreed met socially, a fact which impressed Thiers 
upon his arrival in 1852.4  
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In this setting, the exiles came into close contact with Whigs, and although their 
politics differed, there was a strong degree of mutual respect between the exiles and 
Whig politicians. While Hobhouse disliked Guizot’s ‘public character’, he found him 
‘amiable in private’, and Macaulay similarly ‘liked and esteemed’ Guizot, but found 
his politics ‘detestable’.5 Hobhouse joked that while the ‘English funds’ had initially 
fallen after the revolution, they had risen back, which the Orléans would never do – 
he was relieved, however, that Guizot and the Orléans family were safe.6 Personal 
consideration triumphed over political differences, and the exiles found a great deal of 
attention from Whigs who criticised their roads to ruin. The liberal economist Nassau 
Senior befriended many of the ‘distinguished exiles’ who ‘made London society… so 
brilliant’, and Guizot was often received at the Whig bastion Holland House – he later 
recalled friendships with Russell, Lansdowne and Macaulay.7 As Aberdeen noted, 
Guizot won ‘universal respect and esteem’ in exile.8 Despite the differences between 
the exiles and their liberal hosts, they were welcomed as victims and accepted into the 
social circles which doubled as political forums. 
 
This social acceptance afforded the exiles access to discussions about British politics 
and diplomacy. By April 1849, Guizot could elaborate on Britain’s Austrian policy, 
Prince Albert’s ‘Germanic fantasies’, and even instructions sent to Prussia.9 They 
were not only able to obtain detailed information about British foreign policy. Upon 
Lieven’s departure, Russell’s wife sent ‘[o]ne little word of remembrance...  in return 
for your many messages’. Lieven and Russell had settled and unsettled ‘the affairs of 
Europe’ at her ‘fantasie’.10  The exiles were at the centre of numerous discussions in 
high society concerning the fate of Europe at a critical time, and in turn they provided 
Whigs with information upon an informal basis. Clarendon thought Guizot’s opinions 
‘always worth having’, although he held him more responsible for the turmoil of 
1848-50 ‘than any other human’.11  
                                                 
5  27 November 1848, Lady Dorchester (ed.), Recollections of a Long Life (6 Vols., London, 1911), vi 
p.227; Thomas Macaulay to Selina Macaulay, 13 March 1848., Pinney, T. (ed.), The Letters of Thomas 
Babington Macaulay (6 Vols, London, 1974-81), iv p.362 
6  Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 2-6 March 1848, Hobhouse Papers, Mss Eur F213/22, p.236 
7  Senior, Italy and France, i p.v; Guizot to Sir John Boileau, 7 October 1867, Boileau Papers 66/117; 
Lord Ilchester, The Chronicles of Holland House, 1820-1900 (London, 1937), pp.374-75; Hayward, 
Abraham, Sketches of Eminent Statesmen and Writers with Other Essays (London, 1880), ii p.225 
8  Aberdeen to Guizot, 23 July 1849, Stanmore (ed.), Aberdeen, ix no.110 
9  Guizot to Dumon, 21 April 1849, Witt, H.E. (ed.),  Lettres de M. Guizot à sa Famille et à ses Amis 
(Paris, 1884), p.263  
10  Lady John Russell to Princess Lieven, [n.d., 1849], Lieven Papers, Add. MS 47377 f.46 
11
 126 
 
Access to society afforded the exiles a degree of influence upon Whig perceptions of 
European events, and therefore government policy. Although the exiles’ ambitions 
focused upon encouraging Tory unity, interactions with Whigs provided an additional 
arena to promote their ideals and exercise their ambitions; and like the Conservative 
opposition, the Whig government sought to exploit the exiles’ continental links. 
 
Not all of the exiles were met with such an ambiguous welcome by their peers; for in 
the British royal family, the exiled Orléans family had sympathetic friends who 
wielded some influence over government policy. Prince Albert visited the exiles soon 
after their installation at Claremont House in Surrey, loaned to them by King Leopold 
of the Belgians, and invited the fallen King and Queen to Buckingham Palace with 
Palmerston’s consent.12 That Albert visited alone has been interpreted as a snub; yet 
Queen Victoria was awaiting the imminent birth of her sixth child, and unable to 
travel. 13  
  
Although the Queen was initially critical of Louis Philippe and blamed his downfall 
on being ‘blind to the facts’, she also credited the ex-King for 16 years of European 
peace.14  While Europe was plagued by revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
turmoil, Louis Philippe’s reign represented a relative golden age, and the Queen soon 
forgave what she considered to be Louis Philippe’s greatest blunder, the Spanish 
marriages.15 The Queen was quickly transformed from Louis Philippe’s sympathiser 
to his open supporter. 
 
This enthusiastic partisanship unsurprisingly caused a clash with the Foreign 
Secretary. Palmerston felt that Louis Philippe had ‘no doubt persuaded her’ that the 
revolution was his fault, and that only Prince Albert’s ‘good sense and influence’ had 
prevented ‘imprudent’ displays of sympathy.16 Both Sir George Grey and Palmerston 
consequently warned her to restrain her friendship for the Orléans, and Lord Grey also 
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voiced a ‘strong opinion’ on showing ‘more than mere hospitality’.17  Any intimation 
of royal friendliness seemingly risked either discontent in Britain, or damaging good 
relations with the new French Republic, with which Palmerston sought an entente as a 
means of restraining its apparent ambitions to support republicanism throughout 
Europe, and securing Britain’s own foreign policy objectives. 
 
The Prince of Prussia also received royal attention. As Hannah Pakula notes, Prince 
Albert attempted to ‘press his solutions to the German problem’ upon him, and 
thought that he successfully modified ‘his friend’s attitude’.18 This proved not to be 
the case, and Otto von Bismarck later ‘played skilfully’ on Wilhelm’s ‘deepest fears’ 
– a repeat of the revolutionary turmoil of 1848.19  Although the Prince was only 
present in Britain for a few months, he too found the royal family’s sympathy, and 
thereby briefly occupied a position from which he could influence their interpretations 
of events in Germany. 
 
The Exiles and British Foreign Policy 
 
Soon after the revolution in France, Palmerston feared that Orleanist plots might 
anger the French provisional government. This threatened to undermine the 
cornerstone of his foreign policy, for whereas Aberdeen and Guizot’s entente cordiale 
had been personal, the first object’ of Palmerston’s policy after 1848 was an entente, 
or agreement, between the French and British governments.20 Palmerston quickly 
instructed Normanby to state that the Orléans would be received merely as exiles, and 
that no plotting would be tolerated.21 This concern was actuated by the republic’s 
apparent weakness.  ‘If I was to back an event to come off, I should lay the odds on 
the Comte de Paris’, he noted on 18 March.22 An Orléans restoration would have 
upset Palmerston’s hopes for both stability in France and Anglo-French cooperation, 
and he therefore sought to keep Orléans comfortable and uninterested in power.  
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On 19 May, Palmerston instructed Normanby to remind the French head of state, 
Alphonse de Lamartine, of his decision not to confiscate the Orléans properties, 
because the high-minded’ French nation would not wish to see them suffer ‘the 
pressure of penury’.23 These comments were calculated to flatter the new republican 
regime, but the French government was worried about a potential Orléans restoration 
in the weeks after the revolution. Louis Philippe’s officer sons (the Duc d’Aumale, 
Governor General of Algeria, and Prince de Joinville, a navy captain serving off 
North Africa) were of greater concern than the rest of the family, because of their 
potential to lead an Orleanist counterrevolution.24 Palmerston was right to avoid 
causing any offence in relation to the Orléans’ ambitions, considering the French 
republic’s initial fears of civil war. 
 
Whilst the princes voluntarily followed their family into exile and resolved this 
concern by themselves, the exiles’ presence in Britain remained a potential point of 
contention with France.  In August, the French Ambassador in London was recalled 
after he was seen walking ‘arm in arm with Guizot’; Palmerston joked to Normanby 
that ‘there never was a more rapid military movement’.25 But although he was amused 
by the incident, the Foreign Secretary was painfully aware that the slightest 
impression of favouring the exiles could offend the unstable republican government, 
and fears of an Orleanist restoration continued to circulate in Britain as the summer 
approached. Lady Normanby was sure that the French ‘would call for a King’ and 
‘certainly some wish[ed] the Crown to go to’ Louis Philippe’s grandson the Comte de 
Paris’, while the diplomat Lord Howden warned Palmerston that a French 
correspondent had noticed that ‘a very steadily increasing party’, including the 
majority of junior officers (‘who entirely command[ed] the French army’) favoured 
appointing Joinville as Paris’ regent.26  
 
Although these reports were little more than gossip, they underlined widespread 
concerns about the Republic’s chances of survival, and were reflected in Palmerston’s 
own concerns. As far as the Foreign Secretary was aware, Parisian society favoured 
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Charles X’s grandson the Duc de Bordeaux (now also known as the Comte de 
Chambord); but Paris might be considered an alternative owing to his ‘infancy’. 
Whilst this exempted him ‘from blame’ for the revolution, it also disqualified him for 
the throne in tumultuous times.27 In Palmerston’s opinion, even after the repression of 
the violent ‘June Days’ motivated by the closure of ‘National Workshops’ for the 
unemployed, France was threatened with further revolutionary turmoil, and the ten 
year-old Paris’ accession would have compounded this.  
 
Palmerston was not alone in fearing that the exiles’ presence was a potential threat to 
good Anglo-French relations. On 4 July, Clarendon advised Russell to ‘make some 
formal communication’ about Anglophobia in France. Although Clarendon blamed 
the Irish famine, it was made ‘the more necessary’ by the presence of Louis Philippe 
‘and so many emigrants’, which could ‘incline the French people to believe that we 
are intriguing for a restoration’ and  ‘ dispose them favourably towards their own 
republic and… war’.28 Any implication of Orléans influence over the British 
government was unacceptable, for it threatened to destroy Palmerston’s entente. 
 
Not all of the exiles posed a threat to British diplomacy; Klindworth actually provided 
Palmerston with an opportunity. Once aware of Klindworth’s presence in April, 
Palmerston consulted Normanby. Although Metternich and Guizot had both fallen 
from power, their former intermediary – who had also been a British informant – was 
potentially of interest as a spy. Normanby replied that because ‘numerous copies of 
Guizot’s personal papers’ had recently been published, Klindworth, whose reports 
were amongst them, would be ‘a very useless agent, till he is forgotten again’. 
However, the refugee agent could be relied upon to ride for ‘the master of the 
moment’, and although paid a yearly pension by Guizot, Klindworth was only 
nominally a conservative. 29 Klindworth offered his services to the Foreign Secretary 
in August, and Palmerston evidently followed Normanby’s advice.30 
 
In contrast, Metternich failed to influence British diplomacy. After Austria suffered 
several humiliating defeats to Sardinian-led forces, in May 1848, it sent a special 
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envoy, Count Hummelauer, to London to secure a compromise peace. The settlement 
proposed the creation of a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom under an Austrian Viceroy, 
to prevent French intervention or Sardinian expansion, and even after further 
concessions, it was rejected by the British Cabinet.31 However, Metternich continued 
to support the idea. In a letter to Beauvale dated 12 August, Metternich stressed the 
necessity of the British government adopting it, perhaps hopeful that the former 
diplomat could persuade his brother-in-law Palmerston of its value.32 Metternich 
provided Beauvale with possible alternative peace terms, of which Palmerston made a 
copy; but Metternich’s efforts came to naught.33 By then, the Austrians had inflicted 
some severe defeats upon the Sardinians, and imposed an armistice.  
 
Palmerston believed that Metternich no longer had any influence in Austria. When the 
Austrian diplomat Count Dietrichstein resigned from his London posting in May, 
Palmerston dismissed rumours that Metternich was cooperating with the Austrian 
Legation. Nothing ‘could be so absurd as the notion’ that Dietrichstein was ‘a 
follower of Metternich’, who had thought Dietrichstein ‘too liberal’ and ignored him 
for months on end. Although Dietrichstein had met Metternich ‘several times’, 
Palmerston thought that this was ‘surely [as] an act of courtesy’, ‘no more an 
expression of political concurrence’ than his own meetings with Metternich and 
Guizot.34  
 
Conversely, the Prince of Prussia upset Palmerston over the Schleswig-Holstein 
dispute. The Duchies, which owed allegiance both to Denmark and the Germanic 
Confederation, had rebelled against Denmark in March, and were invaded by Prussian 
forces on behalf of the German Confederation in April. Palmerston sought to mediate 
between Denmark and Prussia to prevent further hostilities, but the Prince thought 
little of these attempts. On 8 April, Wilhelm wrote to his brother, King Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV, that although negotiations between German diplomats and Palmerston 
had not quite failed, British sympathies were unmistakably Danish, and a ‘possible 
mediation’ entailed German troops being drawn back for few concessions. The 
Prussian King and Prince agreed that the number of Prussian troops had to ‘double... 
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as quickly as possible’. Wilhelm thereby undermined Palmerston’s efforts, and in 
May Prussian troops entered Denmark. The Russian government ‘duly informed the 
British that a break in relations with Prussia was a distinct possibility’.35  
 
Prussia and Russia were close allies, and this threatened to further complicate the 
affair. The Russian Minister told both Wilhelm and Palmerston that the Czar would 
support Denmark, but Palmerston was slow to share this information with the Queen 
or Prime Minister. When Wilhelm visited Victoria the next day and ‘alluded to this 
important communication’, she was left ‘excessively embarrassed’. Enraged, she 
summoned Russell to discuss it, and he had only just received notice.36 Palmerston’s 
jealous guarding of his responsibilities, often a point of contention between him, 
Russell and the Queen, had been checked by the Queen and an exile, albeit by 
accident rather than design. Although this incident had no diplomatic effect, it 
contributed to the dispute concerning ministerial responsibilities. 
 
As the Schleswig-Holstein affair continued, Palmerston revised his opinion about 
Metternich, and attempted to take advantage of his presence, having correctly 
anticipated that Metternich’s instructions were disseminated throughout Germany. In 
August, Prussia, alienated from the Confederation, signed an armistice with Denmark, 
independent of the Confederation. The armistice was upheld with ‘Prussian arms’ and 
Disraeli observed that Palmerston had apparently settled the ‘affair’ by getting 
Metternich to ‘write to the Archduke John, appointed German regent by the Diet, 
counselling him to sign the armistice’.37  
 
This overture was a novel, but nonetheless practical means of breaking the deadlock. 
But only on 19 September did the British Minister at Frankfurt, Lord Cowley, confirm 
the Archduke’s support for an armistice, after the Confederation was seemingly faced 
with war against the rest of Europe.38 Although an armistice was signed, it was not as 
a result of Palmerston’s overture to Metternich. Whilst Metternich corresponded with 
his successor Prince Schwarzenberg and others, sometimes via Ponsonby, he was yet 
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to fully throw himself into German politics (which he had certainly done by May 
1849) or re-establish his influence.39  
 
As the summer ended, Palmerston became wary of Metternich’s intrigues. On 31 
August 1848, he warned Ponsonby that ‘Metternich and others’ ‘amuse[d] their 
correspondents at Vienna’ with hopes of French support in Italy and ‘the want of 
power in France to go to war’. Palmerston added that such ideas were nonsense, and 
that the Austrian Foreign Minister, Baron Wessenberg, apparently knew ‘Metternich 
and England well enough not to be misled by’ him. He therefore implored Ponsonby 
to remind Wessenberg that ‘private and personal intrigues’ would achieve nothing in 
Britain.40  The Foreign Secretary wanted to discredit any intrigues initiated by 
Metternich before they could begin to influence the course of Austrian diplomacy. 
Palmerston initially blamed ‘Metternich’s [former] staff’ when Wessenberg appeared 
‘drawn to’ his ‘practices’ in September, but he soon feared that others heeded 
Metternich’s advice.41 On 30 September, the Foreign Secretary noted that the 
Austrian ‘Court Party’ had seemingly been ‘deluded by Metternich’ or themselves 
into thinking that France was bankrupt, divided, and supported by Russia. He warned 
Ponsonby that such ‘blind infatuation’ would ruin Austria, and returned to this 
sentiment in another letter in November.42  
 
Palmerston became obsessed with the idea that Metternich was intriguing against him. 
In reply to a letter in which Palmerston ‘hinted’ that Archduke John ‘might be 
influenced by opinions coming from Prince Metternich’, Cowley noted that the 
Archduke had ‘heard directly’ from him ‘but once’ (i.e. the letter he had sent on 
Palmerston’s suggestion.)43 Such was Palmerston’s interest in the ex-Chancellor’s 
activities that on 14 December, they had ‘a long talk’ at Metternich’s residence.44 
Palmerston had convinced himself that Metternich’s influence was something to be 
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feared, and he was not alone in his belief. The British Minister to Sardinia, Sir Ralph 
Abercrombie, also believed that Metternich still directed Austria’s Italian policy.45  
 
However, the Foreign Secretary accepted that there were a myriad other influences at 
play. In January 1849, Palmerston argued to Cowley that Austria was ‘directed now 
by nearly the same men’ as it had been under Metternich’s rule, and he condemned 
bureaucrats of Metternich’s ‘school’, Tory servility towards Austria, royal dukes’ and 
duchesses’ notions about Hungary, and ‘Austrian agents’ for their links with the 
Times and for ‘buying’ the Chronicle’s support.46 While concerned about the ex-
Chancellor’s influence in both Britain and Germany, Palmerston did not blame 
Metternich alone for pro-Austrian sentiment or specific Austrian policies. However, 
as one reactionary member of the Frankfurt Diet noted, whilst Metternich might not 
have been formulating Austrian policy, he was certainly leading ‘a fierce struggle 
against Palmerston’.47  
 
The Foreign Secretary was willing to use the exiles as intermediaries with Russia and 
Austria. When a quarrel over the Hungarian refugees in Turkey broke, Lieven wrote 
to Lady Palmerston ‘in great anxiety’. Lieven worried that if Turkey remained 
‘obstinate’, a European war was likely; but rather than encourage her husband to 
abandon his policy of supporting Turkey, Lady Palmerston prompted Beauvale to tell 
Lieven ‘that [the Czar] would not have a leg to stand upon’, and that both the British 
government and public supported Turkey.48  Rather than find her advice accepted, 
Lieven was warned that Britain would not yield. 
 
Beauvale wrote to Metternich in a similar vein, asking whether Austria would support 
Russia in such an ‘outrageous proceeding’ as threatening Turkey. Having spoken to 
Palmerston, Beauvale believed that Britain would back Turkey, and claimed that 
Palmerston had shown him a letter written by Nesselrode which hinted at the Czar’s 
extreme ‘excitement’, ‘enjoying his position vis-a-vis Austria’. Although both Austria 
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and Russia wanted to intimidate Turkey, Beauvale warned that Russia considered the 
refugees’ escape a casus belli, and that war would reduce Turkey to a Russian 
province.49 This warning, probably made on Palmerston’s behalf, was intended to 
persuade Metternich into advising Austria to back down because war would weaken 
Austrian influence in the east. Yet on 5 October, Lieven noted that Palmerston did not 
appear to have decided to back Turkey, whilst Metternich and Beauvale agreed that 
hostilities could not open in winter.50 Having failed to convince Metternich and 
Lieven that Britain, France and Turkey would stand together, Palmerston’s efforts to 
restrain Austria and Russia had suffered a major setback. 
 
Further British attempts to prevent the dispute from transforming into a European 
conflict also involved the exiles. On 6 October, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that 
‘the rights of the case’ were against Russia and Austria, that the Russian and Austrian 
Ministers acknowledged that Turkey was not bound to surrender the refugees, and 
that Metternich reportedly thought it ‘a great mistake’.51 Even the ‘bribed’ Times and 
‘bankrupt’ Chronicle agreed.52 Meanwhile, in an attempt to appease the Russians, 
Russell assured Lieven that the British Minister at Constantinople, Sir Stratford 
Canning, had been wrong to cease ‘communication with the Russian Consul’.53 The 
threat which this dispute posed to the Hungarian refugees, Britain’s Turkish ally and 
even the peace of Europe necessitated persuading Austria and Russia to withdraw 
their threats by every possible means, and the exiles provided a vital channel of 
communication. 
 
However, the dispute ‘died away as quickly as it had arisen’.54 By 16 October, the 
Russian government had ‘changed their tone’ in response to British support for 
Turkey and the refugees.55 The near east remained at peace, and Turkey did not 
surrender the refugees. In spite of Palmerston’s fears that the presence of right-wing 
refugees in Britain would undermine British foreign policy goals, he was faced with 
no such crisis. Neither did attempts to exploit the exiles’ high-level contacts abroad 
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have any tangible impact. Although the exiles had seemingly promised to both 
forestall British diplomacy and allow an additional diplomatic channel, in the event 
they did neither, in spite of Palmerston’s best efforts and worst fears. 
 
Society and Whig Politics 
 
Exile opinion often interested members of the government. While London steeled 
itself against the revived Chartists’ march to deliver their petition in early March, 
Lord Morpeth (who held cabinet rank as First Commissioner of Woods and Forests) 
noted that Lieven had warned that it had been ‘like this in Paris’ prior to the 
revolution. After the march proceeded peacefully, Lord Campbell found Guizot ‘lost 
in admiration’ for the people of London.56 Exile commentary generated interest, and 
such was the clamour for European news that Morpeth recorded Lieven’s frustration 
at hearing nothing from the Prince of Prussia.57 He had listened to the exiles earnestly, 
in search of both foreign news and opinion, and for the same reasons, Palmerston kept 
up social relations with Metternich and Guizot. Palmerston invited both to dine at the 
Foreign Office, and shook Guizot’s hand so vigorously that it appeared each would 
lose an arm.58  
 
Despite their political differences, Whigs happily received the refugees; but 
association with such discredited figures could be damaging, especially soon after the 
revolutions. Palmerston’s meeting with Guizot and Metternich was hidden from the 
press, and the cabinet found it ‘thoroughly necessary to contradict’ rumours that the 
Prince of Prussia was ‘driven from Berlin on account of his conduct’, unwilling to be 
regarded as harbouring a despot.59 Meanwhile Louis Philippe’s behaviour in exile did 
not endear him to Whigs. While Senior garnered information for an Edinburgh 
Review article from refugee ex-ministers, Louis Philippe’s peroration on his fall was 
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poorly received.60 His willingness to recount his downfall – for which Whigs held him 
responsible – ensured that he was less popular among them than the other exiles, even 
though Whigs travelled to Claremont to visit him.  
 
Conversely, Guizot’s experience as a historian and politician appealed to the 
government, and he was called before the Committee on the Public Business in the 
House of Commons, organised to consider the Commons’ procedures. While certain 
comments which Guizot made concerning the National Assembly of 1789 were 
thought inaccurate, his evidence was taken seriously, and he corresponded with the 
Whig MP John Evelyn Denison upon committee business in some detail.61 They also 
considered the creation of a committee office.62 They took a respectful interest in each 
other’s suggestions, and the Whig Lord Newark thought that Denison’s fellow 
committee member Peel’s intellect was put to good use in examining Guizot’s 
evidence to the committee.63 Whilst Guizot’s expertise was happily received (Disraeli 
later reminded the Commons that the “great master of debate” had contributed much 
to its deliberations), the report was never fully implemented.64 Nevertheless, Whigs 
and Conservatives alike appreciated this nonpartisan application of Guizot’s talents. 
The evidence which he provided was so highly regarded that it was cited in debates 
concerning parliamentary procedure as late as 1882.65 
 
By late 1848, further Whigs had turned to the exiles for intelligence. Ellice discussed 
French party politics with the former French Interior Minister Tanneguy Duchâtel; 
and Palmerston consulted Metternich about Austria’s new leaders.66 Clarendon, then 
visiting London, also shared the news that Thiers was to meet Louis Philippe with 
Lansdowne.67 Owing to their continental links and experience of government, the 
exiles had become an important source of information about Europe. Even 
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information provided by the discredited Louis Philippe was valued and shared in 
government circles. When the ex-King told Clarendon that France’s army was ill-
equipped for a civil war, this was relayed to Russell and the Queen.68 Clarendon also 
reported Louis Philippe’s belief that Louis Napoleon did not know ‘how to govern, 
from want of head and experience’, that ‘France cannot go to war, and… that Marshal 
Bugeaud talk[ed] of the army of the Alps as a fantôme.’69 Although Whigs held Louis 
Philippe in contempt, these comments by the ex-King were considered valuable at a 
time of great uncertainty. 
 
This was not a simple one-way exchange of information, for the exiles exploited news 
they received from Whigs. Lieven informed Guizot on 17 November that if Russell 
retired, Clarendon would become Prime Minister with Palmerston as Leader of the 
Commons; and after Lieven met Ellice and Aberdeen on 5 January 1849, she was able 
to confirm to Guizot that Russell disliked Palmerston.70 Guizot agreed with Lieven’s 
comments. On the 8th, he noted in a letter to her that at a reception hosted by 
Duchâtel, Ellice was ‘more hostile than ever’ about Palmerston, and added that 
Russell would have to ask Peel for ‘3 or 4 Ministers’.71 This information, which 
identified the government’s weakness and susceptibility to division, encouraged the 
exiles in their intrigues to reunite the Tories and defeat Palmerston.  
 
The latter goal was shared by their informant and collaborator; Ellice was a 
Francophile Whig, and an opponent of Palmerston.  Ellice’s niece Marion was also 
supportive of the exiles, and hoped that Guizot would return to the Assembly. In 
February, she thought that the French ‘had better have let M. Guizot stand for the 
Charente’.72 This was far from typical Whig opinion; on 13 April, Normanby 
informed Lansdowne that the entire ‘moderate party’ were ‘unanimous in censuring’ 
Guizot’s manifesto, which contained ‘everything which ought not to have been said… 
and least of all by him’.73 Although Whigs were interested in Guizot’s commentary, 
he found little encouragement from them. 
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Meanwhile, Lieven struggled to glean European news. She appealed to Lady Holland 
for news from Italy in March and Paris in May, and even asked Lady Alice Peel for 
anything she might hear in Paris.74 The exiled Princess sought information from Whig 
and Tory contacts alike, and in turn, Lieven provided her correspondents with her 
interpretation of events in France, even to Lady Holland, who often resided in Paris.75  
 
Lieven provided her opinion to all who might pay attention, and was at the centre of 
discussions about European affairs in London. Although she disagreed with Whig 
assessments of European news, she was willing to receive intelligence from them, 
especially when it appeared to justify her own opinions. Of particular interest was one 
of Lady Holland’s letters which described Louis Napoleon being heckled; and 
in August 1848, Lieven sent Guizot a letter she had received from Bulwer, who had 
recently returned from Paris. According to Bulwer, the people spoke against the 
‘mob’, and the ‘shopkeepers of Paris’ seemed to ‘fancy’ Joinville as a regent or head 
of state. This was a ‘very vague sort of sentiment’, and he thought that the moderate 
republican General Cavaignac would become President.76 Lieven evidently thought 
that this bade well for a monarchical future, and she was not alone in receiving 
encouraging news from Whigs. On 13 September, Ellice sent Guizot a long 
‘dissertation’ mentioning the certainty of war in Europe, which he hoped Russell 
would adopt.77 Ellice even sent Lieven news from Madrid.78 Whatever news Lieven 
received was recycled in her intrigues, and Ellice, as a fellow opponent of Palmerston, 
was particularly willing to provide her with information. 
 
It is doubtful whether Lieven’s exhortations were particularly effective in Whig 
circles. The harsh Austrian and Russian counterrevolution in Hungary during 1849 
saw Hungarian forces defeated in battle and subjected to harsh punishments, and 
whilst this was naturally distasteful to Whigs, at least two of the exiles thought the 
exact opposite. When Lieven met Lady Palmerston in June 1849, she found her old 
friend more anti-Russian and anti-Austrian than ever, and Princess Metternich 
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violently argued with Lady Palmerston and Lady John Russell about Hungary. After a 
harsh exchange with Lady John (Princess Metternich told Lady John that she 
sympathised with every ‘Judas’ in Europe), Lieven encouraged the feud.79  
 
Princess Metternich appears to have been highly unpleasant. She was ‘insolent’ to 
Milnes when he spoke to her husband about the likely terms for peace in Hungary, 
seemingly on the Hungarian patriot Pulszky’s behalf. 80 Princess Metternich’s 
reactionary opinions did not commend her to Whigs, and not even Tory ladies found 
her opinions amenable. “I never thought such a thing in my life”, Lady Alice Peel 
retorted to Princess Metternich’s comments on ‘order’ and Hungary, which left the 
Princess to vent her anger to Marion Ellice.81 This correspondence interested Prince 
Metternich, who added to one of his wife’s letters that Marion’s correspondence was 
enchanting.82  
 
Despite their long-held dislike for Austrian absolutism, two Whigs defended 
Metternich in publications printed after his fall. Milnes’ 1849 pamphlet The Events of 
1848 endorsed ‘Palmerston’s over-enthusiastic prediction’ of post-revolutionary 
peace, and also argued that Metternich had been forced to balance the interests of 
different nationalities instead of fostering provincial loyalties as he had wished.83 This 
argument was advanced in Parliament by Macgregor, who defended Metternich as an 
earnest reformer.84 Macgregor also noted in a pamphlet that Metternich’s views on 
economics had been ‘far in advance of others in power’ in Austria, and praised him 
for carrying an Anglo-Austrian commercial treaty ‘to a satisfactory and very liberal 
termination’ in 1838. After meeting the exiled Prince, Macgregor was ‘convinced that 
great injustice had been done to that eminent personage by public writers’.85 These 
views hardly coincided with Whig support for progress and liberty, and even 
historical assessments of Metternich’s rule: as Austrian Chancellor, he had been wary 
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of economic development, and even feared that the construction of railways would 
encourage subversion.86 The fact that both men met Metternich in exile suggests that 
personal contact with the ex-Chancellor could sometimes overcome (deserved) 
prejudices. 
 
Liberals also remained interested in Guizot’s opinions until his departure, for in the 
autumn, Guizot was again consulted by the government. Asked by Radical MP 
William Ewart to appear before a Parliamentary committee on public libraries, Guizot 
willingly obliged. His contribution was praised by both the Quarterly and the liberal 
Athenaeum, and although his evidence was later criticised, Guizot’s praise for openly 
loaning books was adopted by the campaigner Edward Edwards.87 Guizot’s evidence 
was supported by other experts who were examined by the committee, and the final 
report quoted him twice.88 Although Guizot was not considered its most important 
contributor, his advice was nonetheless well-received.89 
 
The British Government and three Royal Families 
 
In spite of the virulent criticism which he attracted from Whigs for the Spanish 
Marriages and precipitating the February revolution, Louis Philippe’s fall profoundly 
affected both the Queen and Palmerston. On 25 February 1848, the Queen cancelled a 
dinner upon hearing that Louis Philippe had arrived in Britain, and in anticipation of 
the ex-King’s arrival, summoned Palmerston to talk to Prince Albert about the 
Orléans.90 Motivated by both familial and political considerations, the Queen was 
deeply worried about the ex-King’s fate. Although cautious about ‘harbouring ejected 
royalties’, which ‘the country would not like’, Palmerston put a steamship at Louis 
Philippe’s disposal at her request.91 Despite the political risks of helping a symbol of 
conservative resistance reach Britain, Palmerston was disposed to save the ex-King.92 
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With little certainty about their whereabouts, Palmerston attempted to ensure the 
refugees’ departures for Britain, and adopted the suggestions of an early arrival. Upon 
the refugee Duchesse de Montebello’s suggestion, Palmerston instructed Normanby to 
ensure the Duchesse d’Orléans’ escape from Paris, for which £400 was provided in 
gold. Palmerston added that he was ‘very sorry’ at Guizot’s rumoured detention, and 
urged Normanby to prevent his murder by other prisoners.93 The same day, he 
instructed the British consuls at Le Havre and Cherbourg to quickly arrange the ex-
King and Queen’s departure if they arrived nearby, and even attempted to ensure that 
British steam packets were made available to ensure the Duchesse de Montpensier’s 
safe passage to Britain.94 Personal and political considerations drove Palmerston to 
ensure that members of the deposed Orléans court and regime reached Britain safely 
as a humanitarian necessity. 
 
Palmerston and the Queen also agreed that the Orléans family should have retained 
their estates and rental incomes. On 3 March, the day that the ex-King and Queen 
arrived at Newhaven, Palmerston suggested to the former French diplomat Count 
Jarnac that he should ‘apply to’ him if the Orléans needed money, and the next day, 
instructed Normanby to inform Alphonse de Lamartine, the Provisional Head of State, 
of Britain’s ‘sincere pleasure’ at France’s decision not to seize their properties, a 
decision ‘honourable to the French government and nation.’95 Although not a British 
responsibility, this was a welcome decision which had good diplomatic effects. The 
British Ambassador to Russia, Lord Bloomfield, reported that when he mentioned to 
Nesselrode that the Orléans’ ‘private property... would ultimately be returned’, the 
Russian Chancellor responded with ‘much satisfaction’.96 This reduced the likelihood 
of a Russian-led reaction against France, and thereby strengthened Palmerston’s new 
entente.  
 
Meanwhile, Lansdowne granted ex-Queen Marie Amélie the right to undertake 
Catholic worship at Claremont, and Palmerston provided them with £200 from the 
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unaccountable secret service fund, although he was concerned that this might be 
misinterpreted as support for a restoration.97 This was an accurate observation; many 
republican newspapers had declared that Britain wished to ‘restore Louis Philippe’.98 
In the wake of revolution, the British government attempted to maintain the Orléans’ 
dignity, perhaps to restrain their ambitions as well as out of sympathy and deference. 
 
However, relations between the government and the Orléans quickly soured; Marie 
Amélie recorded that Palmerston’s sympathy disappeared under a fortnight after their 
arrival.99 This apparently stemmed from Palmerston’s suggestion that Louis Philippe 
should not reside at Claremont on the grounds of expense to the British state, and to 
prevent a dispute with the French government.100 Humanitarian concerns were 
quickly replaced by political and diplomatic ones, and although the former editor of 
the Morning Chronicle sent Palmerston a correspondent’s letter which praised his 
‘noble sympathy’ for the Orléans whilst pursuing ‘amicable relations’ with France, 
this apparent public support for treating the Orléans sympathetically was ignored.101 
The need for good relations with the new French republic had quickly triumphed over 
fears for the Orleans’ fate.  
 
The potential arrival of another ex-King threatened further difficulty. On 21 March, 
having heard of escalating protests in Berlin, Palmerston urged Lord Westmorland, 
the British Minister to Prussia, to seek the appointment of a liberal ministry, or else 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV would be ‘added to the list of royal exiles, but without [any 
public] sympathy or compassion’.102 The seemingly wilful tyranny of the Prussian 
King suggested that he would be left a miserable exile.  
 
Instead, on 27 March, Westmorland reported that the King’s brother Wilhelm, Prince 
of Prussia, would be ‘sent to remain in England’.103 Westmorland felt some sympathy. 
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Wilhelm was not responsible for the brutal repression of protests, and had even fled 
Berlin; but after it was rumoured that he ‘was returning at the head of the troops’, 
Friedrich Wilhelm begged him to go to Britain, ‘with a commission to the 
government’.104 The Prince was also wrongly accused of opposing all reform. ‘I am 
sure you will be kind to him’, Westmorland counselled.105 The scapegoat Prince was 
forced to flee, and the Prussian authorities attempted to ensure that he was not treated 
as a fallen tyrant; Bunsen even ensured that the Times reported that Wilhelm was on a 
‘confidential mission’ to Queen Victoria.106 Whereas Palmerston had hoped that the 
threat of Friedrich Wilhelm’s flight would persuade the Prussian government to meet 
demands for reform, the King’s younger brother instead fled as an innocent victim. 
 
Wilhelm received a particularly warm welcome from the British royal family. 
Although Lansdowne appears to have objected to the Prince residing in Britain, 
Prince Albert persuaded the cabinet otherwise.107 Albert thought that Wilhelm should 
not ‘be confounded’ with ‘banished’ royalty; rather, his appearance was ‘to a certain 
degree invested with a diplomatic character’, and he deserved ‘a formal audience’ 
presented by Palmerston and Bunsen. The Queen’s continued recovery from 
childbirth suggested that he might receive Wilhelm on her behalf.108  
 
Wary that rumours about Wilhelm might inflame passions in Britain (the Prince’s 
‘diplomatic mission’ was such an obvious charade that Punch caricatured him as 
being quite literally kicked out of Prussia), Palmerston only allowed the two Princes 
to meet secretly. On 2 April, Wilhelm dined with Albert, and afterwards had an 
audience with the Queen. Victoria recorded that ‘the Communist & Republican plan’ 
was to pit army and people against each other. Wilhelm had found her attention, and 
optimistic that an exchange of ideas might occur, Albert showed him a ‘paper about 
the German Constitution’.109 Not only was Wilhelm welcomed, but his accounts of 
the revolution shaped the Queen and Prince’s views, and he in turn appeared to accept 
Prince Albert’s plans for reforms of German government.  
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This was not the case, for although Wilhelm willingly discussed German affairs with 
the royal couple, he thought Albert’s plans unrealistic.110 On 18 April, Victoria and 
Wilhelm discussed German affairs, and the next day, they again considered ‘the sad & 
dreadful events’ in Berlin.111 The Queen continued to sympathise with his plight, and 
Wilhelm’s exile was soon over. On 11 May, Westmorland reported that Wilhelm had 
been recalled upon ‘honourable’ terms, and that opposition posed no serious risk.112 
The Queen remained interested in Wilhelm’s opinions until the end of his exile; when 
he bade farewell, she noted his continued fears about republicanism in Germany.113 
Yet no real exchange of ideas had occurred. As Frank Eyck notes, they merely 
‘consolidated a close friendship’.114  
 
Meanwhile, the court became ever more supportive of the Orléans, ‘despite or 
without’ Palmerston’s knowledge.115 The royal family were dedicated supporters of 
their exiled peers. To discredit the fallen regime, the French government published 
both Guizot and Louis Philippe’s correspondence in a publication named the Revue 
Retrospective, which ‘left a different impression upon the Queen’ and Palmerston 
concerning the Spanish Marriages. Victoria used the opportunity to criticise 
Palmerston’s conduct during the affair, although she added that nothing ‘clear[ed] the 
French government in the least’.116 While Palmerston blamed Louis Philippe for the 
February revolution, the Queen disagreed, albeit to a point, and she rejected concerns 
about receiving the Orléans. Victoria argued that they were exiles rather than 
pretenders, but Russell objected to her receiving the ex-King and Queen (whereas 
meeting her cousin the Duchesse d’Orléans was acceptable on the grounds of familial 
ties.) In Russell’s opinion, much depended on ‘the circumstances’ – if one of Louis 
Philippe’s sons were ‘to regain the French throne...  the reception of Louis Philippe’ 
have ‘naturally invite[d] suspicions’. Moreover, the French government was weak.117  
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As well as potentially offending the French government, Russell feared its 
substitution for an extremist one, a prescient concern before the ‘June Days’ uprising, 
and Victoria’s argument that the Orléans were ‘comparatively forgotten’ was 
discarded.118 However, without consulting her Ministers, the Queen concluded that 
there could be no political objection to her receiving the Orléans at Osborne House, 
which was her private residence, rather than a royal palace.119 Although the 
government wanted to prevent any display of friendship or sympathy between the 
Queen and the exiled Orléans, worried that this would severely affect the nascent 
entente with Republican France, the Queen was adamant that she would receive them, 
and that such receptions had no political connotations. 
 
The Queen remained a strong partisan of the Orléans. On 6 August, she asked Russell 
to discuss the potential seizure of the Orléans’ estates with the French Minister. Angry 
at being asked to tackle this sensitive question, Russell deferred to Palmerston, who 
acquiesced, intent on arranging their financial security. Although the two Ministers 
disagreed over making such an approach, Palmerston told Normanby to ask the new 
head of state, General Cavaignac, privately, for any ‘public representation might be 
met with the answer that the Republic would not furnish funds for its own 
overthrow’.120 Whereas a formal approach could have caused outrage in France, 
Palmerston hoped that this would suffice to keep the Orléans’ estates in the hands of 
their rightful owners. 
 
However, as France appeared to enter a period of relative stability, the British 
government became uninterested in the Orléans. By late November, Russell had ‘no 
political objection’ to Victoria receiving the Nemours, for the presidential election 
had ‘completely absorb[ed] attention’ in France; and having overcome his previous 
reservations on the issue, he asked whether Normanby should again press Cavaignac 
on the Orléans’ properties (although this question was already largely revolved.)121 
The exiled royal family appear to have been more interested in securing their future 
financial wellbeing than politics. 
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Although the exiles of 1848 had appeared to pose a risk to the British government’s 
foreign policy aims, for the most part they did no such thing in spite of their high 
profile and the support which they boasted both overseas and in Britain. Instead, 
Whig Ministers not only provided them with humanitarian assistance, but treated 
them with dignity. They were often approached by Whig politicians, even senior 
ministers, for information about foreign affairs, both for partisan purposes and to 
structure government policies. They were also turned to, albeit largely unsuccessfully, 
as a means of communication with foreign governments in times of crisis. At a time 
of great uncertainty and turmoil, the British government acted with a great deal of 
circumspection in dealing with these refugees. However, Palmerston retained a great 
deal of distrust towards them, an attitude which not only raised eyebrows but 
negatively affected his policies. Although the government expected to be subjected to 
diplomatic criticism for allowing exile intrigues to continue unchecked, British 
foreign policy was instead influenced by perceptions of exile ambition and 
information which the exiles provided.  
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6: Dynasty, Government and conspiracy, 1848-1850 
 
This chapter explores how Lord Palmerston developed the idea that the exiles were 
actively conspiring against him, the extent to which these ideas reflected actual exile 
activity, and how and why he pleaded an exile conspiracy. It first explores Palmerston 
and Bulwer’s concerns about Orleanist intrigue in Spain, the opposition it found, and 
the shadow it cast over Anglo-Spanish relations for almost two years. The second half 
of the chapter then considers Palmerston’s development of the idea of a vast exile-led 
conspiracy, how he and the supportive diplomat Lord William Hervey promoted it, 
and how it appeared to re-emerge after the exiles’ departures. It then considers the 
manner in which Guizot and Lieven encouraged the Tories’ attack upon Palmerston 
over the ‘Don Pacifico’ affair in 1850, and how Palmerston revived the idea of a 
conspiracy against him in these circumstances. Although often based upon scant 
evidence, Palmerston pursued – or argued that he pursued – two separate exile-led 
conspiracies, which inspired and justified some of his most controversial policies in 
1848-50.  
 
Whilst the exiles’ presence in Britain did not affect British foreign policy as adversely 
as the Whig government feared, Palmerston’s concern that they would scheme against 
him certainly did. As Sir Charles Webster noted, during Palmerston’s earlier 
stewardship of the Foreign Office, the Whig statesman was ‘always in conflict’ with 
domestic and foreign opponents, and his private letters ‘often contain extravagant 
assertions... written in the heat of the moment to convey an immediate reaction.’ 
Accordingly, unless read in conjunction with Palmerston’s dispatches, these letters 
can give the reader ‘a misleading impression of his attitude towards the problems with 
which he had to deal’.1  
 
Although far from delusional, Palmerston was often aggrieved by perceived intrigues 
against him, and while some of these comments can be chalked up to frustration, 
others reflect genuine plots. The most obvious example is the ‘cabal’ which attempted 
to undermine his policies in the Middle East in 1840, whose members included 
Greville, Guizot, King Leopold of the Belgians, and Francophile Whigs such as 
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Ellice, Clarendon and Holland. 2  Other comments closely reflect Webster’s analysis. 
Palmerston had thought – or at least claimed - that Wellington (then his colleague in 
Lord Liverpool’s government) was under Metternich’s influence in the 1820s, and 
after the July Revolution, several Whigs had believed that Metternich and Wellington 
had conspired ‘against the chartered liberties of France’.3 The refugees of 1848 were 
subject to similar conjectures.  
 
Although the revolution in France transformed Palmerston into Louis Philippe’s 
protector, the Foreign Secretary feared that his former adversary would continue to 
intrigue against him in Spain. These concerns played such a prominent role in 
Palmerston’s Spanish policy that comments about Orleanist intrigue could not even be 
hidden from correspondence which was printed after Bulwer’s expulsion, and Bulwer 
shared these suspicions. In his biography of Palmerston written in the 1870s, Bulwer 
recalled that ‘the party of the King of the French’ (i.e. the Moderados) lost its 
protection with Louis Philippe’s fall.4 These fears expressed by both Palmerston and 
Bulwer appear to have been genuine, and are traceable in both official and private 
communications. This imagined Orleanist intrigue contributed to Bulwer’s expulsion 
from Spain, and thereafter both Palmerston and Hervey argued that the malign 
influence of the exiles actively prevented the restoration of diplomatic relations with 
Spain.  
 
Palmerston’s conceptions of exile conspiracy were not limited to Orleanist intrigues 
in Spain. By 1849, he had developed a vast conspiracy theory; that the British royal 
family, King Leopold, Aberdeen, Charles Greville, Reeve, Delane, Guizot, Louis 
Philippe, Metternich and Lieven had united against him. Several historians have 
commented upon this ‘conspiracy’. Whereas Donald Southgate dismissed it, H.C.F. 
Bell, Lawrence Fenton, Phillip Guedalla and James Chambers all expressed a belief in 
its existence. J.P. Parry notably recorded that Palmerston believed this ‘cabal’ plotted 
his downfall over the ‘Don Pacifico’ controversy in 1850. Its existence and breadth 
both remain disputed.5 However, it is likely that amidst constant friction with the 
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court and colleagues including Russell and Lord Grey, Palmerston fused old 
suspicions and rumours together, and exhaustively promoted them to shore up support 
for his policies. In January 1850, after Aberdeen arrived in Paris to visit Lieven, Ellice 
commented that he was ‘quite prepared for the abuse of our friends at home, as one of 
an anti-Palmerstonian conspiracy’.6 So regularly had the Foreign Secretary promoted 
the idea that it became a predictable response to any meeting between his diverse 
opponents. 
 
Whilst Guizot and Lieven certainly had ambitions, Palmerston’s supposed cabal 
overestimated the exiles’ political reach. The two exiles did conspire with 
Conservative politicians, and they were also considered ‘the mother and father of the 
fusion’, a campaign to unite French monarchists behind Chambord’s claim if he 
accepted the Comte de Paris as his successor.7 But there could not have been an 
overarching exile-led conspiracy, for its supposed members did not cooperate as one. 
For example, Reeve later recalled that during 1848, he ‘wrote a great deal in the 
Times’, and believed that his articles ‘would be the best key’ to his own view of the 
tumultuous year, rather than anyone else’s.8 He also condemned Metternich’s ‘effete 
despotism’ and ‘wretched twaddle’.9 Rather than simply act as the exiles’ voice, 
Reeve retained his independence while occasionally publishing articles for Guizot, 
and other collaborations were equally unlikely. In Palmerston’s opinion, the ‘three 
main witches who filled the cauldron’ in 1848-49 were the exiles’ supposed friends 
Brougham, Stanley and Aberdeen; but even these British opponents rarely 
cooperated.10 Stanley was surprised when Brougham promised to aid Protectionist 
opposition to the repeal of the Navigation Acts, which prevented the import of foreign 
goods in non-British vessels.11  
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Neither did Lieven and Guizot conspire with Metternich. Upon meeting Guizot in 
April 1848, Metternich spoke for an hour and a half, and Guizot could not get a single 
‘syllable’ in edgeways.12 Meaningful cooperation was impossible in such 
circumstances, and when Lieven and Metternich met in October 1848, they seemingly 
‘talked of very ordinary matters’. Metternich was also ‘completely put down’ by 
Lieven, whom he bored. When he read his memoirs to her, she ‘threw herself with a 
desperate gesture of weariness’.13 Although Lieven and Guizot had been confidantes 
since 1837, they were not part of an organised conspiracy, and Lieven sometimes 
disagreed with Guizot. Unlike him, she sympathised ‘with any fallen monarch, so 
long as he was not of the [Orléans] family’.14 In spite of the exiles’ efforts to inspire 
the Tories and their arguments with the Whigs, personal and political differences 
divided both the exiles and their British friends, and precluded the possibility of such 
an arrangement. 
 
It is also highly unlikely that the exiles conspired with the Court. As David Brown 
notes, the years of 1846-50 were marked by a power struggle between the Queen, 
Palmerston and Russell; but the royal family did not cooperate with the exiles, a 
combination which would have been incredibly controversial and difficult to hide. 
Guizot admitted that he lacked links with the court, and rather than support Court 
opposition to Palmerston, Aberdeen only occasionally supplied the Queen with 
‘intelligence from his European friends’.15 Both Lieven and Metternich received the 
Queen’s uncle, the Duke of Cambridge, but mutual friendships do not equal a 
conspiracy, and Louis Philippe’s correspondence with Victoria and Albert largely 
consists of friendly expressions rather than anything even vaguely political.16 
Although the court was opposed to Palmerston’s policies, much like the exiles and the 
Tories, they did not establish a political relationship with either. The sheer size and 
political diversity of this supposed conspiracy made its existence all but impossible.  
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The idea of a conspiracy faded away once the refugees began to leave. In September 
1849, Lady Palmerston was ‘glad to hear the Metternichs ha[d] settled to go to 
Brussels… and Madame Lieven goes to Paris in a fortnight’. The ‘old click’ [sic] 
would ‘be broken up’.17 The exiles’ departure meant that this supposed conspiracy 
could no longer be pleaded.  But when Lieven and Guizot encouraged Aberdeen to 
join the Protectionists in attacking Palmerston’s Greek policy over the ‘Don Pacifico 
Affair’ in 1850, with apparent royal acquiescence, Palmerston railed against the 
apparently resurgent conspiracy.18Although something resembling this cabal did come 
into existence, it did not do so during Metternich, Guizot and Lieven’s exile, and only 
in a much looser form than the one which Palmerston had previously pleaded. 
 
Phantom Orleanist Intrigues 
 
Both Palmerston and Bulwer believed that the Orléans would intrigue from the outset 
of their exile. In Palmerston’s opinion, the Duc de Montpensier, who had fled France 
for Britain, would always be ‘the enemy of England’, and Palmerston ‘thought [that] 
the moment was come for settling the question of the Montpensier succession’ and 
removing the ‘Louis Philippist Party’ from power in Spain.19 By preventing the 
Montpensiers from settling in Spain, Palmerston hoped to prevent further Orleanist 
intrigue, severely weaken the governing conservative (and previously Francophile) 
Moderados, and then install a liberal government which would ‘finally resolve the 
succession question.’20  
 
Yet the chances of enacting such an arrangement had already been compromised. In a 
series of communications dated 29 February, Bulwer had already reported that 
Isabella had offered the Montpensiers refuge, independently of her government, and 
that ‘their presence would be unpopular’ and ‘impolitic’.21 Her invitation was 
intended as a courtesy not to be acted upon, and Isabella had ‘no sympathy’ for Louis 
Philippe; but the Spanish government ‘pretend[ed] to say that we can now have no 
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objection to their residence… nor to their possession of the Spanish throne’.22 
Britain’s Foreign Secretary and Minister to Spain had separately concluded that Louis 
Philippe would continue to intrigue with his Spanish allies, with the express aim of 
securing the Spanish throne for his family. 
 
Palmerston turned to Queen Victoria to prevent such an eventuality. On 7 March, he 
portentously warned her that Louis Philippe sought her acquiescence in the 
Montpensiers’ departure, ‘an ill return for the hospitality’ shown to them, which  
would imply that British policy on the ‘Montpensier question’ had ‘changed’.  
According to Palmerston, an eventual Orléans restoration raised the possibility of the 
Orléans eventually reigning in both France and Spain.23 The Queen agreed to help 
prevent the Montpensiers’ departure, but she did not do so to forestall Orleanist 
intrigues. In her opinion, if the Montpensiers departed for Spain, memories of ‘the 
unfortunate Spanish affair…might render’ Louis Philippe’s exile ‘difficult, besides 
making us inimical to Paris’s possible and eventual success.’ She accepted the 
‘painful’ conclusion that the Orléans family’s sojourn would have to be limited.24   
 
However, when Palmerston attempted to argue this policy to the ‘inner cabinet’ which 
took major decisions on foreign policy, he met strong opposition. Its other members, 
Russell and Lansdowne, disputed Palmerston’s fears; both believed that a ‘good 
Republic’ was the only likely government in France for the moment.25 Russell took ‘a 
milder view of the Montpensiers journey’. Britain could not prevent the Montpensiers 
from reaching Spain, and if the Duchesse were excluded from the Spanish succession, 
it would leave the Carlist Count Montemolin next in line for the throne – which he 
considered a far more dangerous prospect.26 Palmerston’s concerns about Orleanist 
ambition were rejected as exaggerated, and his hope to prevent the Montpensiers’ 
departure as impossible.  
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So important was the idea of controlling the Orléans to Palmerston that he attempted 
to do so in spite of his colleagues’ opposition. Palmerston ‘tried to induce Louis 
Philippe to order the Montpensiers to stay here and not to go to Spain.’ The ex-King 
‘refused very indignantly’. Palmerston consequently told the ex-King to leave 
Claremont within two weeks, and his treatment of Louis Philippe, ‘a little crazy and 
weak in nerve and intellect’, left the court so ‘disgusted’ that Palmerston ‘sustained a 
complete reverse’, leaving the Orléans free to remain. Louis Philippe protested, 
‘talk[ed] very loosely and foolishly’, and created such a ‘noise’ that King Leopold 
gave the Orléans permission to reside at Claremont indefinitely.27 The ex-King and 
the British court had foiled Palmerston’s attempt at coercing him. 
 
Meanwhile, Bulwer attempted to prevent the Montpensiers’ arrival in Spain.  On 12 
March, he reported to Palmerston that certain ministers sought to make Spain ‘a sort 
of stronghold for the Orléans family, the first step being the establishment’ of the 
Montpensiers, who had been sent a steamship, despite him warning the Spanish Prime 
Minister, Ramon Narvaez, of ‘the danger of this course’.28 As Orleanist intrigues 
seemingly continued unchecked, both Bulwer and Palmerston had delivered 
apparently fruitless warnings. Bulwer’s fears were meanwhile scorned by others. The 
French Minister to Spain, the Duc de Glücksburg, thought that Bulwer acted as 
though the entire Orléans family would arrive in Spain on the basis of Moderado 
dislike of the French Republic, and Guizot told Reeve that Narvaez had welcomed the 
French Revolution, ‘since it left him more entirely his own master’.29 Although the 
Moderados remained ideologically sympathetic to the fallen regime, they were not 
under the exiles’ influence.  
 
Nevertheless, Bulwer pursued phantom intrigues. On 16 March, he wrote to 
Palmerston that the Spanish government looked to bring the Montpensiers to Spain, 
towards ‘their union of the Orléans dynasty’, and that the Duchesse de Montpensier 
could bring Queen Isabella under her influence (and by extension, Louis Philippe’s.) 
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Bulwer feared both Orléans usurpation in Spain and an Orléans restoration in France, 
and believed that it was now ‘time to settle the Montpensier question’, having 
reminded the Spanish government that British policy remained unchanged.30 Bulwer 
added that he had also ‘a little frightened certain people’ and left the Moderados 
willing to get out of ‘the scrape they were getting into.’31 He remained convinced that 
the Orléans coveted both thrones, and was optimistic that he could forestall supposed 
exile intrigues. 
 
Further suspicions reinforced Bulwer’s view of the Spanish government’s motives. 
On 19 March, Bulwer reported that the Spanish government had circulated a story that 
Victoria had ignored the Montpensiers when they arrived for an appointment to make 
their farewells. This was intended to excite ‘a Spanish feeling in favour of… a 
Spanish princess who had been ill-treated’.32 As far as Bulwer was concerned, this 
Moderado propaganda was an attempt to promote the Orléans connection over that 
with Britain. On 19 March, he noted that the government wanted to make the pregnant 
Duchess’s arrival ‘a point of national honour’ and make Spain a ‘miniature Coblenz’ 
(i.e. an émigré beachhead). 12 days later, he added that Glücksburg was waiting to be 
‘placed at the head of… Montpensier’s establishment.’33  
 
Bulwer was convinced that the Orléans wanted to establish Spain as base for their 
intrigues. He later noted that ‘Guizot and his friends’ had continued to intrigue 
through their ‘agents’ – French diplomats who remained loyal to Louis Philippe, 
hoping to precipitate Palmerston’s downfall.34 In Bulwer’s opinion, both Louis 
Philippe and his fallen Minister were responsible for Moderado policies. Yet 
republican France sought good relations with Spain, and with British diplomats 
there.35 Bulwer’s conspiratorial viewpoint had become dangerously entrenched in the 
face of the French government’s pacific policies. 
 
When Palmerston repeated his concerns about supposed exile intrigues in Spain to 
Russell and Lansdowne in late March, he was again rebuffed. Lansdowne thought that 
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Palmerston’s complaints about Louis Philippe were groundless, and Russell agreed. 
Although he also complained that Louis Philippe and Guizot had grumbled and 
intrigued ‘like ungrateful dogs’, he did not think that they were interested in 
undermining British influence in Spain. 36 Palmerston again ignored Russell’s 
viewpoint. A week later, he sent Bulwer a dispatch concerning Montpensier’s 
marriage without telling Russell, who angrily asked Lansdowne to ‘interfere before I 
say all I think’.37  
 
This dispatch became Bulwer’s fateful lecture to Narvaez, which precipitated his 
expulsion from Spain; and that such an offensive dispatch was sent in the first place 
antagonised the Prime Minister. Upon Russell’s prompting, Lansdowne warned 
Palmerston that Orleanist ambitions were ‘now the phantom of a danger rather than 
the reality’. Russell was also ‘annoyed’ at Palmerston for sending the dispatch 
without permission.38 To underline the serious nature of this complaint, Russell 
personally warned Palmerston that his belief that a Montpensier succession was 
barred under the Treaty of Utrecht (signed in 1713 to settle the Spanish succession) 
was incorrect. Russell thought Palmerston’s attempts to curb Orleanist intrigue 
‘imprudent and unwise’, and he rejected the idea of renewing a ‘chronic quarrel…on 
account of the bad faith of an old and deposed Sovereign and his baffled and exiled 
Minister’.39  Palmerston had both disobeyed Russell’s warnings about meddling in 
Spain and overestimated his own authority.  The course which the Foreign Secretary 
had continued to pursue, independently combating unlikely Orleanist intrigues, was 
rejected as excessive and inappropriate. 
 
Meanwhile, Bulwer continued to pursue the Montpensiers. In early April, he 
unsuccessfully sought a blockade of Spanish ports to prevent their arrival, and then 
protested to Palmerston that the Spanish government was ‘mediating an attempt at 
exciting an insurrection in the south of France’ in Joinville’s favour.40 This 
assessment of the threat posed by Louis Philippe’s son and the level of concern in 
France was almost certainly inaccurate. However, his continued activities and 
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warnings met Palmerston’s approval, and ignoring Russell and Lansdowne’s 
concerns, Palmerston wrote to Bulwer on 20 April that he hoped that Spain would not 
‘act upon the foolish scheme of’ becoming ‘the stronghold of the Orléans family’. 
France, Palmerston added, would probably ‘return to Monarchy’, and he would not let 
both fall to Orleanist ambition.41  
  
The Foreign Secretary’s fears found wider recognition. According to at least two 
newspapers, Louis Philippe was responsible for Bulwer’s expulsion.42 This viewpoint 
also found the approval of Irish Viceroy Lord Clarendon. Clarendon suggested to 
Palmerston that Spanish Minister Javier Isturiz’s ‘account of the public feeling, and 
perhaps some friendly advice’ from Guizot, Louis Philippe and Spanish Queen 
Dowager Christina had led to Bulwer’s expulsion. He suggested that to improve 
relations with Spain, King Leopold ‘would be a suitable mediator if Spain wanted – 
with results honourable to Britain’.43 Whereas the exiles and their supposed Spanish 
cronies had destroyed the chances of restoring British influence in Spain, the 
Anglophile Leopold could help to redress this balance.  Palmerston concurred, and 
added that Spain had been ‘much encouraged, if not prompted by the Orléans family 
and [ex-] Ministry’ to expel Bulwer, because such a ‘row’ would prevent Britain from 
extending its influence at Madrid.44 Palmerston retaliated by expelling Isturiz, and 
Clarendon praised his ‘farewell note’.45 As far as Palmerston and Clarendon were 
concerned, the Orléans retained a degree of influence over the Spanish government, 
and this relationship had to be ended.  
 
However, Guizot appears to have had little interest in Spain. On 10 June, he joked to 
Lieven that at a dinner with Wellington, Aberdeen and Lyndhurst, the conversation 
had focused upon marriages – not Spanish ones, but changes to marriage legislation in 
Scotland.46 Beyond their interest in the debates concerning Bulwer’s expulsion, the 
exiles did not use Anglo-Spanish discord as a basis for intrigue.  
 
                                                 
41  Palmerston to Bulwer, 20 April 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/48/12 
42  Leeds Mercury, 27 May 1848; Examiner, 27 May 1848 
43  Clarendon to Palmerston, 29 May 1848, BP, PP/GC/CL/485/5-6 
44  Palmerston to Clarendon, 30 May 1848, MS. Clar. C.524 
45  Clarendon to Russell, 18 June 1848, Ibid., Irish Box 3, p.9 
46  Guizot to Lieven, 10 June 1848, FG, 163MI9/1940 
 157 
Palmerston remained concerned by apparent exile intrigue in Spain. At the start of the 
summer, he even claimed to have evidence that Louis Philippe was doing so 
specifically to ‘do [him] an ill turn’.47  Whether this was a bluff or otherwise is 
unclear, but at least one warning which implied Orleanist intrigue arrived in August, 
when Palmerston was warned by L.C. Otway, the British consul who had remained at 
Madrid, that the supposed Orleanist stooge Glücksburg was ‘busier than ever - his 
presence… and the position he assume[d]’ were ‘quite a scandal’.48 Such stories 
convinced Palmerston that Orleanist intrigues continued.  
 
Although Palmerston appears to have made little further comment over the summer, 
on 7 November, he noted in an overwrought draft addressed to Normanby that ‘the 
declaration repeatedly made’ by France that ‘dynastic interests… would no longer 
create a difference’ had not ‘been acted upon according to the natural sense of the 
words’. Even when France had been shorn of Louis Philippe for more than six 
months, ‘agents of the French government’ apparently followed ‘precisely the same’ 
policy as before. The new French Minister to Spain, Ferdinand de Lesseps, aided by 
Glücksburg, was supposedly ‘one of the most active and zealous instruments’ of 
Louis Philippe. Moreover, the Spanish government had been ‘put into office and 
maintained therein by the influence of the late King’.49 This argument bears little 
resemblance to the circumstances in which Lesseps was appointed, and the policies he 
was charged to pursue; Lesseps was ‘on excellent terms with the [Spanish] royal 
family’ and various Spanish politicians prior to arrival, and had been sent to foster 
good relations.50  
 
King Leopold’s mediation also invited the Foreign Secretary’s suspicion. On 2 
January 1849, Palmerston warned Howard de Walden, the British Minister to 
Belgium, that it was worth remembering that Leopold’s ‘connection with England 
was out of date, whilst his connection with France and the Bourbons [was] a matter of 
today and tomorrow’. This argument posited that although Leopold was the widower 
of Britain’s Princess Charlotte, Queen Louise of the Belgians was Louis Philippe’s 
daughter. King Leopold would therefore favour the Bourbons in ‘all personal 
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questions’.51 The intermediary Palmerston had initially hoped would help to restore 
Anglo-Spanish harmony now was derided as a supporter of Louis Philippe’s intrigues.   
 
This was not an accurate appraisal of the situation, and perhaps calculated to push 
Howard into pressuring Leopold into a more active, pro-British approach in his 
mediation. According to the diplomat Lord Howden, who maintained contacts in 
Paris, rumours spread by Spanish politicians about the progress of negotiations and 
the terms Britain would accept were a more likely cause of Leopold appearing to 
support terms favoured by Spain (and by convoluted extension, Louis Philippe.)52 
Palmerston was intent upon delivering a blow to both the Spanish government and 
their supposed exile toadies, probably as a means of strengthening his hand in 
negotiations over the restoration of diplomatic ties.  
 
The stumbling block in the negotiations was Bulwer, whom Palmerston insisted 
should be reinstated as British Minister to Spain.53 As early as September 1848, 
Clarendon had warned Palmerston that Spain was ‘anxious to make peace with 
England because France was an unreliable ally, and would ‘submit to any reasonable 
conditions except the return of Bulwer permanently.’54 Yet this appeal made no 
difference, for both Palmerston and Russell refused Spanish overtures which did not 
make ‘the proper reparation’ for Bulwer’s expulsion (i.e. his reinstatement).55 Rather 
than exile intrigues with the Spanish government, the British government’s obstinacy 
was largely to blame for the delayed restoration of diplomatic ties.  This insistence on 
Bulwer’s reappointment eventually became irrelevant; in March 1850, he was 
appointed Minister to the United States.56 Obstinacy and suspicion had guided 
Palmerston’s policy, and delayed the renewal of diplomatic relations until May 
1850.57  
 
Whereas some of Palmerston’s claims about exile influence in Anglo-Spanish 
disputes appear to have been made to bolster support for his policies, his concerns 
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about Louis Philippe appear to have been largely genuine; Palmerston remained 
concerned about Orleanist intrigue at Madrid after diplomatic ties were restored. In 
June 1850, he warned Howden, now appointed Minister to Spain, that ‘the restoration 
of some branch of that family’ in France or Spain remained possible, and added to 
Russell that it was ‘of immense importance to England that Spain should be as 
independent as possible of France.’58 Although it reflected strategic realities, this 
comment also reflected Palmerston’s continued hatred of the Orléans. Rather than 
restore liberal government in Spain and forestall exile intrigues, Palmerston and 
Bulwer’s antagonistic approach, driven by imagined Orleanist ambition, reduced 
British influence at Madrid, created dispute in the cabinet and worsened antagonism 
with Spain. 
 
An Exile Conspiracy? 
 
Palmerston was not alone in making accusations about exile conspiracies. In May 
1848, rumours of exile collusion emerged in Italy; in June, certain British newspapers 
accused King Leopold of supporting the Orléans; and more strikingly, in late August, 
a French newspaper unmasked the exiles’ ‘organised conspiracy against France’. The 
Morning Chronicle, which was cast as their mouthpiece, fervently denied this 
allegation.59 Owing to the number of fallen rulers who had fled to Britain, such 
theories were not uncommon, and had emerged across Europe. The exiles’ presence, 
popularity amongst Britain’s elite and their multifarious activities made an exile 
conspiracy appear a distinct possibly, at least to those geographically and/or socially 
separated from London society.  
 
This suggests that Palmerston adapted existing rumours about the exiles’ influence to 
discredit his opponents before the public, and strengthen his hold over public opinion.  
By July, Palmerston had begun to make similar accusations. ‘I hear the Foreign Office 
says all sorts of ill-natured things of me’, Reeve complained to Clarendon on 3 July.  
Although suspected of passing his time with Guizot, Louis Philippe and Metternich, 
he only saw Guizot ‘occasionally’, had once been presented to Louis Philippe, and 
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had never met Metternich.60 Reeve and Guizot were close collaborators; Hervey was, 
by his own reckoning, never ‘as intimate with Guizot’ as Reeve had been, even during 
Hervey’s posting in Paris.61 But when Guizot dined at Reeve’s in November, the 
entire party disagreed with Guizot about Spain.62 Friendship with the exiles did not 
equate to being in league with them. 
 
By the end of February 1849, Palmerston had written at least two articles for the 
Globe which implied that the Times was colluding with the exiles, and inspired at 
least one more. On 12 January, he wrote in a draft article that the Times looked back 
‘with affectionate regret [to] when… Aberdeen and Louis Philippe and Guizot… 
reigned at the Foreign Office’, attacked its insinuation that his Spanish policy had 
been motivated solely by hatred of the Orléans, and that his Swiss policy had been 
intended to ‘plague’ Metternich. Whilst The Times’ stance was ‘very childish 
nonsense’, the exiles’ supposed hold over it and Aberdeen was backdated to his time 
as Foreign Secretary.63 This approach served to demonise Palmerston’s opponents as 
the tools of unwelcome foreign influences, and it certainly provoked some of his 
targets. Prince Albert noted in December 1848 that Palmerston had ‘weapons in his 
hands (vide Louis Philippe, Guizot, Metternich)’; and on 16 January 1849, Graham 
warned Peel that the Globe had ‘ascribed’ an article in the Times ‘to the hostile 
intrigues and influence of Guizot and Metternich’.64  
 
Globe writers followed Palmerston’s lead, and he praised one for hitting ‘the right nail 
on the head… the foreign and absolutist cabal’ of Louis Philippe, Guizot and 
Metternich. He added that if The Globe were to ‘touch upon these matters again 
before the meeting of Parliament’, it ‘might allude to the great expectations’ which 
they supposedly entertained through Stanley and Aberdeen.65 Accusations of 
conspiring with the exiles were an ideal means of discrediting the Tory opposition, 
and Stanley was therefore added to the list of conspirators. However, such ideas were 
easily condemned by those with an inside knowledge of politics and diplomacy.  In a 
letter dated 27 January, Clarendon admitted to Russell that he heard ‘nothing official 
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or authentic upon foreign affairs’, and asked the Prime Minister how Metternich and 
Guizot were supposedly ‘endeavouring to get us into a war’.66 Claims of an exile 
conspiracy appeared far-fetched to the experienced diplomat and politician.  
 
While Palmerston promoted it in the press, Hervey pleaded this ‘cabal’ to Clarendon. 
Hervey’s attention was first caught by the Times’ coverage of Louis Napoleon 
Bonaparte; its editorial line about the French President had alternated between 
criticism and qualified support since the former refugee had entered French politics. 
Its recent turn towards criticism proved its sale ‘to Louis Philippe and Aberdeen’, 
because a new Napoleonic Empire would make both an Orléans restoration and 
Montpensier’s succession impossible.67 However, this misread a complicated 
situation. The Times’ journalists were not united in their opinions, and Aberdeen 
considered Louis Napoleon ‘a step to something better’; the article which spurred 
Hervey’s response may well have been inserted at Aberdeen’s suggestion.68  
Such convoluted theorising failed to take the various influences upon the Times into 
consideration. 
 
Hervey also argued that with Aberdeen’s help, Louis Philippe had ingratiated himself 
at Windsor, where ‘some countenance’ was given to attacks on Palmerston, and that 
Guizot was behind Aberdeen’s complaints about British policy towards Spain; 
otherwise, Aberdeen would not have supposedly instructed the Quarterly and the 
Times to describe the Spanish marriages as ‘cleared up’, described Guizot as ‘able 
and upright’ (which Stanley had also done), and used his ‘mistake’ to attack 
Palmerston.69 Hervey does not appear to have considered that anybody might view the 
marriages differently from him, or that court opposition to Palmerston might not be 
part of an overarching conspiracy. He was thankful that Clarendon believed that 
Guizot ‘and his associates’ would fail to enact a restoration.70  
 
Although this last statement implies that Hervey had failed to persuade Clarendon that 
the exiles posed any risk to British diplomacy, he continued to send Clarendon letters 
which argued that an exile conspiracy existed. In April, he argued that Aberdeen, the 
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exiles and their ‘host of toadies’, he added, still exploited the Times and Quarterly.71 
Guizot’s association with the Quarterly was an open secret, and so the Quarterly 
became implicated in this wide-ranging conspiracy. Yet the exiled minister’s articles 
were written without Aberdeen’s knowledge.72 Any known exile activity was 
subsumed into this broadening plot, in spite of Clarendon’s rejection of the idea. 
 
Meanwhile, Palmerston continued to condemn the exiles in the press. On 6 June, he 
asked the editor of the Observer to ‘draw the public attention to the fate of the plotters 
and instruments of the late French government in Spain’, and soon after told the 
Globe’s editor that a recent Times article had been written under the influence of 
‘French exiles’.73 A further Chronicle article angered him in July, which accused 
Lady Palmerston of rudely not inviting the exiles to receptions – Palmerston sent the 
Globe’s editor a list of attendees matching the description.74 So confident was 
Palmerston in his assertions that they entered his diplomatic and political calculations.  
On 21 June, he wrote to Howard that ‘The Times got information as to Leopold’s 
having busied himself with our quarrel with Spain’ from Aberdeen, who had acquired 
it from either ‘Leopold’s people’ or Spain. The resulting article, ‘the concentrated 
essence of the hostility of Louis Philippe, Guizot, Metternich and others’, was 
apparently intended to mislead ‘persons abroad’.75  
 
This diplomatic juncture appeared to be intertwined with a parliamentary attack. On 
23 June, Palmerston wrote to Lansdowne that the exiles had inspired Aberdeen to 
table a question on the slow renewal of Anglo-Spanish ties. Van de Weyer had 
recently received the latest Spanish terms, written by Foreign Minister the Marquis of 
Pidal, which were basically the same as those made after Bulwer’s expulsion; and 
because Pidal and Montpensier were ‘amis damnés’ of Louis Philippe and Guizot, 
when Pidal ‘sent off his inadmissible proposal to Brussels’, he had also ‘sent word to 
Guizot to stir up Aberdeen to attack us if we did not at once accept it’.76 Two days 
later, Palmerston added that preventing Anglo-Spanish reconciliation was ‘an obvious 
interest of the Orléans’, and Aberdeen was their natural cat’s-paw. If exile 
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interference became obvious, he would ‘politely insinuate something’ in the 
Commons, in the hope that accusations of refugee interference would galvanise 
support.77 This convoluted argument appeared sufficiently plausible to justify both 
Palmerston’s insistence that Bulwer was reinstated and condemn both Aberdeen and 
the exiles. So confident was Palmerston in the plausibility of this idea, and its 
potential to tar the exiles, that he expressed it to the widely-respected and well-
connected Lansdowne. 
 
However, Aberdeen’s speech gave Palmerston no such opportunity to demonstrate a 
damning link between the exiles’ ambitions to strengthen the Tories and Louis 
Philippe’s apparent interests in Spain. 78 Rather than attempt to prevent Anglo-
Spanish reconciliation, Aberdeen had called for it, and did so from an apparent 
position of ignorance as to the progress of negotiations. Having attempted to justify 
his argument to Lansdowne as a means of galvanising support against Aberdeen, 
Palmerston’s conspiracy was confirmed as a phantom. 
 
Palmerston’s exhortations thereafter lost their sensational edge. In late August, he 
warned Normanby that ‘if Glücksburg remained at Madrid, it would undoubtedly 
‘mean everlasting interruption’ of Anglo-Spanish ties and Isabella being substituted 
by the Duchess of Montpensier. Yet rather than comment about the exiles’ supposed 
influence in Spain, he added that he wanted Glücksburg, Queen Christina’s ‘humble 
slave’, to be replaced as French Minister.79 Although Palmerston’s opponents in Spain 
remained the same, he made no comment about Louis Philippe or Guizot influencing 
them, and when he complained about the Chronicle and Times to Normanby soon 
after, Palmerston made no reference to the exiles.80 Whereas he had once attempted to 
demonise his opponents as part of exile-led conspiracies, Palmerston now attacked 
them on political grounds. Palmerston’s war with the Times also came to an end; 
Reeve entered into a truce with Palmerston, and the Times no longer needed to be cast 
as the exiles’ paper.81 With a return to relative calm in Britain and Europe, and having 
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made a truce with at least one enemy in the press, Palmerston began to dilute his 
arguments about exile intrigue as his fallen enemies returned to Europe. 
 
However, in the summer of 1850, Lieven and Guizot encouraged Aberdeen to 
cooperate with Stanley over the ‘Don Pacifico’ affair. The controversy stemmed from 
Palmerston’s support for extravagant compensation claims made by a Gibraltarian 
Jew, David Pacifico, whose property was destroyed during anti-Semitic riots in 
Athens; Palmerston ordered a British naval blockade when Pacifico’s legal challenges 
failed. As Hicks notes, it provided ‘the first crisis over foreign policy since the dust 
had begun to settle after the revolutions of 1848’, and a ‘broad range of parliamentary 
opinion condemned the government’s Greek policy in the Lords’, following Aberdeen 
and Stanley. This provided a potential opportunity for a Conservative reunion, 
although both Stanley and Disraeli were unenthusiastic about forcing a vote in the 
Commons, which would prove counterproductive given Palmerston’s strength there.82  
 
Nevertheless, members of the supposed ‘cabal’ of 1848-49 were interested in 
defeating Palmerston.  Lieven and Guizot both encouraged Aberdeen, and the court 
was ‘favourable but not complicit’.83 Only after the exiles had left Britain did a 
‘cabal’ with links to Windsor loosely emerge, and as the Don Pacifico affair had 
developed, Palmerston had become cautious about Guizot’s former influence in 
Greece. In February, he had warned Normanby that the French mission at Athens was 
the same which Britain ‘had to… cope’ with during the whole reign of Louis 
Philippe’.84 As in Spain, Orleanist threats seemingly remained in Greece owing to the 
presence of Orleanist diplomats, and Palmerston’s suspicions grew. On 28 May, he 
again wrote of the ‘Guizotish Chronicle and the venal and actually sold Times’ – and 
to the well-connected Normanby.85 Palmerston subsequently ‘detected’ Lieven and 
Guizot’s attempt to unite the Tories.  As far as the Foreign Secretary was concerned, 
this was ‘a shot fired by a foreign conspiracy’, and he ‘revelled in the cry it had 
ricocheted in his favour’. During the Commons debate on the controversy, Sir James 
Graham’s argument that Palmerston was responsible for the fall of Louis Philippe 
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produced the mocking response that the French would not tolerate a foreign cabal 
plotting against their Ministers.86  
 
Bernal Osborne’s contribution to the debate followed similar lines, and this did not 
augur well for the Tories. Whilst Graham, a Peelite and former Whig, had attacked 
Palmerston, Osborne, previously a liberal critic, supported the Foreign Secretary.87 
The Tories lost the vote, and as Stanley and Disraeli feared, their collaboration with 
Aberdeen – and by extension, Aberdeen’s foreign collaborators – was rendered a 
political liability.88 Palmerston’s victory made him so popular among both the public 
and liberal MPs that he felt it would make any attempt by Russell to remove him 
impossible.89 Even if Palmerston had been defeated, Guizot and Lieven’s involvement 
would have made the Tories’ victory a pyrrhic one.  
 
The nearest thing to a conspiracy between the [former] exiles, the Tories and the court 
was a failure, and the conspirators did not even share the same objectives. Prior to the 
affair, Lieven told Ellice that if a Tory ‘coalition’ had been formed, then the 
government was truly threatened. Yet whereas she only wanted them to ‘get rid of one 
minister’, Aberdeen wanted to defeat the government.90 The former exiles and their 
allies instead failed in both of their ambitions, and so strong was Palmerston’s 
animosity that his accusation that the Tories were supported by ‘foreign intriguers’ 
was even communicated to Turkish newspapers.91 These accusations probably had 
little impact upon Britain’s elite; Sarah Austin ‘asked [Guizot] in vain what means’ 
he, Metternich and Lieven had of influencing the British public. Nobody could 
‘answer, but merely assert that it was true’.92 Nevertheless, in light of the nature of 
Palmerston’s triumph, it is tempting to suggest that even if the exiles had inspired a 
successful vote of censure against Palmerston in 1848-49, both Tory disunity and 
Palmerston’s trump card of claiming an exile conspiracy would have prevented the 
survival of a Conservative government in Russell’s stead.  
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Why did Palmerston and Hervey pursue a phantom conspiracy? The most likely 
answer appears to have been to acquire support, peddling exaggerated stories to the 
public, and perhaps also Clarendon in case he was recalled from Ireland, where he 
was relatively isolated from political gossip. The same could be said of similar 
information sent to Howard in Belgium. Whereas Fenton, Bell, Guedalla and 
Chambers took Palmerston’s complaints of an exile conspiracy seriously, the Foreign 
Secretary’s accusations cannot be borne out when considered in conjunction with 
other sources.   
 
Although certain exiles cooperated with Palmerston’s enemies and caused him a great 
deal of unease - which seemingly necessitated a virulent press campaign - they never 
dislodged him from the Foreign Office. However, Palmerston and Bulwer’s fears that 
Louis Philippe would continue to intrigue in exile led to both Parliamentary criticism 
and a suspension of relations with Spain, which itself caused unease for the 
government. Whilst accusations of exile-led conspiracy did little to harm 
Palmerston’s enemies, except during the Don Pacifico affair, Palmerston and 
Bulwer’s genuine fears of Orleanist intrigue created arguments within the government 
and an unnecessary suspension of relations with Spain. Accusations of exile 
conspiracy had achieved very little for the British government. 
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7: Orléans and Orleanists, 1850-1857 
 
This chapter explores the Orléans’ position in British politics during the early-to-mid 
1850s. It considers their transformation from relative outsiders to an ambitious 
hostess’s protégés and the relationship between British foreign policy concerns and 
the support they received, similarly explored through Thiers’ brief exile during 1852. 
The impact of their ambitions, both real and supposed, will also be considered, 
especially the rumours which Palmerston used to justify approving Louis Napoleon’s 
coup in December 1851. While the Orléans’ political standing improved, Louis 
Napoleon’s fears ensured that they remained a concern for British governments. 
These fears ostensibly lessened after the exchange of state visits in 1855, and by 1857, 
the Orléans began to have a dual impact upon British politics, as both a foreign policy 
concern and as the friends, even protégés of aristocratic politicians. 
 
Although the Comte de Paris’s confirmation in July 1850 was attended by several 
peeresses, Aberdeen and Lady Alice Peel (described as an ‘Orleanist conspirator’ by 
Lady Normanby) were by then the sole notable Britons who actively supported the 
Orléans. A memorandum listing Orleanists who had visited Louis Philippe suggests 
the Queen’s interest, but she could only appeal to Ministers on their behalf; and 
whereas Conservative politicians had collaborated with the exiled Guizot, Metternich 
and Lieven, they accepted the new order in France under President Louis Napoleon 
Bonaparte. When Malmesbury visited Louis Napoleon at this time, he ‘stressed that 
the Conservatives were neutral in French domestic and constitutional questions’, and 
would not ‘thwart any of his domestic or dynastical policy’. Neither Stanley nor 
Aberdeen ‘would... quarrel with him’.1  
 
Noninterventionist ideology precluded supporting Louis Napoleon’s rivals, and as 
Parry notes, most British politicians and businessmen thought that the President alone 
could control ‘the army and the socialists’. Through Anglo-French cooperation, 
Britain could ‘maximise its own international influence’ and ‘check’ French 
‘impetuosity’.2 By January 1851, the entire British press appeared to support Louis 
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Napoleon, and after the President’s coup d’état that December, even Aberdeen 
thought that the only alternative to this, ‘the most lawless despotism ever witnessed’, 
was revolution.3 While Louis Napoleon was deemed necessary, the Orléans found 
little support. 
 
The Orléans’ presence nevertheless created controversy. Protectionists considered 
Aberdeen ‘with his Orleanist contacts’ hostile to Louis Napoleon, and in 1852, Queen 
Victoria noted that the President was ‘in constant fear of the Orléans; he shudders 
every time he hears of any member of the poor family having been to see us’.4 Their 
supposed influence at court was still feared, and they remained subject to rumour. 
Journalists and youthful aristocrats alike speculated about the fusion, and Palmerston 
insisted that Louis Napoleon’s coup was a justified response to the Orléans’ schemes. 
He also argued that he was dismissed as Foreign Secretary due to their influence.5 For 
as long as Palmerston retained his prejudice against the French Bourbons, the exiles 
continued to influence his policies; and as Louis Napoleon’s anxieties became known, 
the Orléans’ presence threatened to seriously complicate Anglo-French relations. 
 
However, Louis Napoleon’s authoritarianism simultaneously bred sympathy for 
refugees. After the coup, he exiled both left- and right-wing opponents, and the most 
eminent of the latter, former Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers, was received as a victim 
in Britain.6 Once a liberal, by 1851, Thiers had become a ‘high Tory and 
protectionist’, and one of his speeches had been translated and distributed by 
Protectionist Tories.7 These complex views endeared Thiers widely in public opinion, 
and he was even received at 10 Downing Street by Prime Minister Lord Derby 
(formerly Stanley).8 Thiers’ exiled allies were also feted. Charles de Rémusat met 
Reeve, Mahon, Palmerston, Russell and Ellice; and General Le Flô, the sole Orleanist 
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in the exile community in Jersey, was received by local aristocrats.9 Friendship, rank, 
misfortune and amenable opinions attracted attention, and when the Orléans’ French 
estates were confiscated in 1852, British opinion was aghast.10 Orléans and Orleanists 
alike found at least moral support in exile in Britain. 
 
Yet for much of the decade, the Orléans were rarely received in society. Reeve was 
‘the only stranger’ at a Claremont dinner in September 1855, and on the night of Lady 
Clarendon’s grand reception in April 1854, the Orléans visited the Duchess of Kent.11 
As Philip Mansel notes, they did not ‘interact with the English as easily as the 
[émigré] Bourbons... or Louis Philippe himself.’ Although they remained close to the 
British royal family, most of the Orléans ‘spent every evening together’, and had very 
little contact with British politicians.12 The Princes also had to give up precedence to 
French Ambassadors, and therefore could ‘not go out much into the world.’13  
 
But while his brothers the Duc de Nemours and Prince de Joinville retired from public 
life, the Duc d’Aumale became ‘a sort of favourite’ in society. Unable to attend events 
frequented by French diplomats such as public banquets, Aumale ‘entered a few 
houses where he could’ and met ‘all the most brilliant people’.14 As a historian and 
patron of the arts, he made the acquaintance of politicians including Russell, 
Lansdowne and Mahon, and fellow bibliophiles such as British Museum Librarian 
Antonio Panizzi.15 Even Palmerston made some rapprochement when they met in 
1856, and by 1857, the Aumales had established friendships with the Conservative 
Lady Salisbury and the liberal Lady Waldegrave, both rising political hostesses whose 
roles in party organisation made them serious politicians in their own right.16 Social 
eminence remained a vital prerequisite for refugees to engage with British politics, 
and Aumale’s interests allowed him to do so while avoiding a potentially 
controversial meeting with Louis Napoleon’s representatives in Britain. 
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British Responses to Dynastic Schemes, 1849-1851 
 
As Chamberlain notes, during 1849-50 Aberdeen ‘did his best to prevent the 
reestablishment of a Bonaparte dynasty’. He and Louis Philippe began to discuss the 
fusion in December 1849, and soon after, Aberdeen assessed its prospects in Paris. 17 
As far as Aberdeen could tell, ‘considerable progress had been made’, but only in a 
crisis ‘could all be carried into effect.’ Persuading Legitimists and Orleanists to 
cooperate was incredibly difficult, and Peel failed to reassure Aberdeen when he 
suggested that ‘the modern history of France’ was ‘the substitution of one crisis for 
another’.18 While both statesmen supported Louis Philippe’s efforts, they were 
hamstrung by the difficulty of persuading the two dynastic parties to accept a 
compromise succession. Aberdeen identified the problem as Thiers’ refusal to proffer 
his support, and once aware of Thiers’ opinions in some detail, Aberdeen again spoke 
with Louis Philippe. He sent Guizot details of their discussion, including Louis 
Philippe’s willingness to meet Thiers, and that he and his sons accepted the fusion.19 
 
Aberdeen and the Orléans’ shared hope to secure a French monarchy made him an 
ideal intermediary between the ex-King and his French supporters, and the fusion was 
crucial to him. ‘It may be true that neither Legitimists nor Orleanists have the least 
chance... at present’, Aberdeen wrote to Londonderry, and he agreed that Louis 
Napoleon had to be supported temporarily, to preserve ‘order and tranquillity’.  But 
the republic could ‘never last’, and a Bonaparte dynasty would be ‘impossible’. 
Aberdeen knew neither when, nor ‘in whose person’ monarchy would be restored.20 
Uninterested in which Bourbon eventually reigned, Aberdeen and Louis Philippe’s 
shared goal of ensuring the fusion seemingly promised both a future for the Comte de 
Paris, and order in France without the threat of Bonapartist expansionism. But when 
Peel died in July, the Orléans lost a ‘dear friend’.21 His death underlined the fact that 
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the Orléans had lost British supporters rather than gained them in exile; and Louis 
Philippe himself died in August 1850. 
 
Although the Queen, Aberdeen and Peel had supported the campaign to unite the two 
branches of the French Bourbons, not all of the Orléans’ British supporters were 
fusionist. The liberal writer Sarah Austin considered the Duchesse d’Orléans her 
‘heroine’ (but was never ‘what is called an Orleanist’) and Lady Alice Peel also 
supported the Duchesse.22. While Lady Alice provided Lieven with intelligence about 
dynastic intrigues, Lieven attempted to push Lady Alice and the Duchesse to accept 
the fusion. Lieven even wrote of the Duchesse’s ‘beloved President’, whose triumph 
she had ensured by preventing the fusion; she was the ‘sole obstacle’, who should be 
told of her error.23 It was ‘very unwise’ not to see the fusion as ‘their only chance’, for 
otherwise Bonaparte would be ‘there for life’.24 Lieven’s tone became ever stronger; 
by May 1851, the fusion was in ‘very good health and getting stouter every day’, 
whereas ‘[y]our party may be discernible by a microscope’.25 These exhortations 
failed to convince Lady Alice and the Duchesse.26 Although Lady Alice and 
Aberdeen were considered intermediaries between the fusion’s French supporters and 
the Orléans family themselves, they had little influence upon these machinations. 
 
Late 1851 saw discussion of Joinville seeking the French Presidency. In the belief that 
Louis Napoleon would seek re-election (despite being limited to a single term by the 
French constitution), Thiers decided to use the Orléans ‘to prevent the declaration of a 
new French Empire’, and hoped that Joinville would stand in the election scheduled 
for May 1852. The princes initially declined, but Joinville ‘was almost persuaded’.27 
British responses to Joinville’s ambitions were largely negative. Reeve was 
enthusiastic; but the Quarterly Review noted that Joinville was considered ‘hostile to 
England’, and the liberal writer Walter Bagehot thought that republican institutions 
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could ‘never be administered by a Bourbon or Orléans prince’.28 Queen Victoria 
considered the idea inherently flawed, and thought that he should have declined 
because it put him ‘in a false position towards the royal family… and the republic’. 
She and Russell hoped that the government (i.e. Palmerston) would ‘take no part in 
the matter’ and not ‘encourage violent articles’.29 An unlikely Joinville victory 
seemingly threatened both French institutions and Britain, and in such circumstances 
excessive criticism of his campaign might have caused severe Anglo-French 
disharmony. 
 
Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador to France, was even more concerned by the 
prospect of a Joinville presidency. By August, he feared that republicans might back 
Joinville because their own candidate could never obtain a majority, and ‘produce 
confusion’ by joining conservative supporters.30 The idea of ‘Red Republicans’ 
acquiring a degree of influence outweighed doubts as to whether Joinville might 
stand, and Normanby concluded that if Joinville had no ambition, a prompt denial 
would be an ‘act of true patriotism’.31  As far as the British Ambassador was 
concerned, either a Joinville Presidency or a government supported by the republicans 
would have been incredibly unwelcome. However, on 17 August, he reported that 
Joinville might not accept the nomination, and that although Joinville’s supporters 
wanted to nominate him for a Paris by-election, if Joinville were elected for Paris, the 
French government might revise the constitution to allow Louis Napoleon’s re-
election as President.32 Initially worried by the Pandora’s Box which Joinville could 
open, Normanby’s fears were allayed by French government’s willingness to check 
Orleanist ambitions. 
 
Joinville did not stand for election in Paris and thereafter Normanby and Palmerston 
dismissed his chances.  Normanby soon thought that Louis Napoleon would win the 
scheduled election under a revised constitution, and considered Joinville’s candidacy 
‘so extraordinary’ that he hardly believed it would ‘assume a definite shape’. There 
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were ‘many reasons why it should be avoided’, and although ‘moderate republicans’ 
would support Joinville, the moderate republican General Cavaignac, had ‘persevered 
with his own candidateship’, ‘a great blow to the Joinvillists.’33 Joinville’s campaign 
had been rendered irrelevant.  
 
However, in October, Normanby became concerned by Louis Napoleon’s fear that 
King Leopold was intriguing in Joinville’s favour.34 The British Minister to Belgium, 
Lord Howard de Walden, was warned that King Leopold should desist, and that if he 
was not intriguing, ‘the sooner and the more explicitly’ he made it known, ‘the 
better.’ These efforts succeeded.35 Joinville could count upon support neither at home 
nor abroad, and having dismissed this ‘idle report’, Palmerston warned Russell that in 
the unlikely event of Joinville or a socialist’s triumph, ‘we should have to sleep with 
one eye open’.36Although a Joinville presidency would have been unwelcome, it was 
of less concern than Louis Napoleon’s paranoia, which threatened to escalate into a 
dispute with Belgium, an eventuality which could have spiralled into an international 
crisis. 
 
Orleanist plots were also discounted by British politicians. By 20 November, 
Palmerston thought that Louis Napoleon’s certain re-election would be ‘the best thing 
for France and for England’, and he would not even regret the establishment of a 
Bonaparte dynasty. The Bourbons had ‘always been hostile’, and Britain would gain 
nothing ‘by substituting [Chambord] or the Orléans family for the race of 
Buonaparte’. Despite his ancestry, Louis Napoleon alone promised stability, and 
‘knew the faintness of heart of those who were trying to overthrow him’.  The 
monarchists might have been wished success if they ‘fairly said that they want to re-
establish a monarchy’ but they seemed unready, and wanted to overthrow ‘the next 
[best] thing’.37 The President alone promised stability and Anglo-French harmony, 
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and Russell agreed that Louis Napoleon would be re-elected.38 Both dismissed the 
prospect of the Orléans’ immediate return. 
 
Similar notions had been long disregarded. As early as 1850, Aberdeen had 
condemned ‘the repeated notices of expected coups’, and rejected rumours of a 
depressed Louis Napoleon wanting to restore the monarchy.39 Ellice was even more 
dismissive; French newspapers reported ‘expected coups’ daily ‘to keep up 
excitement and ensure [sales]’.40 Although these rumours never amounted to much, 
they continued to arrive in Britain.41 Louis Napoleon’s rule appeared secure, but 
nevertheless, one contemporary charged that a ‘dislike for Louis Philippe...  rather 
than a sentiment of generosity towards Louis Napoleon’ made Palmerston ‘espouse 
his cause’.42 Despite the unlikelihood of an Orleanist coup, Palmerston retained a 
strong prejudice against the Orléans. 
 
The Orléans, Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état, and Lord Palmerston’s Dismissal, 
1851 
 
On 2 December, Louis Napoleon launched his coup d’état against the French 
Assembly to establish his dictatorship, and in the following days, Palmerston argued 
that the President had pre-empted an Orleanist plot, an explanation few historians 
have accepted except for Philip Guedalla.43 Although recent studies have considered 
both Louis Napoleon’s impact upon British politics and the role of public opinion in 
Palmerston’s response to the coup, this aspect of Palmerston’s reaction remains 
largely unexplored, and offers further explanations for his actions.44 Whilst it is 
accepted that Russell’s dismissal of Palmerston was precipitated to a greater or lesser 
degree by the Foreign Secretary’s approval of Louis Napoleon’s coup contrary to 
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government policy, relatively little consideration has been given to the reasons 
Palmerston gave for his actions – in which the Orleans played a prominent role. 
 
In the hours after Louis Napoleon struck, Palmerston was ‘anxious to receive… some 
explanation’, and on the 3rd, before the cabinet adopted a ‘neutral policy for the time 
being’, he expressed his approval of the coup to the French Minister, Count 
Walewski.45 Rather than wait to see how his colleagues would respond to the coup, 
Palmerston had decided to support Louis Napoleon. This mistake ensured that 
Palmerston’s declared policy was now completely different from the one he had to 
follow in public. Were Russell to discover this, Palmerston would have risked 
dismissal, and the Foreign Secretary had to persuade Normanby to back his policy.  
 
He was soon provided with an explanation for his course. Palmerston later claimed 
that on the evening of 3 December, he was told by a former attaché (Augustus 
Craven) and his wife that at Claremont the previous Friday, the ladies had been ‘in a 
great bustle’ and expected to be in Paris the next week.46 The Foreign Secretary 
subsequently wrote to Normanby that although ‘we… cannot be supposed to know as 
much as people at Paris did about what was going on amongst the Bourbons’, it was 
‘well known here’ that the Duchesse d’Orléans was preparing to be called to Paris 
with her son ‘to commence a new period of Orléans dynasty’.47 These explanations 
continued to develop, and Palmerston continued to act independently. On the 5th, the 
cabinet adopted a ‘strictly neutral’ attitude and he instructed Normanby to do the 
same, but added that ‘the party at Claremont were reckoning last week upon being at 
Paris again before the end of next week’.48  
 
In defiance of his colleagues, Palmerston pieced together an Orleanist plot in an 
attempt to persuade Normanby to follow his own course. This instead angered 
Normanby, whose working relationship with Palmerston was already strained. 
Although he ‘did not dispute any knowledge’ which Palmerston might have, 
Normanby thought that it would have been in Louis Napoleon’s interest to let an 
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Orleanist coup break out, ‘for we know by the reception of the Joinville candidature 
that it would have been a miserable failure’.49 As Southgate notes, Normanby had 
hoped that Palmerston would express ‘a Whiggish horror’ at the bloodshed and 
imprisonment of legislators, rather than send ‘humiliating’ rebukes to him;50 but he 
was also angered by Palmerston’s rumour-mongering. Palmerston had incurred 
Normanby’s opposition, at the risk of revealing and undermining his independent 
policy. 
 
Palmerston’s explanations continued to develop. On 7 December, Peter Borthwick 
told him that a former aide-de-camp of the Orléans believed that although Joinville 
had been dissuaded from resisting the coup, Aumale would do so.51 This story did not 
originate with Borthwick’s son Algernon, the Morning Post’s Paris correspondent; 
Borthwick explained to his son on 6 December that he had ‘reason to believe’ that 
Joinville and Aumale were en route to Lille to see whether ‘any royalists would 
accept their leading’; he supposed this would fail.52 As an apparently credible rumour, 
it was circulated quite widely. The editor of the Morning Chronicle, J.D. Cook, heard 
that Joinville and one of his brothers had ‘left Claremont in a hurry’, ‘ready for an 
opening if one should offer’. Cook believed that this would merely harm Joinville, but 
Palmerston, rather than dismiss Joinville’s chances, immediately requested that 
inquiries were made to the police at Claremont.  Although it transpired that Joinville 
was unwell, Palmerston told the cabinet that he thought it ‘likely’ that Aumale and 
Joinville ‘might go to Lille’.53  
 
Palmerston had lied to his colleagues, and they appear to have accepted this story, for 
on 8 December, the courtier Charles Greville hurriedly wrote to Sir James Graham 
that Joinville and Aumale had ‘gone off to Lille’. He had heard from Lansdowne, 
straight ‘from the Cabinet, where it [was] believed’. Palmerston had also mentioned 
that despite apparent opposition at Claremont, Joinville had said he would go even if 
Aumale refused, and that Joinville’s rooms there reportedly ‘look[ed] as if he was 
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gone’.54 Curiously, Palmerston recorded in his diary that the Princes had gone to Lille, 
perhaps suggesting an initial belief in this rumour prior to hearing of Joinville’s 
illness. Palmerston also mentioned their departure to the Queen, but she rubbished it. 
Joinville was ‘very ill’, and Aumale was detained in Naples by ‘the Duchesse’s 
health’.55 Although this rumour was soon exposed to him as a canard, the Foreign 
Secretary capitalised upon it in an attempt to find support for his policy of supporting 
Louis Napoleon.  
 
The same day, Palmerston provided the editor of the Globe with a further explanation 
for his actions: ‘almost certain’ conflict between the royalist majority in the Assembly 
and Louis Napoleon, who had struck ‘before they could disarm him’. All ‘traditions 
of order and tranquil security’ belonged to Monarchy or Empire, and the Bourbons 
could not promise it. A Legitimist restoration was politically impossible, and while 
the Orléans had relied upon ‘popular choice’, they had lost it in 1848. Whereas a 
Bourbon or Orléans restoration threatened civil war, Louis Napoleon represented ‘the 
real interests of France’.56 According to this more reasoned explanation, the Orléans 
were merely among those who had to be kept from power. The idea of an Orléans 
conspiracy and the Princes’ supposed departures served as convenient excuses for 
Palmerston’s pursuit of a separate policy towards Louis Napoleon, which had to be 
hidden from his colleagues to ensure that he remained in office.  
 
However, Normanby angrily rejected the idea of an Orléans conspiracy. Although the 
Duchesse d’Orléans had ‘some foolish... advisers’, the failed Joinville candidacy had 
terminated their schemes.57 Rather than ensure that Normanby supported his policy, 
Palmerston had alienated his Ambassador to France, but he stood his ground as the 
political situation demanded, unable to reveal his true reasoning and split from 
Russell. On the 10th, he explained the rumour to Normanby as one of a succession of 
schemes, certain that ‘the people at Claremont’ had openly believed that ‘events... 
would bring about their return’. He also explained his reasons for supporting Louis 
Napoleon. Had the monarchists had a suitable pretender, ‘a disinterested candidate’ in 
the President’s position ‘might have… abdicated’, but enthroning the unpopular 
                                                 
54  Greville to Graham, 11 December 1851, Graham Papers, Add. MS 79649 ff.123-25 
55  7 December 1851, BP, PP/D/12; Victoria to Palmerston, 8 December 1851, Ibid., PP/RC/F/505 
56  Palmerston to Blackett, 8 December 1851, Blackett Papers, ZBK/C/1/B/3/3/21  
57  Normanby to Russell, 8 December 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9J pt. 1 ff.75-76 
 178 
Chambord, the 12 year-old Paris with  his ‘foreign mother’ and Thiers, or even a 
Joinville presidency would have created widespread strife. Conversely, Louis 
Napoleon had acted ‘believing... that the majority of the nation, and the bulk of the 
army’ favoured him.58 Fearing the exposure of his behaviour, Palmerston supported 
his growing reserve of rumours by arguing that the French President alone promised 
order.  
 
Normanby could not ‘attempt to contend with the miscellaneous gossip’ of 
Palmerston’s ‘anonymous informants’, having ‘found out something of the source 
from which so much of this is derived’.59 He again wrote to Russell on 15 December, 
and although his main complaint was that Palmerston had provided instructions 
contrary to his remarks to Walewski (which were interpreted as British policy), the 
Orléans remained a major point of contention. As for the ‘triumph’ of the monarchists 
and the Orléans, which ‘Lord Palmerston always treat[ed] as the same thing, neither... 
were at that moment the least likely’. Palmerston had ‘persevered in his own opinion’ 
while ignoring ‘the best information’ which Normanby was ‘avowedly furnished by 
the highest authority’; the ‘supposed conspiracy’ was not ‘pleaded by the President’, 
but a canard circulated ‘by all connected with the Elysée’ – i.e. Louis Napoleon’s 
closest supporters. Palmerston had ‘no better ground for asserting its existence’ than 
his letter of the 10th, a ‘lame and impotent conclusion’.60 Normanby had revealed that 
Palmerston had acted independently and justified it with rumours.  As Charles 
Greville noted, this ‘Orleanist plot’ and ‘the violence which the Assembly was about 
to have recourse to’ were probably ‘mere pretences... to cover’ Louis Napoleon’s  
‘violence with something plausible which the world might swallow’.61  
 
This appears to have been Louis Napoleon’s course. Palmerston’s arguments reflect 
those later promoted by the then-Préfet de Police, C.É. de Maupas; that a royalist 
insurrection would have precipitated civil war, and that royalists had planned a coup 
despite their own divisions. Maupas added that after the coup, ‘Orleanists were told 
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that their princes had just landed at Cherbourg, where ‘troops had immediately placed 
themselves under their command’.62   
 
Reliable observers dismissed such ideas. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in a letter to the 
Editor of the Times that the ‘Assembly... may have included... certain conspirators’, 
but that most deputies sought ‘moderation towards him to the verge of weakness’; and 
Ellice believed that there was ‘no truth in the report of the Orléans Princes going to 
France’ or an ‘Orleanist complot’.63 The explanations that centred upon the Orléans, 
which Palmerston deployed to shore up his support for Napoleon, were simply 
excuses which other well-informed figures cursorily dismissed. Yet as they seemingly 
excused Palmerston’s support for Louis Napoleon and were centred upon his former 
enemies, he willingly accepted them. 
 
Both Palmerston’s approval of the coup and his attempts to justify his actions with 
rumours about the Orléans contributed to his dismissal. His position was already 
weak; several Cabinet Ministers had complained to Russell about him, and strongly-
worded letters from Lady Normanby reached General Phipps, Normanby’s brother 
and Prince Albert’s secretary. Palmerston calmed tensions by writing Normanby a 
despatch which explained that he had simply expressed an opinion to Walewski. 
When the Queen requested alterations, she was told that it had already been sent. 
Palmerston’s habit of doing this had long irked both her and Russell, and on 17 
December Russell demanded his resignation.64  
 
These events were in part driven by rumours about the Orléans. Although Palmerston 
did not mention the Orléans in the dispatch, he did opine that Bonaparte and the 
Assembly could not have co-existed much longer, and that the Assembly's divisions 
‘would only be the starting point for disastrous civil strife’.65 He had previously 
mentioned this in relation to the Orléans’ possible return, and his ‘explanation for the 
Queen’ for sending the dispatch mentioned Nemours [rather than Aumale] and 
Joinville’s supposed plan (Nemours had apparently developed cold feet). In response, 
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Russell rebuked Palmerston for answering the wrong question.66 Palmerston 
continued to defend his reaction to the coup. He denied expressing his ‘entire 
approbation’, and again suggested that the best interests of Europe were with Louis 
Napoleon, because the Assembly could only offer a republic or restoration. The 
Orléans remained central to his explanation: 
 
 ‘I know, at least it was told to me... that those who were... at Claremont expected 
something which they considered favourable to their interests to happen at Paris 
before the end of that week... preceding the 2nd.’67  
 
Less assertive in explaining their apparent role than before, Palmerston backdated his 
knowledge of the Orléans’ “plot” to before 3 December.  
 
This argument provoked Palmerston’s dismissal. Russell maintained that Palmerston 
had ‘mistaken the question at issue’. He had disputed whether Palmerston should have 
expressed ‘an opinion’ to Walewski, and ‘most reluctantly’ concluded that Palmerston 
could not remain Foreign Secretary.68 Russell had already decided to support 
Normanby, and graver was Palmerston's approval of the coup ‘contrary to the line of 
neutrality’; the Prime Minister would tolerate no further transgressions.69 Although 
there is ‘no simple answer’ for Palmerston’s dismissal, his fixation upon the Orléans 
was used to justify his response to the coup, which was the final straw. Indeed, the 
royal adviser Baron Stockmar calculated that Palmerston’s hatred of the Orléans and 
desire for an entente inspired his actions.70 Palmerston’s attempt to extricate himself 
from a dispute of his own creation had failed. His response to the coup and 
subsequent rumour-mongering had catalysed his dismissal and departure from the 
government.  
 
Palmerston continued to attempt to justify his actions. A few days after his dismissal, 
Queen Victoria was told that an ex-aide-de-camp of the Orléans had believed that 
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‘Joinville had certainly had the mad intention of going to France, and fortunately 
given up... when he saw that there was... no call for them.’ Yet this declaration had 
been ‘a sort of fit of desperation, caused by annoyance & excitement’ rather than a 
serious intention.71 This suggests that Borthwick had adapted the story to justify the 
coup. Whereas Palmerston had acted as though this was a serious plot, the Queen 
dismissed it. However, in February 1852, Palmerston offered another explanation. 
Louis Napoleon had supposedly been ‘forced to act’ in the belief that that the Orléans 
had bribed the British press, and that they were responsible for royal hostility towards 
him.72  
 
Palmerston also received information which appeared to confirm earlier rumours. He 
later recalled that after the coup, the Princesse de Joinville had told the Portuguese 
Minister that she had expected to be in Paris by 20 December, while his brother, the 
British Minister to Naples, informed him that Aumale had left Naples before the coup, 
‘quite suddenly... having heard of the illness of his mother’.73 This allowed Lady 
Palmerston to tell Panizzi that Aumale had ‘taken the pretence of his mother’s illness’ 
to leave before news of the coup arrived, and had ‘meant to be in or near France.’ 
Another ‘very good authority’ had said that Aumale would have met Joinville and 
travelled to Lille, where they were ‘sure’ that the garrison would support them.74 With 
little evidence for their assertions, the Palmerstons capitalised upon rumours, and in 
reply to his son’s contention that there was no Orleanist conspiracy against Louis 
Napoleon, Borthwick argued that Louis Napoleon’s rule was ‘absolutely necessary for 
France and for Europe - not by the fact of a conspiracy against the President 
individually – but… a conspiracy... against France’.75 The use of rumours about the 
Orléans to justify supporting the coup could only be rationalised with desperate 
backpedalling. 
 
The Palmerstons also blamed the Orléans for his dismissal. While Palmerston 
encouraged the Morning Post to blame the ‘hostile intrigues’ of the Orléans, Austria, 
Russia, Saxony, Bavaria and Prussia, Lady Palmerston told Beauvale that Russell had 
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‘used exactly the same expressions’ as Palmerston in favour of the coup, and that 
Normanby had ‘proposed to cease relations’ with Louis Napoleon. ‘How curious it is 
that out of this... statement that so much mischief should have arisen’ she noted, 
considering it ‘an intrigue of’ Normanby, Phipps and Prince Albert, ‘worked up by 
the deep disappointment of the Orléans overthrow and the hopes which Normanby 
had helped to raise.’76 She told others of the Orléans’ supposed designs, the Princesse 
de Joinville’s comments, and that they had been prepared to leave, before the coup 
had ‘cut in just before theirs’.77 Lady Palmerston even wrote to Lieven that Thiers had 
‘told... people at Lady Alice Peel’s... about the plans which had been made to arrest’ 
the President ‘days later’. He apparently denied this once told that such ‘frank talk’ 
played into Louis Napoleon’s hands.78  
 
Some did blame influences upon the Queen for Palmerston’s dismissal; Malmesbury 
and Disraeli both saw the hand of Aberdeen and several diplomats, but not the 
Orléans, and as Russell wrote to Lady Palmerston, ‘there has been no conspiracy.’79 
Charles Greville similarly noted that Russell could say ‘“alone I did it!”’, for ‘not one 
of his colleagues’ knew that he would dismiss Palmerston. ‘[N]obody’ could say that 
there was a ‘conspiracy’, although the Queen was overjoyed.80 This assessment was 
almost certainly accurate. For the Palmerstons alone, the Orléans were behind the 
events of December 1851.  
 
The Orléans Property Decrees, 1852 
 
When the French government confiscated their vast estates in January, the Orléans 
found widespread sympathy in Britain. While the Standard and Morning Chronicle 
both condemned the idea of an Orléans conspiracy, ‘the injured and outraged exiles 
applaud[ed] and thanked’ the British press, and ‘in private conversation’, the Queen 
was ‘very hostile’ to Louis Napoleon.81 The confiscation was a ‘refinement of 
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cruelty’, and she ‘and many others’ were convinced that Bonaparte’s ‘wicked deed’ 
would receive ‘the punishment it so richly deserve[d]’.82 Even Louis Napoleon’s 
British supporters were incensed. The Duke of Rutland rebuked Lady Londonderry 
that her ‘former friend’ would alienate both ‘his real friends’ and those who saw him 
as the ‘least of two evils.’83 Palmerston thought the confiscation counterproductive, 
and Malmesbury thought it ‘tyrannical’. While Malmesbury recognised that this was 
technically an obligation to sell, but it was ‘really the same thing’ as a confiscation, 
and he wrote ‘a strong remonstrance’ to his old friend; but Louis Napoleon replied 
that it was necessary, because Orleanist agents had attempted to bribe French 
senators.84  
 
The confiscation also troubled British diplomats. G.H. Jerningham, Chargé d'Affaires 
at Paris, repeatedly expressed his disgust to Palmerston’s successor, Lord Granville.85 
Jerningham was not alone. Howard thought that events following the coup had 
‘produced the worst effect’. The confiscation and banishments had ‘completely 
undermined all … confidence’ towards Louis Napoleon in Belgium.86 Meanwhile, the 
British Chargé in Berlin feared that Britain might be drawn into another dispute. 
Although Prussian Minister-President Baron Manteuffel asked the Belgian Minister to 
advise King Leopold against signing ‘any protest on the subject’, if the confiscation 
proved illegal, he was ‘disposed to admit’ King Leopold’s ‘right’ to protest. 
Manteuffel regretted the sudden confiscation, which British influence could ‘have 
been usefully exerted to prevent’, and thought that Britain ‘might... assist King 
Leopold’.87 Although Louis Napoleon’s actions appeared reprehensible, Britain had to 
avoid criticising them, because it could have been drawn into international 
disagreement, and thus aligned against France.  
 
In Madrid, Lord Howden was more sanguine. The ‘furious’ court had forced the 
government to ‘write a very strong remonstrance to be presented... at Paris’ as the 
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dowry of the Duchesse de Montpensier (formerly the Infanta Luisa) was ‘placed in 
mortgage on some of the land’, which ‘would not bring half of its value’. Even 
Moderado newspapers, previously ‘violently hostile against anything English’ were 
consequently critical to the point of favouring ‘England and an English alliance’. 
Howden was ‘astonished at [his] own success’.88 Faced with an incredibly critical and 
personal reaction to Louis Napoleon’s actions, Howden capitalised upon the anger 
which the confiscation created to restore some of Britain’s standing in Spain. 
 
Granville did not protest against the confiscation. He informed the Queen that the 
Belgian Minister thought that if Louis Napoleon was ‘inclined to agree to what is 
just’, he would rescind the decrees without ‘being pressed’, and would attribute 
British remonstrances to ‘Claremont influence’. It was therefore impossible to take ‘a 
high tone’. Although ‘very moderate language’ would have implied that Britain was 
‘not much interested’, Granville would not ‘give a direct refusal to those interested in 
these decrees’.89 Passivity was the best policy, and Victoria and Albert did not allow 
their sentiments to ‘influence’ the Foreign Secretary.90 Any implication of sympathy 
for the exiles would have needlessly angered Louis Napoleon, and was therefore 
rejected out of hand. 
 
Normanby’s replacement, Lord Cowley, was also hostile to the confiscation. On 17 
March, he reported to Malmesbury (who had replaced Granville after Derby formed a 
Protectionist government) that people felt ‘that their fortunes [were], in a great 
measure, in the hands of a single individual, and that their properties may be attacked 
as suddenly and inexplicably as... the Orléans family[’s]’.91 But although the 
confiscation and its aftermath seemingly demonstrated the arbitrary nature of the 
French regime, Cowley rejected precipitate action. When his Belgian colleague 
suggested submitting ‘the question of the Orléans family property, as far as it 
[regarded]’ King Leopold to arbitration, Cowley warned that this would ‘irritate the 
President unnecessarily.’92 While angered by the confiscation and subsequent political 
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and legal fiascos, Cowley recognised that any representation would have worsened 
concerns about the Orléans’ supposed influence in Britain. 
 
The Orléans sidestepped the confiscation with the help of their British bankers. 
Angela Burdett-Coutts was close to the Orléans, and ‘came immediately to their 
assistance’. Although the amount of financial support she gave is uncertain, they were 
certainly ‘glad of her help’; Aumale wrote to her in late March about a ‘secret 
proposal’, perhaps related to the purchase of Orléans House, which was bought on 
Aumale’s behalf by Coutts’ Bank and leased to back him, because foreigners could 
not then purchase property in Britain.93  
 
Coutts’ was able to take decisions on the Orléans’ behalf to evade both British laws 
which penalised foreigners and the French government’s attempts to weaken the 
Orléans’ influence. The sale of the great Chantilly estate to Coutts’ was also ‘a false 
one’. Coutts’ pretended to buy it from Aumale to prevent its confiscation, and rented 
its ‘Petit Château’ to Cowley as a summer residence.94 Unencumbered by diplomatic 
realities as the government was, Coutts’ were able to help the Orléans both retain their 
profitable estates and acquire further property in Britain. 
 
Enter Thiers, 1852 
Thiers’ potential arrival also created concern for British politicians. After he was 
initially expelled to Belgium, it was expected that he would leave for Britain. 
Although Marion Ellice commented on 17 December that friends feared that he would 
be suspected of conspiracy in Britain, she soon conjectured that they would ‘be much 
joyed at his crossing the Channel’, to ‘make mischief (or rather... be suspected of 
doing so)’.95 Thiers was ‘uncertain’ whether to go to Italy or Britain; Ellice 
commented that if Thiers and his allies were ‘wise, they [would] come here’. He had 
already invited his friend to London.96 However, both Orleanists and the Orléans were 
opposed, ‘for fear of reports of intrigues at Claremont’.97 Thiers’ potential arrival 
                                                 
93   Healy, Edna, Coutts & Co, 1692-1992: The Portrait of a Private Bank (London, 1992) p.299, 
p.342; Aumale to Angela Burdett-Coutts, 30 March 1852, Burdett-Coutts Papers, Add. MS 85275 f.1 ; 
Schedule of Title Deeds and Documents, MCC/CL/L/CC/8/049/1/1 
94   Richter, L.M., Chantilly in History and Art (London, 1913), p.119 
95   Marion Ellice to Edward Ellice, 17 December 1851, Ellice Papers, Mss. 15071 f.178; Marion Ellice 
to Edward Ellice, 21 December 1851, Ibid., f.173 
96  Ellice to his daughter in law, 17 December 1851 , Radford (ed.), Ellice, i p.253 
97  Ellice to his daughter in law, 21 December 1851, Ibid., i p.254 
 186 
seemingly threatened Anglo-French accord, and more dangerously, Howard feared 
French protests about Thiers’ presence in Belgium, still seemingly a likely target for 
French invasion. On 6 February, he reported that the French statesman had left, 
‘carrying out his original intention of settling in England’, because ‘his continued 
residence... had produced disagreeable correspondence’ with France.98 Granville was 
thankful for his departure. 99  
 
Upon arrival, Thiers immediately announced his presence to Ellice and threw himself 
into politics.100 After several French Ministers resigned over the confiscation, he 
spoke about their replacements in detail at a reception; at another, he told guests that 
he believed Louis Napoleon would declare a new Empire; and he responded in detail 
to questions about whether the French army would be expanded.101 Thiers’ loquacity 
attracted great interest, but he did not devote his exile to proselytising. When he dined 
with Ellice and Hobhouse on 17 February, the conversation focused upon cabinet 
procedure, and days later, when the Whig Sir John Hobhouse asked him what France 
would make of rumours that Palmerston would join the Protectionist government, he 
‘could not tell’.102 Nevertheless, his opinions were valued and shared. Aberdeen noted 
that Thiers was convinced Louis Napoleon wanted to invade Belgium, and the same 
day, upon hearing of the confiscation, a fellow-exile urged Thiers to raise this and 
other ‘socialist’ acts with the British government.103  
 
Thiers was feted by liberals and Conservatives alike, sometimes simultaneously; on 
25 February, he dined with Ellice, Disraeli, and the Radical Charles Villiers.104 His 
opinions even reached the royal family. As was his habit, the Whig economist Nassau 
Senior recorded his conversations with Thiers, and Senior shared his transcripts with 
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an interested Prince Albert.105 Thiers was also privy to discussion of British politics; 
he informed Ellice that the Peelite Sir James Graham was willing to support the 
Whigs in that year’s general election.106 The exiled former minister had quickly won 
the trust and support of a wide range of figures in British political life. 
 
Such was Thiers’ popularity that Malmesbury lobbied for his exile to be rescinded. 
Walewski complied, worried by the ‘coldness of England to the new regime’.107 So 
well-received were Thiers’ opinions that his exile had become counterproductive in 
the eyes of both the French and British governments. After a continental holiday, 
Thiers returned in the autumn for ‘the usual round of country houses’, and even 
discussed free trade with the Radical John Bright.108 He continued to attract attention, 
and Aberdeen praised him after they met in December.109 More controversially, 
Disraeli’s eulogy at Wellington's funeral plagiarised one made by Thiers, who 
subsequently alerted the Peelite journalist Abraham Hayward; this revelation was 
publicised to some acclaim.110 Throughout his exile, Thiers had allowed his remarks 
to be used for political advantage.  
 
British Hospitality and French Concerns, 1852-55 
 
In contrast to the welcome which the British aristocracy gave to Thiers, the British 
royal family only gave the Orléans moral support. In the wake of the threatened 
confiscation of the Orléans’ properties, Queen Victoria wanted them to remain 
‘passive’, and Prince Albert hoped that ‘when returned to calmness from the very 
natural indignation which the unjustifiable treatment of all their friends has 
occasioned’, they would consider Louis Napoleon’s dictatorship a ‘necessary stage’ in 
France’s ‘malady’, which had to ‘be cured before constitutional government [could] 
be established’.111 When Nemours protested against the confiscation to Prince 
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Albert’s brother, Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg, Albert hoped that Ernest would protest 
upon legal, rather than familial grounds.112 Owing to the risk of incurring French 
displeasure, the relationship between the two royal families had to be limited to 
friendship. 
 
Yet even this friendship antagonised Louis Napoleon. After Malmesbury instructed 
Cowley to explain a visit to Antwerp by the Queen as ‘merely a family visit’, his 
French counterpart, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, questioned Cowley because ‘she met 
the Orléans family’ at the funeral of the Queen of the Belgians. Cowley responded as 
requested, and criticised ‘the President’s unwarrantable jealousy of the civility 
shown... to the Orléans family’. Drouyn ‘fully admitted the President’s fault, and 
lamented... the susceptibility of his character’.113 The French President’s paranoia was 
now clear, and in July, Cowley reported that Louis Napoleon was angered when the 
Duchesse d’Orléans met four French generals in Belgium, and accepted explanations 
that King Leopold was neither complicit nor aware of her visit.114 Any rumoured 
collaboration had to be neutralised, and on 1 November, Cowley reported that a 
German diplomat had ‘had several confidential interviews’ in Switzerland with some 
of the Orléans. Their language was very ‘reasonable’; they ‘had no party in France, 
and... admit[ted] that... Louis Napoleon [was] necessary and desirable.’115  
 
As far as Cowley was concerned, this admission of weakness by the Orléans and their 
unwillingness to challenge the status quo in France was an admirable act which would 
only serve to improve Anglo-French relations. Nevertheless, Derby feared that the 
Orléans had ‘been imprudent’ when Louis Napoleon, who had now declared himself 
Emperor Napoleon III, ‘heard things and expressions… which did a great deal of 
harm’, and he ‘begged’ Queen Victoria to warn them, in case they ‘unintentionally 
compromised us seriously’. Derby even worried that she might be blamed if Britain 
rejected an Anglo-French alliance, seemingly influenced by ‘mistaken friendship for 
the Orléans’.116 In the Prime Minister’s opinion, the Orléans’ opinions and friendship 
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with the Queen remained problematic. Napoleon’s paranoia concerning the Orléans 
was a far greater threat to British diplomacy than their actual activities. 
 
After the Protectionists’ budget was rejected in December, Aberdeen was appointed 
Prime Minister in a Whig-Peelite coalition, and as Malmesbury predicted, Aberdeen 
cooperated with Napoleon. Nemours congratulated Aberdeen, who offered ‘any 
service in [his] power’ in reply, albeit tempered by ‘the obligations of duty’.117 He 
could only do a small favour. Customs duties were remitted on ‘certain items’ 
imported for the Orléans, and both he and the Chancellor, Gladstone, wished to avoid 
interference. If the Orléans were found to be abusing the law by selling imported 
items, it ‘might perhaps give rise to questions of a disagreeable manner.... which had 
better be avoided’.118 They agreed that duties should be paid on anything intended for 
sale, but Aberdeen believed that the consequences could be ‘painful to all 
concerned’.119 Even this seemingly innocuous favour could have upset Napoleon and 
harmed both the Orléans and the government. 
 
Russell, now Foreign Secretary, also feared that the Orléans might compromise 
British diplomacy. In April, Malmesbury told him that Napoleon had complained of 
the Queen’s ‘Orleanist predilections’, and that in 1850-51, the French government had 
‘made up its mind to the necessity of war with England’, having apparently 
discovered supportive letters from the British court to Orleanist leaders.120 Russell’s 
subsequent complaints about Victoria’s relationship with the Orléans were strong 
enough to leave her ‘annoyed and vexed’. Russell seemed ‘to expect that because the 
Emperor disliked it, we should now change our course’, whereas Derby had merely 
hoped that they were ‘prudent in their language.’ The ‘poor exiles and near relations’ 
were rarely received,  never invited to ‘state parties’, nor spoken to about ‘politics’, 
except for her ‘close relatives’ the Nemours. Victoria was also ‘struck’ by their 
‘extreme prudence and moderation’, even when Palmerston had promoted ‘an 
Orleanist plot’. Aberdeen was instructed to prevent further ‘speeches’, and to remind 
Russell that in reply to complaints, he should state that Britain had ‘promptly’ 
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recognised the Second Empire.121 In the Queen’s opinion, Russell’s suggestions were 
excessive, contrary to British customs of hospitality, and reflected poorly upon her 
efforts to avoid creating offence.  
 
However, suggestions of Orléans influence had to be discouraged, and indeed, prior to 
Derby’s fall, Malmesbury had warned Cowley that Stratford Canning had ‘given the 
French the idea that the Aberdeen school [was] hostile’. Napoleon had ‘always 
thought so and I have often assured him not, but now he will be convinced he was 
right’.122 Malmesbury felt that Stratford had undone his efforts to assuage the 
Emperor’s fears. He had assured Napoleon that Victoria had no enmity towards him, 
merely friendship for her ‘Orleanist relations’.123 Protectionists, Peelites and Whigs 
all agreed that Britain had to cooperate with Napoleon, and that the Orléans should 
abstain from politics.  
 
The Orléans also concerned both the British and French Police. Surveillance by the 
latter appears to have been more stringent; whereas few Metropolitan Police reports 
survive, Lord Holland compared French surveillance of the Orléans to the close 
attention British visitors were subjected to in absolutist Naples.124 Along with a record 
of Louis Philippe’s death, only one Metropolitan Police report concerning the Orléans 
survives, recording their visitors and Joinville’s departure for Ireland in March 1852. 
Although this lack of records may reflect a destruction of material, it appears likely 
that the Metropolitan Police simply took little interest in the Orléans’ movements.125 
Indeed, when John Sanders (the detective usually charged with observing refugees) 
was sent to Jersey to monitor the exiles there, Le Flô was only mentioned in passing 
as the main target of a French agent.126 Joinville’s journey caused some concern 
because he had suddenly left England, and Sanders concluded that Joinville was 
probably visiting the former French diplomat Count Jarnac in Ireland.127 Whilst the 
French authorities were far more vigilant, Britain only appears to have monitored the 
Orléans’ movements when their activities appeared to threaten unrest in France.  
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However, the Queen was worried by Joinville’s Anglophobe reputation when an 
article he had written for the Deux Mondes was published in February 1853; a 
pamphlet by Joinville concerning the possibility of a French invasion had created 
panic a decade before, and Victoria thought that Joinville had acted with ‘folly & 
imprudence’, for the new pamphlet created ‘great indignation’ and ‘the appearance of 
the greatest ingratitude’. She did ‘not put any bad interpretation upon it’, but thought 
‘the want of judgment & feeling...  inexcusable, & the imprudence incredible!’128 The 
Duchesse de Nemours was ‘cautioned’, ‘for their own sakes’, and Aberdeen 
downplayed the ‘episode’.129 The Queen’s concerns for once outstripped his.  
 
Aumale attracted more positive attention. The exiled prince was subject to some 
publicity upon buying ‘the celebrated Standish Library’ in 1851, and became a 
‘prominent and active member’ of the bibliophile Philobiblion Society, founded in 
1853. Many of its members were politicians - including Whig MP Monckton Milnes, 
and Tory MP William Stirling-Maxwell, and Aumale was invited to become its 
patron. Although replaced as patron by Prince Albert, Aumale became one of its 
leading hosts.130 The Philobiblion established an ‘enviable position in cultural circles’, 
and Aumale became ‘widely known as a collector of fine arts’.131 Aumale’s 
association with Reeve also began in 1853; Reeve noted that they first ‘[m]ade 
acquaintance... at Lady Alice Peel’s - at his request’.132 Lady Alice also invited 
Lansdowne to meet Aumale.133 Through his own interests and with Lady Alice’s 
support, Aumale began to establish friendships with influential Britons. 
 
Nevertheless, the Orléans remained unpopular, and in late 1853, they were named in 
another supposed conspiracy. After briefly resigning, Palmerston fell out with Prince 
Albert, and did little to discourage a series of ridiculous newspaper attacks upon the 
Prince.134 It was alleged that Albert was part of a German, Coburg, or even ‘Austro-
Belgian-Coburg-Orléans’ clique which sought to make Britain a Russian puppet, and 
he could not defend himself publicly. King Leopold subsequently protested, but 
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Palmerston believed that there was ‘some truth in Albert’s Orleanist leanings’, and 
only disavowed  the stories once the consequent press campaign spiralled out of 
control.135  He also took the opportunity to ask Leopold to ‘inspire’ better feelings 
towards Napoleon ‘at Windsor’; although Palmerston thought that it ‘quite natural’ 
for the Queen and Prince to show goodwill towards the Orleans, he considered a 
‘courteous’ relationship between the court and Napoleon a diplomatic necessity.136 
 
However, Palmerston’s resignation led Napoleon, already concerned by the royal 
family’s ‘Orleanist connections’, to believe that the government’s ‘apparent paralysis’ 
was due to ‘a pro-Orleanist Aberdeen… playing France for a fool in the east’.137 
Although he had bolstered his reputation, mostly at Albert’s expense, but also that of 
the Orléans, Palmerston’s actions had triggered Napoleon’s fears about the exiles, and 
as the Crimean War approached, Britain and France supported Turkey against Russia. 
The Queen sympathised with the ex-soldier Aumale, who had to remain inactive, but 
good relations with Napoleon were vital.138 Any association with the intriguing 
Orléans still threatened to derail relations with France – now both a potentially 
dangerous neighbour and a close ally. 
 
The Queen and government both feared that the Orléans’ intrigues might upset the 
alliance. Upon hearing that Chambord wished to visit Nemours in Britain in January 
1854, Queen Victoria was alarmed. She hoped that the reports were ‘unfounded’, for 
they were ‘too alarming to be entertained for a moment’, and quickly sought 
Aberdeen’s advice.139 In a far harsher tone, Palmerston warned Aberdeen that the 
reports should be contradicted ‘without delay’, as it was ‘impossible that such a 
meeting should be permitted… in a royal palace’.140 Both the Orléans’ critic and 
defender were worried about the supposed reception’s likely fallout, and the Prime 
Minister shared their concerns.  
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Although Aberdeen thought that the story had probably been fabricated to discredit 
the government and create ‘suspicion in France’, he urged Victoria to persuade the 
Orléans not to receive Chambord.141 She warned that such a visit would be an 
embarrassment, and create ‘umbrage’ in France. Although France was Britain’s ‘very 
intimate ally’, her friendship with the Orléans made Britain’s position ‘very 
delicate’.142 Nemours replied that the false report came from Russia, and that 
publicising such a visit would be political suicide.143 Aberdeen was relieved by 
Nemours’ announcement, and Victoria thought the affair satisfactorily resolved, 
although Nemours did not ‘see the danger’.144 Serious concerns remained about the 
Orléans’ tact and reputation for intrigue. 
 
A Change in Fortunes, 1855-57 
 
Eventually, Napoleon appeared to accept Victoria and Albert’s relationship with the 
Orléans. Although he had feared that the royal couple ‘had an avowed antipathy 
against him’, by June 1854, they ‘had been so kind to [him] that [he] could never 
doubt the sincerity of their feelings’.145 These increasingly positive sentiments were 
shared in Britain. Queen Victoria had ceased to despise Napoleon, and in 1855, they 
exchanged state visits. 146 Extensive preparations were made to ensure that 
Napoleon’s visit to Britain was a success, and on the orders of Palmerston (appointed 
Prime Minister after Aberdeen fell), prominent radical refugees were warned that if 
the ‘least annoyance’ was given, he would immediately introduce an Alien Bill to 
expel all political refugees.147 The Orléans were also targeted. Much to their horror, 
while French policemen brought to Britain to ensure Napoleon’s safety threw cordons 
around Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, two were posted outside Claremont, 
and another at the nearest station.148 Britain appeared to have yielded to Napoleon’s 
paranoia despite the Orléans’ quiet existence.  
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Nevertheless, the visit saw discussions which were to the Orléans’ benefit.  Upon 
meeting Napoleon, Victoria mentioned the Orléans, and spoke frankly, anxious to ‘not 
have this untouchable ground’ between them.  In reply, Napoleon asked Victoria to 
tell the elderly ex-Queen, who occasionally visited Spain, that ‘she must travel 
through France if the return journey... [was] too difficult’.149 Napoleon seemingly had 
few concerns about the Orléans, and Victoria appreciated his remarks. Aberdeen 
debated the value of the offer; this ‘act of civility’ was ‘certainly no great matter, but 
as an indication’, it was ‘not altogether without value’.150 However, Victoria was 
impressed, and urged the ex-Queen to ‘accept it as a proof of [her own] unalterable 
friendship’. She added that Napoleon now understood her sentiments; he ‘could not 
object to [her] seeing the members of the family’.151 Napoleon’s flattery gave both the 
Queen and her government the impression that the Orléans’ presence no longer 
appeared to affect Anglo-French understanding.  
 
Privately, Napoleon remained concerned, and in late August, Howden, who had 
known Louis Philippe’s sons ‘familiarly’ from ‘their earliest years’, was accused of 
carrying letters for the Orléans. While Clarendon gave him the benefit of the doubt, 
Palmerston disagreed. Howden would not knowingly have served as ‘the channel for 
any intrigue or correspondence politically hostile to the Emperor’, but could well have 
‘undertaken to carry private letters’. This was ‘no great harm in itself, but imprudent 
in a Minister’.152 These fears persisted, and in November, Napoleon complained to 
Malmesbury about British conduct in Spain, and ‘accused Howden of conspiring with 
the Orleanists and Montpensier’.153 British diplomats had to account for Napoleon’s 
paranoia, and a rumour related to the fusion did create concern. When Montpensier 
visited Chambord in August, the British Chargé in Madrid forwarded the Spanish 
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government's grave concerns to Clarendon. Yet these fears were soon allayed.154 For 
once, British concerns seemingly outstripped Napoleon’s. 
 
Proposals to place Aumale upon a putative Mexican throne similarly worried the 
British more than the French. A former French diplomat, Viscount Gabriac, ‘gathered 
together a number of wealthy [Mexican] conservatives’ to ask Britain and France to 
support a ‘monarchical intervention’, and after they chose Aumale as their preferred 
candidate in September 1856, Gabriac approached the British Consul. Gabriac spoke 
‘at length’, and believed that Mexico would accept ‘any foreign prince offered’, 
although it would be impossible to select a British, Spanish or Italian Prince, or a 
Bonaparte. Aumale alone possessed the requisite ‘religion, character, talent, years and 
fortune’, and could apparently be installed with a small European force. Consul 
Lettsom was sceptical, but as requested, he asked Clarendon to consider it.155 
Clarendon was dismissive, and joked that he would prefer to send Isabella II of Spain 
to Mexico, a godsend to Spain which would make Mexico no worse.156  
 
The idea of an Orléans candidacy was discounted, but it was disconcerting, and 
Clarendon sent Cowley a copy of Lettsom's dispatch to ascertain further details. 
Walweski, now Foreign Minister, knew nothing of Aumale's role; he assured Cowley 
that the scheme had no official backing, and added that another supporter, the 
Marquis de Radepont, would visit London. While Clarendon paid little attention to 
Radepont, Napoleon gave his ‘unqualified consent’ if Aumale were to accept.157 This 
was a worrying prospect; if Aumale accepted, then Napoleon might have backed the 
scheme to sideline the Orléans, and weakened his own regime. Napoleon’s intentions 
concerning the Orléans, rather than their activities, had again created apprehension. 
 
Meanwhile, the Orleans began to be received in society. After Palmerston and 
Aumale met amicably in August 1856, Senior commented that ‘Holland House will 
be marked with black in the Tuileries Register’.158 This happened in strange 
circumstances; Palmerston mistook Aumale for the Comte de Castiglione at a 
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reception, and greatly offended the Comtesse, a cousin of Sardinian Prime Minister 
Count Cavour. He avoided an ‘international misunderstanding’ by asking to be invited 
when Aumale next dined there.159 Association with the Orléans no longer appeared to 
risk offending Napoleon, although conversation was not ‘an easy matter, as you [had] 
to be constantly on your guard against touching any of their sore points’.160 This did 
not prevent their entry into political circles. In January 1857, the Nemours attended 
their ‘first large dinner party’ in exile at Windsor, with the Derbys and Sir George 
Grey in attendance, while the Aumales were received as ‘intimate friends’ at Hatfield 
House, increasingly ‘a meeting-place for distinguished spirits in every sphere’.161  
 
The Aumales also befriended Lady Waldegrave, an ambitious liberal hostess. 
Waldegrave was initially unwilling to meet the Aumales, whom her husband, the 
Conservative MP George Harcourt, had met at both Milnes’ and Holland House, but 
they insisted upon meeting her, and she quickly came to like them.162 The Aumales 
soon benefited from this friendship. The increasingly popular hostess ‘determined’ 
that the ‘Saturday [Review]’s great influence should be exercised’ for her ‘new 
protégés’, and so ‘complete was her enslavement’ of its editor, J.D. Cook, that she 
compared it to Lady Palmerston’s increasing influence over The Times. Another 
protégé, the liberal MP Chichester Fortescue, wrote pro-Orléans articles for the 
Saturday, along with Hayward for Fraser’s, the Quarterly and the Edinburgh. A 
young William Vernon Harcourt also joined her roster of journalists.163 The Saturday 
proved to be a consistently anti-Bonapartist paper.164  The Orléans had quickly 
acquired support from both politicians and the press. 
 
In some respects, little had changed in the Orléans’ position in British politics 
between 1850 and 1857; they still had few enthusiastic British supporters, and 
schemes centred upon them continued to trouble the Foreign Office. This is not to say 
that their presence had been of little consequence. Palmerston’s attempt to deploy 
rumours about them to excuse his conduct in response to Louis Napoleon’s coup had 
resulted in his dismissal and subsequent row with Russell (which was not resolved 
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until 1859), and both rumoured and actual Orleans intrigues had caused serious 
concern. Moreover, they had steadily acquired the support of British politicians. 
Whereas their dynastic intrigues had been of interest to only a few supporters during 
the early 1850s, by 1857 Waldegrave had begun to build support for them. 
Meanwhile, disputes with Napoleon regarding the Orléans seemingly no longer 
threatened Britain’s relations with France, now an authoritarian Empire rather than an 
unstable Republic. The Orléans had been transformed into popular figures who had 
the potential to influence British politics, much as Thiers had been during his brief 
exile in 1852. 
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8: The Orléans in Exile, 1858-1871 
 
During the later years of the Orléans’ exile, their presence touched upon numerous 
aspects of British politics. Their dignity, advice and writings won them respect, and 
when their presence or activities concerned British governments, this was often 
tempered by their status, although Lady Waldegrave’s ambitions were vital to their 
advancement. This chapter explores how the Orléans established themselves in British 
politics, the influence they exercised, and their links with the press. It also considers 
the impact which they continued to have upon British foreign policy. While they 
never regained the French throne, the Orléans’ presence and opinions continued to 
influence both British politics and diplomacy, owing to the reputation they established 
in Britain and Napoleon’s continued fears about their ambitions. 
 
By the late 1850s, the Orléans, especially Aumale, had achieved great prominence. 
Even the previously hostile Palmerstons recognised the Aumales’ social standing and 
gave them a grand reception in 1859.1 The Orléans were no longer political and social 
pariahs, and this success owed much to Lady Waldegrave’s ambition. While her 
houses became ‘active centres of the Liberal party’, she was also the Orléans’ 
‘preferred hostess’. Waldegrave’s influence over Aumale was widely acknowledged, 
and by 1859, she had also discussed several ‘projects’ with the Comte de Paris. 
Waldegrave sought to use the Orléans as a stepping-stone to cross-channel influence, 
and in the wake of Napoleon’s fall, certain ‘wags’ intimated that if Chichester 
Fortescue (her protégé, and from January 1863, third husband) died, she would 
become ‘Duchess of Aumale and perhaps eventually Queen of France.’2  
 
But the Orléans were not merely Waldegrave’s pawns. As David Steele notes, their 
acceptance into ‘English, and more especially Whig, society’ brought them ‘into 
contact with leading politicians.’3 They hosted numerous receptions, and Aumale, 
‘brilliant in conversation’, ensured his own fame; even the discriminating Charles 
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Greville praised him lavishly.4 Louis Philippe’s grandsons also become popular. 
Gladstone once invited John Stuart Mill to a breakfast ‘with the added inducement 
that the social lion was to be... the Comte de Paris,’ whose brother, the Duc de 
Chartres, received the Russells and Clarendons.5 This regard guaranteed a degree of 
influence over British politics, and in 1877, six years after their departure, the German 
Minister to France believed that Britain exercised significant influence there through 
the Orléans’ ‘connection with the English aristocracy.’6  
 
The Orléans also cooperated with British journalists. An 1858 French government 
report recorded links between the Times and both French monarchists and the 
Orléans, while Richard Cobden believed that the Orléans held a financial stake in the 
newspaper.7 Although these rumours were dismissed by British diplomats, the Times 
was at least ‘avowedly anti-Bonapartist and very pro-Orleanist.’8 This was not their 
only link to the press. While Waldegrave mediated between Aumale and J.D. Cook, 
the supportive journalist Abraham Hayward exercised great influence, and Aumale 
‘furthered’ an acquaintance with Walter Bagehot, a critic of Napoleon III in the 
Economist. 9  With Waldegrave’s help, the Orléans acquired a strong degree of 
support from various newspapers, and the Princes’ writings also found attention, 
including articles in the Orleanist Revue des Deux Mondes, and a work on British 
Trades’ Unions by Paris.10  
 
Through their labours and connections, the Orléans attracted further recognition, and 
they retained favourable financial facilities. In 1861, the Duchesse d’Aumale wrote to 
Angela Burdett-Coutts about a secret transaction of £20,000, and the Orléans were 
thankful for the work of Coutt’s partners.11 Coutts’ also purchased Paris’ home York 
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House on Aumale’s behalf.12 Personal relationships with Britain’s elite were vital to 
the Orléans’ rise, for they ensured political support, publicity and financial stability. 
 
There were limits to this success. One attendee found a ball at Orléans House ‘dull, 
and no wonder’, because ‘there were more French royalists present than anyone else’, 
and the Orléans often sojourned abroad, which limited the number of receptions they 
could attend.13 Such absences reduced their political reach, and the Aumales often 
antagonised Waldegrave. They even attempted to dissuade her from remarrying, 
fearful that Fortescue would ‘deprive them of her company’.14 Their ambition and 
reliance upon her patronage could clearly produce friction. Yet Waldegrave and the 
Duchesse shared an ‘obsessive friendship.’15 The Orléans and Waldegrave remained 
both firm friends and political allies, though the Orléans were not obsessed with 
politics. While Aumale ‘diverted’ himself writing history, the Duchesse d’Aumale 
admitted to Lady Salisbury that ‘Lady Clarendon works, and I do nothing.’16 The 
Duchesse d’Orléans and the elderly ex-Queen instead dedicated themselves to religion 
and family. 
 
Far more problematic was Joinville’s Anglophobe reputation. Although his infamous 
1844 pamphlet was not included in an 1859 collection of his writings, Sarah Austin 
thought the publication ill-judged, and one journalist thought  his ‘foolish hostility’ 
unforgivable.17 He remained widely despised, and Aumale’s ‘liberal tendencies’ 
contrasted with Nemours’ and Joinville’s ‘narrow outlook’.18 Aumale’s brothers’ 
retirement from public life perhaps benefited the Orléans’ liberal image.  
 
Toleration and sympathy extended beyond Whig society. Tories also admired the 
Orléans’ qualities; aside from Lady Alice Peel and Lady Salisbury, Nemours wrote of 
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his long friendship with Disraeli, and Lord Stanhope (formerly Mahon) and Aumale 
exchanged ‘wonderful French bons mots’.19 More significantly, Disraeli dedicated his 
novel Lothair to Aumale, his second-greatest friend, and did not ‘know [Aumale’s] 
equal.’ Malmesbury similarly thought Aumale ‘very gentlemanly and agreeable’.20 
Conservatives admired Aumale, and the exiles also remained close to the British royal 
family. Although Queen Victoria and Prince Albert established a ‘fairly close’ 
relationship with Napoleon, Cowley was appalled by their ‘violence and indiscretion’ 
against the Emperor in 1860, and Napoleon remained ‘jealous’ of the attention the 
Orléans received.21  
 
The Orléans also remained a headache for British diplomats. The wartime alliance 
with France came to an end after 1856, and as David Brown notes, ‘by 1858 France 
again seemed to be positioning itself as a rival to Britain’. Numerous Anglo-French 
disagreements occurred between then and Napoleon’s fall in 1870, including disputes 
over Italian unification in 1858-59, Poland in 1863, and Schleswig-Holstein in 1863-
4. Nevertheless, a degree of cooperation continued, and to Palmerston, Prime Minister 
for much of the period, ‘Anglo–French harmony seemed the best guarantor of 
international relevance and influence in both countries.’22 Napoleon remained an 
important partner, and he was wary of the Orléans, whose ambitions and activities 
continued to influence British foreign policy. 23 Three of the princes participated in 
the American Civil War, during which time Joinville attempted to prevent Anglo-
American conflict; Aumale’s candidacy for the vacant Greek throne, and his potential 
rule there deeply concerned British statesmen; the Duc de Montpensier’s attempts to 
gain the Spanish throne in 1868-70 resurrected fears of Orleanist influence in Spain; 
and after the Franco-Prussian War, many Britons considered the likelihood of an 
Orléans restoration. As the Orléans’ ambitions grew, they had an ever greater impact 
upon British politics and diplomacy. 
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Initial Efforts and Controversies, 1857-61 
 
By late 1857, the Orléans had established themselves in society, and as Waldegrave’s 
protégés. The Aumales’ ‘second appearance’ came in June 1857, and in December, 
the Nemours were introduced to Lord Grey.24 Soon after, Waldegrave met Paris, and 
wrote of Joinville’s ‘honourable character’.25 She was deeply impressed by the 
family, and Fortescue also toiled on their behalf; one article in their favour was 
finished at 3 A.M. ‘with great difficulty’.26 Waldegrave not only ensured that her own 
energies, but also those of her protégé Fortescue were put into providing the Orléans 
with publicity, and this attention was gladly reciprocated. By August 1858, 
Waldegrave dined at Orléans House ‘as often as [the Aumales were] allowed’, 
because the ex-Queen constantly invited them to Claremont; they only otherwise 
rejected an invitation from Waldegrave when Queen Victoria ‘sent for them’.27 This 
remarkably strong friendship supplanted older allies. After Madame Graham received 
the Aumales in 1860, Lady Clarendon ventured that her guests ‘were pleased at seeing 
your royalties’.28 Aberdeen nevertheless remained supportive; Paris visited him in the 
summer of 1858, and he passed on a message from Aumale to the Prime Minister, 
Derby.29 But the Orléans had new, enthusiastic patrons.  
 
Their company was soon widely valued. The Whig politician Lord Carlisle found 
Aumale ‘most intelligent and pleasing’ and by August 1858, the more Clarendon saw 
of Aumale, ‘well-informed and gentlemanlike’, the more he admired him.30 Lady 
Theresa Lewis similarly thought Aumale, ‘the most perfect model of a Prince’, and 
Clarendon believed that ‘next to Macaulay’ he had ‘the most varied and extensive 
amount of knowledge of anyone he knows.’31 Such remarks speak volumes about how 
highly Aumale’s character and opinions were esteemed, and while he discussed 
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French affairs with literary contacts such as Alfred Tennyson, Lady Alice Peel quoted 
French news from the Duchesse d’Orléans’ in correspondence with John Bright.32 The 
intelligence which the Orléans provided was as valuable as their company, and the 
Aumales, among ‘the principal entertainments’ at Strawberry Hill, soon became a 
fixture in society. On one occasion in 1859, they dined with the Granvilles and went 
‘afterwards to the Clarendons’.33 Waldegrave’s efforts had quickly paid off, and 
ensured the Aumales’ place in Whig networks. 
 
However, Waldegrave’s attempts to establish popular support for the exiles proved 
costly and ineffective. In 1858, Waldegrave helped Aumale to establish the weekly 
Continental Review, an anti-Bonapartist newspaper dedicated to European affairs. But 
although it quickly attracted attention from both the public and the London 
newspapers, its appeal as an ‘exclusively continental’ paper soon wore off. In spite of 
the efforts of its staff - including J.D. Cook of the Saturday Review – the sheer 
expense persuaded Aumale to instead focus upon influencing French-language 
newspapers in Belgium.34 Other efforts to influence the press in the Orléans’ favour 
were unsuccessful. Although the Statesman was in ‘daily contact’ with Aumale, 
supporting the Orléans lost it sales, while Waldegrave subsidised it by £50 weekly, 
and she failed to have an article inserted into the Times in Aumale’s favour.35 Without 
subsidisation, British newspapers were rarely supportive. 
 
Meanwhile, the Aumales’ rise threatened Anglo-French relations. In February 1858, 
Derby formed a second government after Palmerston fell in the wake of a botched 
attempt on Napoleon’s life. An Italian refugee named Felice Orsini and three 
accomplices had attempted to blow up the Emperor’s open carriage, killed eight 
bystanders and left over 140 wounded. The plot was hatched in Britain, and 
Palmerston’s government was defeated in an attempt to introduce legislation to 
placate Napoleon. As Hicks notes, ‘Britain’s apparent vulnerability to attack, even 
invasion created widespread concern’, and the government therefore sought to ‘reduce 
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tension with France’.36 The Orléans provided a potential further point of contention, 
and by late March, they had ‘reason to believe’ that French spies were attempting to 
implicate them in imagined ‘plots’.37  
 
Painfully aware of the regime’s paranoia, they still sparked a minor incident.  On 10 
April, Victoria noted that Aumale ‘spoke very nicely about’ the new French 
Ambassador, the Duc de Malakoff, his “loyauté” and ‘determination to maintain the 
alliance’.38 Aumale’s commentary was welcome, and in conversation with Victoria, 
Malakoff praised the Princes, especially Aumale.39 This presented Waldegrave with 
an opportunity to intercede in Anglo-French relations via Aumale, and she organised 
a meeting between him and Malakoff.40 News of their meeting leaked, and on 17 
April, the Queen recorded that Napoleon’s ‘abominable’ Foreign Minister Walewski 
‘had tried to make mischief between’ Malakoff and the man he had replaced, Count 
Persigny.41  
 
Concerns about the Orléans’ popularity fed into official anxieties. When Malmesbury 
sought advice about whether Lady Derby should invite Paris to a reception on 2 May, 
the Queen replied that she would ‘prefer not being consulted’, and Cowley initially 
hesitated, ‘certain’ that making enquiries would have ‘the worst effect.’ The Orléans’ 
presence was a sensitive matter to both the Queen and the Emperor, and Cowley 
thought that in response to similar enquiries, he would probably be told that they 
could ‘do what they pleased’, and that this would cause unnecessary ‘irritation’. 
Knowing Napoleon’s ‘foibles’ regarding the Orléans, he thought it ‘very unfortunate’ 
that their desire ‘to go into the world should have occurred in this manner’, and feared 
resuscitating ‘ill-will against us’.42 Cowley added that Napoleon was ‘well aware’ of 
intrigues including the Duchesse d’Orléans’ correspondence with his ‘most decided 
enemies’.43  
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Caution appeared necessary, and when Cowley discussed the matter with Finance 
Minister Achille Fould, he agreed that Paris should ‘enter society’, although ‘public 
men’ should not show ‘any extraordinary marks’ of attention. Cowley concluded that 
‘there was no necessity for giving dinners exclusively for them’.44 It was therefore 
permissible to receive the Orléans so long as they were not feted, and Malmesbury 
was ‘much obliged’ for Cowley’s ‘prudence’. ‘[T]he Princes won’t be asked by Lord 
D[erby] or me’, he noted on 4 May, and soon added that it would be ‘better not to 
invite’ them to Ministers’ houses.45 Malmesbury’s caution exceeded Cowley’s, but 
Cowley was ‘very glad’ of it, for after Malakoff’s ‘accidental recontre’, Napoleon 
reflected that during his exile, ‘ministerial houses’ had been ‘shut to him’.46 Although 
the Aumales remained close to Lady Salisbury and the Peels, the government’s 
vigilance and hope to appease Napoleon restricted their scope for influence in Tory 
circles. 
 
This policy did not please the Queen. Soon after, she enquired of Malmesbury 
whether court mourning could be ordered after the death of the Duchesse 
d’Orléans’.47 Treading carefully about the emotional issue, Malmesbury drew up a 
paper which she returned to the Foreign Office for future reference. Having set a 
precedent for honouring deceased exiles contrary to government policy, Victoria 
added that she was glad to that a ‘universal feeling seem[ed] to pervade France’ after 
the Duchesse’s death. She remained a partisan of the Orléans, and was disgusted by 
Napoleon’s allusion to his own exile. Whereas Napoleon had been an ‘outlaw’, the 
Orléans were exiles and former allies, ‘living quietly... and… [closely] related to’ her, 
and receptions by ministers had created no problems previously.48 In her opinion, the 
government’s caution was excessive. 
 
The Orléans also provided the Queen with intelligence on Italian affairs. When France 
and Sardinia consolidated an alliance with the marriage of Victor Emmanuel’s 
daughter to Napoleon’s cousin in 1859, Victoria recorded that Aumale was ‘not 
unprepared’ for it.49 Similarly, as Franco-Austrian conflict became increasingly likely 
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in 1859, Aumale told Clarendon that he would not be surprised if Napoleon made ‘a 
good plan of campaign and clever combinations, but that in the event of a reverse... he 
would probably want decision.’50 This proved to be correct; Napoleon suddenly 
sought peace, and in October, the Whig Lord Carlisle praised Aumale, with whom he 
had ‘talked strategy’.51 As an authority on French affairs, Aumale was approached for 
his opinion. 
 
However, when Joinville warned Prince Albert that France had secretly arranged to 
annexe Savoy, he precipitated an argument between the royal couple and the 
government.52 This made the Queen ‘angry and belligerent’, and Palmerston and 
Russell (who had replaced Derby and Malmesbury in a Liberal government in June 
1859) feared that precipitate action could undermine trade with France. While 
Joinville’s warning had spurred Victoria, it was not welcomed by Ministers who were 
already well aware of Napoleon’s plans.53 Moreover, Russell feared that the slightest 
implication of sympathy for the exiles would damage relations with France. When the 
Foreign Secretary referred to Louis Philippe as a ‘most peaceful sovereign’ in a July 
1859 debate, he quickly added that he meant ‘no offence to’ Napoleon.54 (Appealing 
to their expertise seems to have been deemed less offensive.55) 
 
The Liberal government also defended the Orléans. When Aumale received 
threatening letters in September 1861, his friend the Duke of Newcastle (then 
Colonial Secretary) ensured that the affair ended quietly. Newcastle concluded that 
the author probably wanted to extort money, and thought that Aumale should ignore 
it, but because the author could have been an assassin, he secretly warned Sir Richard 
Mayne, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, without mentioning Aumale, 
considering his ‘natural dislike’ of entanglements.56  Aumale’s wishes were respected, 
but the writer, named Gratieu, was ‘under the patronage of [Orsini’s accomplice,] the 
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notorious Bernard’. Newcastle recommended that Gratieu should be watched, and the 
letters secretly returned to him with a warning.57 It was not thought ‘desirable’ to 
notify the French government.58 The threat of Anglo-French strife ensured that the 
case was resolved quietly, and French protests about the Orléans were curtly 
dismissed. In March 1861, Cowley reported that the ‘number of Orléans Princes’ at 
the Duchess of Kent’s funeral had given ‘great umbrage’, sentiments which were 
expressed in  the ‘ministerial’ Patrie. In response, Russell and Clarendon both 
condemned ‘the wanton and revolting article’ which created panic throughout Europe 
and ‘an extent of mischief’ which was ‘very little anticipated.’59 This attack on the 
Orléans, who had won the trust of Britain’s elite, merely bolstered sympathy for them.  
 
Aumale’s Lettre sur l’histoire de France, 1861 
 
In April 1861, Aumale caused a sensation when he published a savage response to a 
derogatory speech about the Bourbons made by Napoleon’s cousin, Prince Napoleon 
or “Plon-Plon”. Aumale was concerned about how the pamphlet would be received; 
he ‘constantly’ consulted Waldegrave about it, and asked Newcastle whether he 
should publish under his own name.60 He knew from the outset that its contents would 
be controversial, and its success created other concerns. Because the pamphlet was 
printed while the French Interior Ministry moved offices, their normal censorship 
failing, over 3000 copies were sold in France. Cowley damningly noted that the 
censor, ‘either an Orleanist or an ass’, ‘let it pass’ and ensured ‘some hours’ of 
printing. Next came ‘the folly of interdicting the further sale’, an act of ‘madness’ 
which increased demand.61 The French government’s behaviour appeared chaotic, and 
the pamphlet was well-received by British sympathisers. Prince Albert noted that 
although many considered it to be ‘unseemly on the part of a prince’, he though it a 
huge, amusing blow to Napoleon III.62 Hayward, who received a copy from Aumale, 
thought that ‘it would damage these blackguards’, while Disraeli praised it as a 
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‘masterpiece of composition – of trenchant sarcasm, and incisive logic’, and Lord 
Carlisle was also impressed.63  
 
Aumale also attracted diplomatic attention. ‘All Paris’, Cowley noted on 15 April, 
was interested in Aumale’s pamphlet. The ‘serenity of the Palais Royal [was] very 
much upset’, and all politics was ‘laid aside’; nothing else was ‘heard of.’64 It was a 
remarkable event, and Russell regretted his friend’s publication. He did not think it 
became ‘a Prince, a gentleman and an exile’ to taunt Prince Napoleon, ‘who would 
fight’, and he found Cowley’s account ‘very curious’; ‘the less that Prince Napoleon 
[was] esteemed... the better’.65  Cowley added that its impact would be minimal. 
While the French government feared that another impression could reach workers and 
the army, only Orleanists reaped its rewards.66 Despite the controversy which 
surrounded it, the pamphlet alone created no Anglo-French dispute.  
 
However, Aumale feared facing Prince Napoleon in a duel, and this created new 
concerns.67 Russell concluded that the French attached more importance’ to it; 
although diminishing ‘the weight of Prince Napoleon’ remained desirable, ‘mere 
scolding’ would have ‘little effect’.68 There was a serious risk of an international 
incident, and as Cowley wrote to Clarendon, Parisian society could ‘talk and think of 
nothing else but whether’ Plon-Plon would issue a challenge.69  
 
Impressed by the pamphlet, Clarendon thought that Napoleon’s Ministers looked 
foolish insisting that Prince Napoleon fought, and in reply to Cowley, he 
simultaneously praised Aumale’s qualities and disparaged his actions. He and many 
others thought that Aumale had ‘made a mistake’, and ‘was descending from the high 
position he had created for himself.’ Aumale’s ‘courtesy and agreeableness and 
wonderful extent of information’ had made him popular in society, yet this was 
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‘utterly useless... in France’. Therefore, he must have responded to Plon-Plon to 
attract publicity. Although the ‘obese’ Plon-Plon would have fared poorly against the 
‘first rate swordsman’ Aumale, a duel could have ensued.70  
 
Although the affair ended quietly, serious damage could have been done. It was 
‘under serious consideration’ whether Prince Napoleon would challenge Aumale, 
suddenly ‘an important personage in France.’71  Aumale was praised; Napoleon 
showed a ‘great odious ingratitude’ towards the Orléans, and the French government 
was not alone in believing that the pamphlet could have done great harm in the 
provinces and the army.72 Its success also encouraged Waldegrave. Visiting Zurich in 
August, she noticed that ‘Aumale’s photograph [was] in all the shops’ and that 
Belgian reprints of his pamphlet were ‘a great sensation all over Switzerland.’73  
 
Aumale’s quarrel with Plon-Plon remained a potential flashpoint in Anglo-French 
relations.  A year later, Clarendon heard that Plon-Plon and the Orléans both planned 
to rent Holland House that summer, and related his fears to Cowley. As well as a duel, 
there was a risk that the Orléans’ French visitors might meet Plon-Plon.74 When 
Cowley sought further information, Clarendon asked ‘Monseigneur himself.’ Aumale 
was aware of the ‘absurd’ story that Plon-Plon feared him, but thought that they had 
‘no quarrel’, for Aumale believed he had had ‘the last word’.75 The chances of 
Aumale causing a diplomatic crisis had increased with his popularity. 
 
Paris similarly found British attention when he turned his eye and pen to the Near 
East. French ambitions there had long concerned Britain, and his travels with Chartres 
in 1860 were followed by British diplomats. The Consul-General in Cairo reported 
that they appeared ‘much pleased’ prior to visiting works for the Suez Canal, and the 
Consul in Jerusalem remarked that his French colleague had ‘no objection’ to them 
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travelling under their titles, and took ‘no notice of them’.76 The fact that the French 
Consul was so accommodating to them was deemed noteworthy.  Upon his return, 
Paris thanked Waldegrave for reading his travel journal, and explained his intention to 
publish. Paris believed that Syrian independence would benefit Europe, and he 
castigated the British policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire. He also had 
reservations about British public opinion and reforms promised in 1856; there was 
plenty of evidence of Turkish misrule in blue books and parliamentary debates.77 
Paris had an eye upon influencing British opinion and was unsurprisingly praised in 
the Saturday.78 The Daily News was also supportive of Paris’ work, and Paris replied 
to Senior that he was ‘far too indulgent’ about it.79 Although he rejected British policy 
(and disputed the wisdom of doing so with his patron), Paris found genuine praise, 
and not only from Waldegrave’s organ. 
 
The princes were increasingly well-regarded. However, in June 1862, the writer 
Harriet Martineau saw no chance of Napoleon’s reign ending ‘till he dies; nor of the 
Orléans family [ever] succeeding him.’ They had ‘no prestige’, and in France, nobody 
cared ‘a straw’ for them beyond a small, repressed Orleanist ‘clique’.  She supposed 
that Aumale was ‘the best of them’, but as a family, they were neither ‘princely’ nor 
republican, ‘however estimable among friends’.80 Although the Orléans had many 
British friends, few supported their ambition to rule France. 
 
Britain, the Orléans and the American Civil War 
 
When Joinville, Paris and Chartres entered the American Civil War on the side of the 
Union in the summer of 1861, they were severely criticised. The princes hoped to 
embarrass Napoleon by supporting liberty, and while Joinville ‘politely’ rejected a 
naval command to act as an adviser to General McClellan, Secretary of State William 
Seward ‘waived the rules’ so that Paris and Chartres could fight.81 Many British 
aristocrats sympathised with the rebel Confederacy, whose representative in Britain 
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was ‘delighted’ that the Princes had joined the Union army, because he thought it 
would expedite French recognition in retaliation, the opposite of what the Princes and 
Fortescue wanted.82 Their departure seemed mistaken, and in November, Reeve 
advised Aumale ‘to get them home’. Although the Athenaeum praised both Paris’ 
pamphlet and their enlistment, other publications attacked their decision.83  
 
Involvement in such a controversial conflict seriously threatened the position they had 
won in Britain, and the explanations they provided for their departure denied any 
interest in combat. On 28 August, Paris informed Victoria that whilst Joinville would 
place his son in the United States Naval Academy, he and Chartres would tour 
Canada and the United States, so far as the latter was possible.84 The Duchesse 
d’Aumale simply informed Lady Salisbury that Paris was taking a ‘rather long 
voyage’.85 But while King Leopold of the Belgians recognised that they wanted to 
‘show courage’, they risked ‘being shot for... the most rank radicalism’.86 He accused 
them of ‘ingratitude’ and of supporting the Union because its triumph ‘would be a 
French interest’, keeping ‘an enemy for England’ ‘en reserve’. This rendered their 
service ‘the more reprehensible’, and jeopardised their relationship with the British 
royal family.87  
 
Nevertheless, Joinville attempted to prevent conflict from erupting between Britain 
and the United States.  After an Anglo-American dispute erupted in October when an 
opened diplomatic bag revealed that a British Consul had negotiated with the 
Confederacy, Joinville made numerous warnings in Washington, including that 
Britain was ‘most unfriendly’ and ready to recognise the Confederacy, while 
Napoleon was so ‘concerned with European affairs that he would let England have 
her way anywhere else’. Joinville even clashed with the British Minister, Lord Lyons, 
who said that ‘they will do nothing.’ Indeed, when he visited Washington to meet 
Seward, Joinville was told that the affair had been resolved.88 However, matters 
                                                 
82  Ibid., passim;  Fortescue to Waldegrave, 15 November 1861, SP, CI/440 
83  Fortescue to Waldegrave, 28 November 1861, Ibid., CI/445; Athenaeum, 2 November 1861; 
Standard, 21 October 1861; John Bull, 26 October 1861 
84  Paris to Victoria, 28 August 1861, RA VIC/MAIN/Y51/13 
85  Duchesse d’Aumale to Lady Salisbury, 12 November 1861,  Mary Derby Papers, MCD 213/14 
86  Leopold to Victoria, 17 October 1861, QVL, iii p.579 
87  Leopold to Albert, 6 December 1861, quoted in Balance, Francis, La Belgique et la guerre de 
Sécession, 1861-1865 (2 Vols., Paris, 1979), n.239; Leopold to Victoria, 6 December 1861, Ibid., n.238 
88   Diary, 24 October 1861, Dahlgren, J.A., Memoir of Ulrich Dahlgren (Philadelphia, 1872), p.347; 
11 November 1861, Ameur (ed.), Paris Journal, pp.168-69 
 212 
worsened when a Union warship intercepted the British mail packet RMS Trent and 
two Confederate Diplomats, en route to Europe, were removed. Britain became 
exasperated with Seward’s belligerence, and war seemed possible.89 Joinville 
anticipated such a reaction, and acted quickly. On 18 November, the Times 
correspondent W.H. Russell noted that Joinville had protested ‘in the highest quarter’, 
and in a letter subsequently sent to Victoria, Joinville warned Leopold that there was 
‘a great danger in this fight if it continue[d].’90  
 
Joinville even attempted to persuade President Lincoln to restrain Seward. Lincoln’s 
advisers disagreed as to how to deal with the affair, and probably at Joinville’s 
suggestion, McClellan led the charge in arguing that Britain might respond 
threateningly. Seward told Joinville “[l]et them give up the principle, and we shall 
give up the men”; and although McClellan warned that Seward was bluffing, on 1 
December, Joinville wrote to Lincoln.91 Joinville warned that ‘one broad fact’ would 
‘strike everybody abroad’; that the commissioners had been removed from a neutral 
vessel in international waters, a right which ‘no state’ would allow. Joinville 
advocated their release before ‘the pressure of any foreign remonstrance’, and to ‘save 
a lot of trouble without any loss of dignity’. Within days, it might become ‘too late’ to 
prevent ‘an inopportune foreign war’ which would bring ‘incalculable evil upon 
humanity.’’92 This emotionally charged appeal was grounded in international law, but 
when Lincoln received it, he ‘categorically’ told McClellan that they would not be 
released, and Seward, who also received a copy, was unwilling to ‘hear bad news’, 
especially from McClellan, ‘whom he disliked’.93 Joinville’s heartfelt appeal had 
fallen flat in the face of American belligerence. 
 
His efforts were better appreciated in Britain. On 30 November, the dying Prince 
Albert crucially encouraged the Cabinet to make a peaceful resolution possible.94 The 
Orléans were not far from his thoughts.95  Meanwhile, members of the government 
commended the Orléans. Upon receiving Joinville’s letters, Aumale told Clarendon 
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that Joinville had ‘advised the immediate restoration of the commissioners and British 
protection’. Clarendon, who thought Aumale ‘no bad judge of things here and 
abroad’, immediately warned Lord Russell.96 Joinville’s intervention was important 
news, and because he passed Joinville’s advice to Lincoln, Lord Russell wished that 
‘McClellan could be made dictator’.97 Joinville’s warning steadied British nerves, 
lessening the immediate risk of conflict, and on 24 December, Aumale sent Newcastle 
a copy of Joinville’s letter, which Joinville wished him to send to a ‘very small 
number of people’. 98  
 
Newcastle’s cabinet position probably influenced this decision, and Reeve was also 
sent a copy. While impressed, Reeve feared war.99 Although Henry Greville recorded 
that Joinville’s actions made ‘it almost certain that the message expected’ would 
‘make war inevitable’, The Times stated that Joinville was right, and Senior heard that 
Joinville’s ‘advice’ had been ‘very useful’; Lincoln had apparently ‘yielded’ to 
Joinville’s ‘remonstrances’.100 Various narratives circulated, and on 7 January, Reeve 
told the Duke of Argyll, Lord Privy Seal, that the influential Senator Charles Sumner 
‘had told Joinville that personally he agree[d] with him’.101 Joinville’s exertions and 
Aumale’s attempts to publicise them paved the way for Britain’s continued pacific 
response. 
 
On 21 July, Joinville and his nephews arrived in Britain. Their appearance at an 
exhibition days later was a ‘sensation’, and appeased by their resignations from the 
United States army, King Leopold smoothed their relationship with Victoria.102 They 
soon shared intelligence about America in society.103 But their opinions remained 
unpopular. In October, Paris wrote Waldegrave what she called a very affectionate 
note; he could not deprive himself ‘entirely of the pleasure of seeing’ her, ‘anxious to 
argue’ about America. 104 Even the Orléans’ patron disagreed with their opinion, and 
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in September, Joinville advised Seward that Union victories alone would ‘destroy all 
the absurd hopes which [British and French] people put in an amicable settlement’ 
between the belligerents, a message which he shared with Lincoln.105 On both sides of 
the Atlantic, exile opinion found interest – but not necessarily agreement in Britain. 
 
The war also coincided with a cotton famine and mass unemployment in 
Lancashire.106 Paris, who toured Lancashire during December 1862, was ‘deeply 
impressed’ by ‘the wonderful organisation of national charity’ to alleviate its 
effects.107 ‘[S]truck by the charitable spirit which inspired the superior classes’, he 
supportively described Christmas in Lancashire in an anonymous Deux Mondes 
article.108  Despite its anti-Bonapartist tone, as Paris informed an appreciative 
Waldegrave, its ‘only object’ was to ‘stimulate private charity in France’, and he 
believed that it would have been inopportune to comment on hostilities. Unable to 
defend the Union, Paris praised the British aristocracy, and Waldegrave was not alone 
in being impressed.109 
 
The Princes’ opinions continued to find interest. An article believed to be by Joinville 
intrigued Lyons, who sent a copy to Lord Russell, and in late 1863, Seward was 
informed that recent articles attributed to Joinville had been ‘everywhere reprinted 
and read’.110 Their opinions also interested Gladstone.111 But these commentaries 
were better received in American government circles.112 Crucially, many of 
Joinville’s letters, which Seward thought to signal European support for the Union, 
impressed Lincoln.113 Albeit obliquely, the Orléans contributed to some improvement 
in Anglo-American relations. 
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The Orléans still struggled to promote the American cause in Britain. On 16 October 
1865, the Morning Post announced that a letter written by Joinville, which announced 
that the Royal Naval was in decline, had been published in America. Although every 
allowance was made for a ‘high spirit’ in exile, Joinville’s commentary was 
unwelcome.114 The United Service Magazine, which had praised Joinville for 
publicising French sailors’ grievances, condemned him for having ‘again... fired an 
express shot at England’.115  
 
British politicians otherwise praised Aumale’s counsel. In December 1862, Clarendon 
visited Hatfield House to meet Aumale and discuss Napoleon’s ambitions in 
Mexico.116  Clarendon subsequently wrote to Russell that Aumale considered 
Napoleon’s Mexican expedition his ‘greatest mistake’, sure ‘that we have only yet 
seen the beginning of it.’ Napoleon had ‘no intention of’ withdrawal, obsessed with 
the idea that ‘there [was] a fabulous amount of mineral wealth’ there, and that the 
United States would take great offence. Clarendon trusted this assessment, because 
Aumale remained in touch ‘with all his old military friends’.117 Russell similarly 
noted that Aumale’s information on Spain ‘quite agree[d] with ours’, and Aumale was 
even approached for advice on the Swiss education system.118 Whilst supporting the 
Union cost the Orléans British goodwill, their opinions were otherwise valued by 
British politicians.  
 
Aumale and the Greek Throne, 1862-63 
 
When the Greek throne became vacant after King Otto fell to a revolution in late 
1862, his potential replacement with Aumale deeply concerned the British 
government. Greek independence was upheld by the three ‘Protecting Powers’ of 
Britain, France and Russia, and owing to strategic interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean, it was vital to Britain that Greece remained independent.119 As a 
French (or at least Orleanist) candidate for the vacant throne, Aumale’s candidacy 
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threatened Greece’s independence, and while this concerned both Russell and British 
diplomats, it revived Palmerston’s lingering suspicions of the Orléans.120  
 
Palmerston’s opposition was remarkably dogmatic. ‘If [Aumale] were King... all the 
Orléans Frenchmen would flock thither, and it would become a centre of intrigues of 
all kinds against England, Turkey, Austria, and [Napoleon.]’  Palmerston decided that 
Greece could not obtain the British-occupied Ionian Islands under Aumale, and 
warned the Greek Chargé of a subsequent ‘invasion of Greece by Orleanists’.121 This 
reflected British opinion to a certain degree, for Aumale’s candidacy received little 
support. Waldegrave was ‘sure’ that he would make ‘an excellent King’, but 
Fortescue did not ‘admire [her] reasons for wishing to choose a king for the Greeks, 
though... sure they are good ones’, and the Peels expressed ‘much surprise’ at her 
‘wish to lose [her] royal friends by sending them to Greece.’122 Of Aumale’s British 
friends, Waldegrave alone wanted him to assume the throne, a potential stepping-
stone to power in France. 
 
But in mid-December, while the Greek legislature favoured Victoria’s second son 
Prince Alfred, Nicolas Bourée, the French Minister to Greece, began to ‘openly’ 
advocate Aumale, who suddenly become an unofficial French candidate; Aumale was 
not subject to the ‘self-denying ordinance’ secured by Palmerston, under which 
Britain, France and Russia agreed not to support members of their royal families.123  
This attempt to subvert the ‘ordinance’ ensured that Aumale’s candidacy was soon 
discussed by British and French diplomats. On 16 December, Henry Elliot, en route to 
assume a special mission in Greece, met Foreign Minister Drouyn in Paris, reported 
that the idea was thought ‘extremely distasteful’. If Aumale was discussed at Athens, 
he would ‘throw cold water upon the suggestion.’124 The idea that France might 
support Aumale seemed ridiculous. Russell agreed. Although he did not ‘know what 
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objection we could make’, French objections seemed certain, and Cowley doubted 
that Aumale would agree to become King.125  
 
Dynastic rivalry seemingly rendered the prospect impossible, and on 23 December, 
Cowley reported that Napoleon and Drouyn had decided that if Aumale were 
‘accepted into the circle of European sovereigns’, he would have to recognise 
Napoleon.126 ‘[S]urprised’ about Aumale, Russell agreed, and consequently did not 
think that Aumale would accept; ‘but if he did’, Napoleon’s escape from Elba ‘would 
have its counterpart’.127 His occupation of the Greek throne would quite literally be a 
staging-post to that of France. 
 
As 1863 dawned, Aumale’s candidacy re-emerged. On 1 January, Russell pressed 
Palmerston to reply to the Queen about the candidacies of Princes Alexander and 
William of Baden, because if Britain did not decide soon, ‘a Russian candidate’ or 
Aumale would be chosen by the Greek legislature.128 Eliot shared these concerns.129 
He even warned Cowley that Aumale’s ‘private fortune would be a nearly irresistible 
argument in his favour’. Unless Britain suggested an alternative, Elliot expected ‘to 
see him coming to the front.’130 Napoleon’s reason for ‘not disliking’ the idea was 
that the Greek King had to ‘acknowledge him as Emperor’. British procrastination, 
lavish bribery and tacit French support were a dangerous combination. Russell’s 
familiarity with the Orléans reinforced his view that Aumale’s candidacy was 
impossible. Russell replied that this would dissuade Aumale, whose sons would never 
join the Greek Church as the constitution stipulated. Although ‘very fond’ of Aumale, 
Russell thought that as King of Greece, ‘he would be surrounded by French intriguers 
of all kinds’. Britain could not ‘recommend his election for obvious reasons’.131  
 
                                                 
125  Russell to Cowley (copy) 18 December 1862, Ibid., PRO 30/22/105 f.149; Cowley to Russell, 19 
December 1862, Ibid., PRO 30/22/58 f.250 
126  Cowley to Russell (confidential), 23 December 1862, FO 27/1448/1420 
127  Russell to Cowley (copy) 20 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105 f.151 
128  Russell to Palmerston, 1 January 1863, BP, PP/GC/RU/755 
129  Elliot to Russell, 9 January 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65 f.1 
130  Elliot to Cowley, 9 January 1863, FO 519/183 f.15 
131  Russell to Elliot (draft), 15 January 1863, FO 32/315/11; Russell to Elliot (draft), 15 January 1863, 
minuted by Palmerston, Ibid., no.18 
 218 
Elliot discouraged Aumale’s candidacy. He was not convinced that Bourée could keep 
‘quiet’ as ordered, and by 26 January, Aumale had ‘gained much ground.’132 
Napoleon’s policy of quietly supporting Aumale left Elliot powerless to protest, but 
there was soon a ‘marked change in [Bourée’s] manner’. He had seemingly changed 
his mind under duress, and now hoped that Aumale ‘would not accept if elected’. To 
reinforce this, Elliot told him that it was believed in Britain that Aumale would not 
willingly recognise Napoleon.133 Aumale’s fame and pride in his family’s history 
were easily exploited in an attempt to prevent Bourée from campaigning in his favour. 
On 5 February, to prevent Bourée’s intrigues once and for all, Elliot ‘fairly frightened 
Bourée’ by telling him that every copy of Aumale’s ‘Life of Condé’ had been seized 
in France. Bourée ‘positively jumped off his chair’; were Aumale elected, he would 
have been ‘a ruined man and never forgiven.’134 Aumale’s proscribed status was a 
formidable weapon in dissuading the French Minister’s wayward ambitions. 
 
Yet Aumale’s candidacy refused to disappear.135 By February, he was apparently 
willing to ‘try his hand’, and amongst Greek parliamentarians whose debts suddenly 
disappeared, one could command 35 votes – ‘quite worth buying’ if Aumale would 
‘pay handsomely’. Elliot and Scarlett, the British Minister to Greece, now feared that 
Aumale might succeed, an idea which was ‘gaining ground in certain quarters at 
Paris’.136 Enthusiasm on the part of Aumale and both French and Greek supporters 
were worrying developments. Moreover, the bribes apparently came from Paris. ‘If he 
is willing to stand and spend money you will require a good man to beat him’, Elliot 
warned Russell.137 Cowley was also warned that Aumale had ‘declared himself ready 
to accept’.138 Rumour fed concern, and as candidacies came and went, only Aumale 
and William of Baden were ‘spoken of’. Without instructions, Elliot would have to 
state that he did not know who Britain supported, and it was believed that Aumale 
would ‘become popular’.139 Inaction in London weakened Elliot’s arguments and 
thereby strengthened Aumale’s chances. Meanwhile, Waldegrave remained 
supportive. On 6 March, she reminded the Duchesse that ‘from the first moment’, she 
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had been convinced that it would be ‘desirable’ for the Orléans if Aumale became 
King. She added that ‘his language should be most guarded’ because the government 
thought the Orléans unfriendly towards Britain.140  
 
Elliot continued to worry. Aumale was ‘brought permanently forward’ in March, and 
while ‘influential Greeks’ had ‘unquestionably’ communicated with the Orléans, 
Aumale retained ‘a strong body of supporters’. This situation was worsened by 
Britain’s ‘long silence’, which still threatened the election of either Aumale or 
William of Baden.141 Without a “British” candidate, Elliot could not see how Britain 
could justify rejecting either; Aumale had ‘powerful supporters at Paris’, and would 
gain support without a “British” rival.142 Procrastination still seemingly presaged 
Aumale’s election, and on 22 March, Elliot warned that the head of the “French 
Party” had returned from Paris with news that Aumale would accept.143 Palmerston’s 
fears appeared realised, but Russell, ‘assured on good authority’ that Aumale would 
not accept without French support, ‘intimated’ that Britain favoured Prince William of 
Denmark.144 Private information and the emergence of a new compromise candidate 
finally promised a solution to the problems posed by Aumale’s candidacy. 
 
Had the protecting powers failed to find an acceptable candidate, Aumale could have 
been elected, and his supporters remained ‘very busy’. Nevertheless, William of 
Denmark became King George of Greece.145 Despite Aumale’s popularity in Britain, 
his candidacy had created serious unease for Elliott and Palmerston. The Orléans had 
retained both their reputation for intrigue and the support of French schemers. 
 
‘Every year it gets better’ – Society and Politics, c. 1863-68 
 
As the 1860s wore on, the ambitious Orleans attracted ever more favour from 
Britain’s elite.  After balls at Strawberry Hill, the Aumales insisted that the guests –
‘half the diplomatic corps and most of the Liberal Party’– then danced at Orléans 
House, and as Victoria noted after Paris’s wedding in 1864, ‘ever year it gets better, 
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and now they are so popular and go everywhere.’146 The wedding was attended by 
royalty, diplomats, and politicians including Lords Russell, Clanricarde and St 
Germans.147 Paris also accepted Waldegrave’s offer to ‘kindly take care of the matter 
of’ journalists, grateful that Delane ensured that the names of French guests were 
omitted from the newspapers.148 The wedding was a display of favour from Britain’s 
elite, but at a ball held by Chartres afterwards, the few ‘old friends of a fallen dynasty’ 
were ‘raked together with a painful observance of royal forms’.149 Whilst many 
British politicians respected the Orléans, very few supported their dynastic ambitions. 
 
However, Delane was willing to assist further. Waldegrave courted his support, and in 
May 1863 she encouraged the Duchesse to tell Aumale that ‘Delane dines here 
tomorrow’.150 She was prepared to exploit this connection, and by late September, 
Waldegrave could point to a favourable article in the Times, with which she was 
‘much pleased’.151 Waldegrave had cultivated the support of the most powerful 
newspaper in Britain, and Aumale was appreciative. When the Times stated that the 
status quo would not immediately change in France, Aumale informed Waldegrave 
that he agreed with this and other editorials.152 Cautious, but trenchant criticism of 
Napoleon coincided with Aumale’s views and desires. 
 
Although King Leopold had been granted Claremont for life before he loaned it to the 
Orléans, on 6 July 1864, Palmerston canvassed Gladstone, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, about its future, because it might prove ‘useful as a residence for some... 
member of the royal family’. King Leopold objected, and it was decided that 
Claremont would eventually become ‘part of the Crown property’.153 Palmerston’s 
prejudice against the Orléans was overwhelmed by this interjection, and upon 
Leopold’s death in late 1865, the Orléans were again threatened with eviction. 
Although this threat was mitigated by Palmerston’s death weeks before, Queen 
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Victoria thought it dishonourable that ‘the venerable [ex-] Queen’ should suddenly be 
‘stripped of everything that enabled her to live’ there, and recommended warning its 
trustees.154  
 
The trustees - Derby, Lord Powys and the courtier Sir Edward Cust – thought that 
‘every generous mind’ had to wonder about ‘the destiny of the present illustrious 
occupants’. The government was willing to place Claremont at the ex-Queen’s 
‘convenience’, and the trustees wished to defer the sale; but this would cost perhaps 
£5000 annually.155 Russell, who had succeeded Palmerston as Prime Minister, was 
also sympathetic; and although Gladstone expressed amazement at the demands 
‘made upon the public’ for the ‘venerable and illustrious’ ex-Queen, whose 
‘children...  may be called immensely rich’, he respected Leopold’s wishes.156  
 
On 21 March 1866, the government decided that Claremont would be rented to Marie 
Amélie for life, subject to Parliamentary approval.157 This resolved the problem of 
expense, but on 24 March, Marie Amélie died. Victoria and her government’s efforts 
had been in vain, and the next day, she visited Claremont and condemned France as a 
‘rather ungrateful country’.158 The ex-Queen’s death revealed Victoria’s sympathies, 
and because Nemours was compelled to leave Claremont, she granted him the vacant 
Bushey House, which he ‘gladly’ accepted.159 Widespread sympathy had ensured that 
the Orleans retained a free residence.  
 
Meanwhile, the Orléans’ opinions on military affairs were increasingly valued. In 
December 1867, Fortescue discussed ‘the new military convention in France’ with the 
‘impressive and interesting’ Joinville.160 Aumale was also concerned, and in April, the 
Times praised an article he had written on the subject.161 This review was the result of 
an initiative by the Aumales. On 15 March, the Duchesse sent Waldegrave an article 
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from the Deux Mondes, to which Aumale had added the ‘parting words’, for her to 
send to Hayward and Delane. Aumale also sent a copy to Disraeli, again appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.162 Such articles were now routinely attributed to the 
Orléans. The United Service Magazine lavishly praised the article, and in 1866, 
Joinville wrote to the Standard to deny authoring a pertinent article on the Battle of 
Lissa.163 Although Waldegrave’s patronage and other personal contacts remained 
vital, the Orléans’ publications and opinions were genuinely respected. 
 
Waldegrave even ensured that articles by Paris were published virtually verbatim. 
Upon reading one Times article in 1868, he ‘recognise[d] whole sentences from the 
one [he] wrote yesterday’, and praised further articles in the Telegraph, Standard and 
Globe.164 Waldegrave could not always ensure publicity, but the Orléans were now 
widely praised in the press. When Paris visited Spain in February, Chartres sent him 
articles from the Star, Pall Mall Gazette, Spectator and Saturday which mentioned 
him, ‘delighted’ to see Paris ‘presented to the public under such a good light.’165 
Waldegrave’s efforts had ensured that Paris was praised in a cross-section of British 
periodicals, and when she mooted an ‘arrangement’ with the Morning Chronicle, 
Aumale was ‘somewhat prepared to accept’.166 She had taken advantage of the 
Orléans’ considerable fame and improved reputation to acquire substantial press 
support.  Even Joinville was praised by the radical Westminster Review for tutoring 
his nephews and his development of the French navy.167  
 
Such was Aumale’s renown in aristocratic circles that when he sent copies of his work 
The Military Institutions of France to British politicians in 1867, he received much 
genuine praise. Both Disraeli and Gladstone expressed their gratitude and friendship; 
an impressed Stanhope promised to review it in Fraser’s; and Delane, who ‘spoke 
highly of it,’ promised a review.168 It was even mentioned in Parliament.169 The high 
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estimation of Aumale’s abilities was reflected in the fact that the book was acclaimed 
across party lines, and positive reviews were promised rather than sought.  
 
Meanwhile, Napoleon remained concerned by the Orléans. After meeting Napoleon in 
1867, Clarendon noted that the Emperor ‘spoke... with the bitterness of alarm’, and 
not without reason, because Aumale was ‘devoured by ambition and the spirit of 
revenge’, capable of ‘accepting a republican ladder... to power... with the intention of 
kicking it down.’170 It was entirely possible that the ostensibly liberal Aumale could 
topple him with the support of either republican politicians or royalist officers, and 
Napoleon’s fears were amplified by the Orléans’ friendship with Queen Victoria. In 
June 1868, a French semi-official newspaper condemned the fact that the Aumales 
had been formally received at Buckingham Palace.171 The Orléans remained a 
nuisance in Anglo-French relations. 
 
Iberian Difficulties and British successes, 1868-70 
 
After the Spanish “Glorious Revolution” of 1868, both Britain and France became 
concerned about the prospect of Orleanist intrigue, for amongst the candidates to 
succeed the deposed Isabella II was Montpensier, supported by the centrist Union 
Liberal party.172 Clarendon, who returned to the Foreign Office under Gladstone in 
December 1868, feared that Montpensier’s election might provoke Napoleon to 
invade Spain, and Montpensier ‘and his money’ became a constant annoyance.173 
French diplomats feared Orleanist ambition, and their anxieties intrigued the British 
Minister, Sir John Crampton.  Crampton thought that Montpensier ‘may be King of 
Spain yet’; he had money, and would apparently ‘be backed up by the Orléans family 
and Prussia so as to take a large slice in the £20 million [Spanish government] loan’, 
which nobody else would. The Orléans’ wealth seemingly guaranteed that Spanish 
politicians could be bought, and another British diplomat had already speculated that 
Montpensier would probably gain Prussian support. Yet Montpensier ‘made both the 
cause of royalty and himself ridiculous’ by offering to help ‘put down rebels at 
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Cadiz’.174 Although the exiles could have actively supported Montpensier’s efforts, 
his behaviour made his candidacy seem irrelevant.  
 
Nevertheless, Clarendon recognised the potential for both exile intrigue and French 
attempts to complicate matters by attempting to counter it. In February 1869, he 
warned Crampton that Montpensier was unfit to rule, and would be ‘so ill-liked’ by 
Napoleon that Spain would be subject to a ‘guerre sorde of espionage and vigilance’ 
to prevent ‘Orleanist intrigues’. Although Clarendon rejected taking ‘any part against 
him’, he hoped that ‘the Spanish liars’ could never ‘say that you had done or said 
anything’ to favour Montpensier.175 Even the slightest suggestion of British support 
for Montpensier had to be avoided, and Clarendon also warned Lyons, who had 
replaced Cowley at Paris, that Napoleon had ‘trouble in store for Spain’.176 However, 
Montpensier’s candidacy hardly blossomed. By late 1869, British diplomats thought 
him ‘the reverse of popular’ and his election impossible.177 The potential for exile 
plots informed, but did not drive British policy. 
 
Meanwhile, Aumale found it difficult to preside over banquets because the press, 
especially the Times, seemed ‘to make voluntary allusions about what is happening in 
France’ whenever he did.178 The support which Waldegrave solicited had now begun 
to backfire, and made it impossible for him to speak in public without the risk of 
harming Anglo-French relations. Yet the whole family depended upon Waldegrave’s 
‘advice and influence’.179 On 21 December, Aumale and Paris ‘cried out at her for 
wishing the [Colonial Office] for [Fortescue] instead of Ireland’.180 As press support 
plateaued, the Orléans remained reliant upon Waldegrave, and could not afford for her 
to leave. 
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The decline of the Second Empire encouraged the Orléans’ supporters.  On 17 
October 1868, Hayward gloated to both Gladstone and Lady Holland that their 
‘prospects [were] looking up’, whilst the Bonapartes were ‘losing ground daily’.181 
Yet rumours of the Emperor’s illness ‘stirred something of a panic’ in Clarendon.182 
Stability in France remained of paramount importance to British politicians, and the 
Orléans were not considered Napoleon’s ideal successors. Nevertheless, Waldegrave 
remained optimistic that her protégés could regain the French throne or otherwise be 
of use to her. When Aumale announced that he would visit Ireland, Waldegrave was 
adamant that he attended a ball, for ‘the Dublin folk’ to ‘have the honour of meeting’ 
him.183 When the Duchesse d’Aumale died in 1869, Waldegrave’s ambition crept into 
a letter of condolence; she thought that Aumale should find solace in having ‘a dear 
son to live for, devoted relations and... high duties to fulfil’, thoughts which ‘must 
constantly be kept in mind.’184 Her ambition to influence British and French affairs 
remained tied up in their success  
 
Intelligence from the Orléans also remained valuable. In October 1868, the British 
Minister to Bavaria recorded a conversation with Paris at (Nemours’s son) the Duc 
d’Alençon’s wedding there, notably that the French ‘war party’ was not as strong as 
thought, and that Napoleon had no desire for war.185 Similarly, in June 1869, Paris 
sent Waldegrave a letter which he wanted passed to Colonial Secretary Lord 
Granville, and added that elections in France had been a great success for the 
opposition.186 When Aumale told Clarendon that ‘the present men’ in France were ‘all 
his friends’, but would serve Napoleon ‘faithfully’, this news was passed to Lyons.187 
But after liberal reforms were passed in France the next May, Paris ‘abandoned his 
hopes of... restoration and made plans to settle in America.’188 The chances of an 
Orléans restoration remained poor.  
 
1869 also saw the publication of Paris’s book upon British Trades’ Unions. Paris’ 
efforts found support from quarters sympathetic to the subject. It was translated by 
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Senior’s son and introduced by Radical MP Thomas Hughes, and as Mark Curtoys 
notes, it had a ‘pronounced effect upon contemporary opinion’. Paris ‘identified’ 
unions ‘with the success of English civic and moral values’, and concluded his work 
‘in terms likely to appeal to Whig-Liberal opinion’.189 The Orleanist pretender 
nevertheless believed that it would have wide appeal in Britain. When he sent a copy 
to Disraeli, Paris wrote of Unions as a natural product of a liberal and civilised 
society, and of his desire to publicise the example British statesman set with their 
concern for the working classes.190 Similarly, in presenting a copy to Victoria, he 
praised the hospitality which allowed him to publish, free from partisan ‘passions.’191 
Paris considered himself a neutral observer, and was therefore willing to promote it 
widely with the hope of influencing British opinion. 
 
The book was widely praised by liberals and radicals.192 Watching the Commons on 7 
July, Paris ‘had the pleasure of hearing [his] little book quoted’ by his ‘friend’ Hughes 
in ‘very flattering’ terms.193 Gladstone was also impressed, and Paris was pleased that 
they agreed about Unions, because British policies would have a great influence 
worldwide, particularly in France.194 The book was also lauded by several journals.195  
However, on 26 April, the Comtesse de Paris found that a review which Waldegrave 
had promised had not appeared, and Paris subsequently discovered that the Times had 
decided not to publish it. He hoped that Delane would ‘be more courageous when the 
translation [was] published’.196 The Times’ support was not guaranteed, perhaps 
because Paris’ work commented upon a thorny question of domestic policy. 
 
Meanwhile, the Orléans prospects in Spain were destroyed as the ‘feeling against 
Montpensier built up to a white heat’, abetted by French diplomats. In January 1870 
he lost a by-election, and in March, he killed the radical prince Don Enrique in a duel. 
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Montpensier’s candidacy was thus practically annulled, and legally barred in June.197 
Although Crampton’s replacement, A.H. Layard, was certain that intrigues were being 
‘actively pursued in [Montpensier’s] favour’ in early March, he thought that the duel 
added ‘another chapter’ to the ‘history of the crimes and misfortunes of this unhappy 
family.’198 Their old reputation for intrigue had been superseded by one for 
misfortune.  
 
Aumale jumped to Montpensier’s defence. On 13 March, he replied to a telegram 
from a shocked Victoria that Montpensier had been treated in a very low manner, and 
was inexperienced with pistols. This was reinforced by Clarendon, who added that 
according to Layard, ‘Montpensier had behaved extremely well & the insult put upon 
him had been fearful.’199  Despite the serious nature of the news, Montpensier was 
treated sympathetically, and without reference to Louis Philippe’s intrigues in Spain 
two decades before. Aumale added to Victoria that Montpensier had never wished to 
fight, and would probably be pardoned, and she remained sympathetic. ‘What a 
terrible thing... poor Montpensier and his promise’, she wrote to Aumale on 14 
March, condemning Enrique’s ‘provocation’.200  
 
At this tragic moment, the Queen stood by the Orléans, and the duel spurred her to 
consider their future. On 15 March, Clarendon wrote to Lyons about the Montpensier 
duel, because the Queen was ‘exceedingly’ interested’, and wondered ‘whether the 
present French government with their Orleaniste proclivities’ thought that Napoleon 
was ‘much endangered’ by Montpensier ‘wearing that crown of thorns’.201 Lyons 
found it ‘rather curious to see how little attention’ Montpensier’s duel attracted. What 
little was said was disapproving, and the Orléans had ‘never excited so little interest 
in France as at the present moment.202 Despite their popularity in Britain, the Orléans’ 
prospects looked equally poor in France and Spain. 
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In the wake of the duel, Aumale sought advice from British supporters. Waldegrave 
and Fortescue bizarrely believed that the duel would ‘make’ Montpensier King, 
because of Enrique’s undesirable character, and in reply, Aumale condemned 
Enrique, to whom Nemours had responded in the Times.203 But although 
Montpensier’s ambitions had not been treated as an extension of his family’s, Aumale 
feared for their reputation. On 15 March, he sent General Peel several articles, 
worried whether they should ignore ‘the insinuations contained in them’, or whether 
they should be answered, Peel subsequently advised him to ‘write nothing unless any 
facts could be stated which’ gave ‘a different complexion to the affair’, because the 
newspapers had ‘generally stated the case very sensibly.’ Aumale agreed, and Peel 
hoped that Lady Salisbury would too.204 Restraint seemed a wise course for the exiles; 
but press criticism was minimal. On 14 April, Paris read the Times’ article on 
Montpensier’s banishment with great pleasure; ‘I only see how justice is done to my 
Uncle, and... the difficult position in which he finds himself’.205 The Standard even 
printed a letter from Aumale which professed that Montpensier could not shoot.206 
The Orléans were both absolved of blame and permitted to defend themselves, 
although among their British friends, Waldegrave and Fortescue alone supported 
Montpensier’s ambitions.  
 
By 1870, a potential Orléans restoration was again under discussion in Britain. On 1 
February, Chartres wrote to Waldegrave that they ‘were very much interested by a 
letter’ published in the Pall Mall Gazette; ‘An Observer’ had praised the Orleanist 
party, but disagreed that ‘we may get back to France as citizens’.207 Press opinion 
remained encouraging, and Aumale was ‘in good spirits as to the family prospects.’ 208 
The support of the crown and significant sections of the press encouraged the Orléans 
to believe that their restoration was increasingly likely, and Disraeli shared these 
sentiments. On 10 January, Lord Derby, son of the late Prime Minister, heard from 
Disraeli that the Rothschilds believed Napoleon had been outmanoeuvred by the 
constitutionalist Orléans; and in July, Disraeli clarified his thoughts to Stanhope. It 
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was a ‘curious and interesting time’ to visit Paris’s home, and although one guest 
thought the Orléans ‘forgotten’, Disraeli thought that they ‘may be wanted. Nobody is 
forgotten, when it is convenient to remember him.’209  
 
Disraeli was prepared for a restoration, and so was Waldegrave. On 5 March, she sent 
Aumale a Morning Post article concerning the Orléans, which she had just received 
from Algernon Borthwick, now its editor, who had recently spoken to Napoleon. She 
was cheered by the fact that Napoleon was ‘almost despairing as to his dynasty 
continuing on the throne of France’. Although Napoleon ‘hope[d] for the best’, she 
‘rather believe[d]’ that he would fall.210 It appeared probable that the Orléans might 
be recalled upon Napoleon’s death, and owing in part to Waldegrave’s efforts, they 
attracted increasingly supportive comment. 
 
Britain, the Franco-Prussian War and an Orléans Restoration? 1870-71 
 
At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July, the Orléans maintained 
significant sympathy from Britain’s elite. This was an ideal environment for the 
Orléans to accrue British support for their ambitions, but as early as 11 July, Paris told 
Victoria that it would be too dreadful “pour notre civilization d’avoir une guerre de 
succession.”211 The idea of dynastic struggle disgusted him, but when Aumale, 
Joinville and Chartres volunteered their services to France, they were rejected because 
their presence ‘might be misunderstood’, despite their ‘new pretensions to 
liberalism.’212 Joinville’s alter ego was soon unmasked, but Chartres served under the 
name of an illustrious ancestor, Robert Le Fort.213 They had decided to support the 
French war effort rather than precipitate some kind of dynastic struggle. 
 
Waldegrave, meanwhile, became increasingly ambitious. While the Orléans ‘assumed 
the airs of dauphins, she asserted’ that Aumale would become French President, and 
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‘earmark[ed] the Paris Embassy’ for Fortescue.214 This confidence was reinforced by 
Aumale’s secretary, Auguste Laugel, who informed her on 16 August that France was 
‘tired’ of Napoleon, and Aumale was ‘still ahead’; he only had to ‘watch the fatal 
events’.215 Waldegrave’s hopes seemed close to fruition, and Fortescue was also 
encouraged by Napoleon’s weakness, having learned that Algernon Borthwick of the 
Morning Post ‘considered him gone.’216 As Napoleon’s grip on power loosened, the 
Orléans’ patrons were optimistic of success – and their own advancement. 
 
British scrutiny now fell upon the support which the Orléans had accrued. Although 
an Irish Tory newspaper accused Waldegrave of leading British newspapers to 
support the Orléans, the origins of their partisanship were contested. 217 On 13 August, 
Derby noted that the Times was ‘writing up very unmistakable hints, the deposition of 
the Emperor, and calling to power of one of the Orléans princes’, and speculated that 
this was due to the apparently ‘Orleanist’ Granville’s influence.218 Lady Derby 
(previously Lady Salisbury) also wondered what had ‘made Delane suddenly 
Orleanist’, and General Peel thought that this ‘proceed[ed] from the Rothschilds.’219 
The success of Waldegrave’s efforts only became apparent once Napoleon’s fall 
appeared likely. 
 
Waldegrave’s support for the Orléans now appeared farsighted. As one correspondent 
informed her, the Orleanist General Trochu seemed ‘to be the coming man.’ It looked 
as if her ‘prophecies would come right.’220 Waldegrave appeared poised to assume 
great influence, and because Aumale possessed ‘the qualifications making a great 
General and statesman’, she implored him to wait to ‘use his best gifts’. The Lord 
Chancellor agreed that ‘the only hope for... France was the Orléans Family’, and 
advised Aumale that the ‘best of them’ should not ‘end their lives recklessly’.221 
Patience among both the Orléans and their British supporters seemingly guaranteed 
success. 
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The Orléans’ future suddenly became a matter of great interest and importance when 
Napoleon was captured after the disastrous Battle of Sedan. On 3 September 
Granville announced to the retired Russell ‘the wonderful news’ that Napoleon had 
been ‘snuffed out like a candle’; and on 14 September, Fortescue wrote to Gladstone 
that Waldegrave had received ‘a long letter’ from Paris, which showed ‘their 
readiness to acknowledge [the French Republic] as an authority capable of making 
peace’.222 This was a wise decision. As Henry Greville informed Lady Holland, the 
Princes had acted ‘with judgement lately’, confident that they would regain the 
‘rickety’ French throne within a year.223 The Orléans and their British friends waited 
for France to enact an unpopular peace, which they could eventually exploit to ensure 
an Orléans restoration. 
 
A Foreign Office paper predicted post-war Orleanist ascendancy, and as T.G. Otte 
notes, throughout ‘the autumn and winter... a Bonapartist, or at any rate monarchical, 
restoration seemed a distinct possibility’ to British diplomats.224 In this atmosphere, 
Granville even seemingly considered an Orléans restoration. On 15 September, he 
opined to the retired Russell that it would be ‘dishonourable to use Britain’s influence 
in favour of old friends.’225 The idea appears to have crossed their minds, but Britain, 
without any allies in Europe, could not have enforced such a settlement.226 Moreover, 
the republic found widespread support in Britain.227 Aumale’s friend Bagehot noted 
that an Orléans monarchy had little appeal, and in the Fortnightly Review, John 
Morley called for ‘not... a makeshift Orleanist monarchy, but... a French Republic.’228 
The Orléans could not compete for support with a tenacious French Republic, which 
continued to fight against overwhelming odds. 
 
The Orléans nevertheless remained a source of counsel. On 4 October, Gladstone 
informed Granville that Aumale had talked to Reeve and that Paris had written to 
Waldegrave, ‘very much in my sense’ about Alsace and Loraine. Hayward also met 
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Aumale, who was furious ‘at the’ irreparable disgrace’ of Sedan, to ‘talk over the 
Emperor’.229 In the wake of Napoleon’s fall, Aumale’s opinions remained valued, and 
his relationship with the royal family also remained a potential point of contention 
with France. On 18 November, Granville warned Gladstone that the Prince of Wales 
had been especially ‘unwise in his talk’, sought an interview with Aumale to 
‘ascertain his views on the proper conditions of peace’, and advocated enthroning 
Aumale.230 Rumours of British support for their ambitions had to be quashed.  
 
While the Orléans waited, neither they nor the British government wanted their 
prospects to be discussed.  Aumale told Waldegrave that he ‘would not object to 
[dining] and meet[ing] people if they would talk of anything but the war’, and in late 
October, he told Lady Holland that while he had no objection to meeting her friends, 
‘political or otherwise’, he expressed unease at the idea of dinners ‘to meet 
royalty’.231 The impatient Waldegrave even recorded that Aumale would not meet 
‘anyone in society if he [could] help it.’232  
 
Whereas the Orléans advocated restraint, their British supporters extolled the Orléans’ 
hopes and Napoleon’s fall. In early November, William Stirling-Maxwell, a 
Conservative MP and friend of Aumale, publicly claimed that after Napoleon had 
heard that Aumale had ‘lately occupied’ a study room at the British Museum’s library, 
he had responded that he would “very likely one day replace him, as he replaced 
me.”233 Other British friends were equally optimistic. Hayward thought that the 
Orléans had ‘a capital chance’ if they played the waiting game.234 By December, he 
was confident that Aumale stood ‘higher than any man in France’, and made 
‘honourable mention’ of him in an article for Fraser’s.235 But Paris twice explained to 
Waldegrave in November that Britain could not influence events in Europe.236 Any 
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association with the struggling republic or neutral, helpless Britain would have 
damaged their hopes. Throughout early 1871, however, the princes often landed in 
France, and British friends were told little of their activities.’237 
 
Nevertheless, British supporters continued to assist the ambitious Orléans. On 10 
March, Fortescue showed Gladstone ‘a letter from a French banker’ to Paris 
concerning France’s ‘enormous [financial] difficulties’, which proposed ceding 
France’s Indian possessions to Britain in return for guaranteeing a loan of £100 
million. The Prime Minister was ‘most struck by it’.238 Fortescue remained willing to 
support the Orléans, and in April, he received a ‘very interesting’ letter from Aumale, 
who was ‘biding his time somewhere in France, not without danger’.239 The ambitious 
Orléans had begun to do something which British politicians could not: restore the 
family’s standing in France.  
 
Meanwhile, Lyons contemplated the likelihood of a restoration in France. Of ‘the 
various pretenders’, he supposed that none ‘would wish to be… responsible for such a 
peace as must be concluded’.240 Any immediate restoration was unlikely, and by 10 
February, the Assembly appeared likely to favour a temporary ‘moderate republic’, to 
‘prepare the way for a constitutional monarchy’.241 The future of France remained 
uncertain, and as Lyons fled Paris on 26 March, prior to the rise of the Commune, he 
commented that if the Assembly ‘[got] hold of a general’ and dependable troops, they 
would ‘very likely proclaim Henri V or some other Monarch.’242  
 
The Orléans’ prospects returned to the fore in May. On the 16th, Lyons reported that 
the fusion between Paris and Chambord would be ‘much easier than the one between 
their respective parties’.243 The possibility had returned with an Assembly determined 
to elect a King, and after Joinville and Aumale were elected, Lyons believed that they 
would take their seats despite Thiers’ objections. The ‘favourite combination’ among 
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monarchist deputies appeared to be Aumale as Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, 
‘to prepare the way’ for Chambord as King.244  However, on 2 June, Lyons reported 
that Monarchists feared that the Republicans would gain over 100 seats in a series of 
by-elections, and more startlingly, if the Assembly proclaimed Chambord, many 
towns might refuse to recognise him or Aumale’s new roles.245 An Orléans restoration 
now appeared unlikely. 
 
Lyons continued to fear the Orléans’ return. While the validity of the Princes’ 
elections was debated, Lyons spared Granville ‘a list of conjectures’, although he 
believed that their election could precipitate Thiers’s resignation or the proclamation 
of Chambord and Aumale.246 But after the debate, Thiers told Lyons that he had not 
resisted, having feared a ‘dangerous’ ‘feeling of soreness among the right’. 
Speculating about a ‘Republican present’ and ‘Monarchical future’, Lyons did not 
‘know what ha[d] become’ of the idea to give Thiers two years’ grace.247  Yet the 
‘threat of a revived fusionism’ ‘clinched’ a ‘marriage of convenience’ with Bismarck 
and ensured the republic’s survival.248 Any restoration was now practically 
impossible, and on 13 June, Lyons recorded that Thiers had received Aumale, 
Joinville and Chartres, who were treated ‘with even more than the usual respect 
shown to Royal Princes.’249 The Orléans had quietly returned without creating 
turmoil. 
 
The Orléans’ British friends were effusive in their praise and expectations. 
Waldegrave wished that ‘all [would] go well for the future of France and those who 
are worthy to lead her’, and ‘rejoice[d] most sincerely that things are as they are, and 
as I believe they will be, although she regretted losing sight of ‘so many good 
friends’.250 Delane added that ‘all the Englishmen’ whom Paris had met felt ‘sincere 
respect and goodwill’ towards him.251 He was not the only journalist who expressed 
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such sentiments. Edward Levy of the Daily Telegraph warned that patience and 
‘above all, devotion to France’ were ‘the duty of all who wish well to the suffering 
country.’252 Although Reeve congratulated Paris, he added that numerous questions 
needed to be addressed before the restoration of order and liberty in France, and on 6 
June, Hayward informed the ‘Dear Boy’ Paris of his regret that he did not ‘follow my 
advice to keep... quiet for some days’. Paris had acted without his ‘usual wisdom’, 
and Hayward was sorry to be frank; but his despair came from enthusiastic support.253  
 
Queen Victoria was also supportive. Nemours praised her as an ‘excellente et fidele 
amie’, an assessment which she thought she had fulfilled, and allowed Nemours to 
retain Bushey Park, for she feared for the stability of France. ‘Paris, [Chartres] & 
Aumale’ also expressed ‘their unbounded gratitude for all [her] kindness’. Their hope 
to establish a constitutional monarchy ‘[did] credit to them.’254 Yet although the 
Queen now felt free to advocate their restoration, the government disagreed. 
Gladstone was ‘glad’ that Paris ‘acquiesced in the Republic’, for ‘the conduct’ of the 
French pretenders was ‘not merely mischievous, but ridiculous’.255 The Orléans had 
won the respect of Britain’s elite, but their claim to the French throne never found 
widespread support in Britain; and from July onwards, division and electoral defeats 
began to weaken French royalism.256  
 
The regard they had won amongst Britain’s elite owed more to their conviviality and 
ability to provide information rather than their potential as an alternative to Napoleon. 
Although they had exercised a significant degree of influence in exile, few British 
politicians returned the favour and supported their ambitions. That a British 
government never supported the Orléans is unsurprising – this would only have 
created a breach with France. Their ambitions, or at least their rumoured ambitions, to 
rule elsewhere in Europe had also concerned British governments, which feared not 
only strife with France in such circumstances, but also the potential risks of such an 
ambitious family occupying a European throne. The most they could have realistically 
hoped for was to influence the views of British politicians while waiting to be recalled 
to the French throne. Although they achieved the former goal, both their ambitions 
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and diplomatic realities had rendered them a problem for successive British 
governments. 
 
Epilogue 
 
Right-wing refugees continued to come to Britain after 1871. Don Carlos’ grandson 
arrived in 1876; several of the Orléans were again exiled in 1886; the controversial 
French politician General Boulanger arrived in 1889. But they had little impact upon 
British politics. Although received by a few ‘old supporters’ and the curious, the Don 
Carlos who arrived in 1876 was verbally abused upon arrival and widely ignored. He 
left Britain after three months.257 Boulanger’s exile followed a similarly uneventful 
course, for the refugee General retired from politics before leaving Britain to commit 
suicide in 1891. The British Ambassador to France, Lord Lytton, correctly thought 
that rumours of Boulanger’s return to France in May 1890 were an ‘electoral 
manoeuvre’.258 These later refugees simply sank into anonymity, and found no serious 
British support. Even the Orléans Princes who arrived in the summer of 1886 attracted 
little attention.259 Boulanger similarly left little trace amongst the society pages.260 
The right-wing refugees of the late 19th century neither sought nor found influence in 
Britain. 
 
The Orléans did occasionally worry British governments after 1886. Paris remained 
active in French politics, and he supported Boulanger for some time in return for a 
restoration.261 Although Lytton thought this alliance fraught with contradiction, it did 
cause the Ambassador a significant degree of worry, and Paris’s presence created 
occasional concerns for British governments.262 He was not invited to a Jubilee dinner 
for ‘every European dynasty’ in 1887 because his presence would have offended 
Republican France, and the brief engagement of his daughter Hélène to the Duke of 
Clarence threatened friction with both France and Germany. Although the 
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engagement was averted, any hint of favour being shown to the exiles had to be 
avoided. When Paris visited Jersey in 1887 to receive French supporters, Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury ordered the Lieutenant Governor not to give any ‘official 
reception or demonstration’; and despite Salisbury’s opposition, Paris’ son the Duc 
d’Orléans served as an aide-de-camp to Lord Roberts in 1888-89.263 Any suggestion 
of British favour being shown to the exiled Orléans was avoided for fear of creating 
offence. 
 
Yet the French Republic’s resilience ensured that the Orléans’ activities caused little 
diplomatic controversy. Even when the Duc d’Orléans was imprisoned for arriving in 
France via Lausanne in 1890, provocatively seeking to undertake military service, his 
family was blamed rather than Britain, and French politicians were more concerned 
about the political implications of his sentence.264 Neither did exhortations written by 
Paris create dispute. A manifesto which he issued in September 1887 had so little 
impact that, as the British Chargé d’Affaires reported, one French minister thought 
that even if it had been issued when the Assembly was sitting, it would have simply 
motivated a ‘violent onslaught from the extreme left’, and thereafter been ‘quickly 
forgotten.’265 These exile appeals were considered so insignificant that an 1888 letter 
from Paris to the Mayors of France only attracted widespread attention when it was 
impounded by the police.266 
 
Conversely, Aumale’s return was thought politically useful in France. By January 
1889, Lytton correctly anticipated that the embattled government, scared that 
Boulanger might launch a coup, would recall Aumale to placate the right-wing 
opposition.267 Unlike his nephew and great nephew, Aumale was treated as an elder 
statesman who did not pose any risk to the Republic’s survival. ‘Conservative’ had 
replaced ‘Royalist’ as a party label in France, and by 1891, Lytton thought Orleanism 
dead.268  
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It is possible that the Duc d’Orléans’ later activities had some effect upon Anglo-
French relations; although considered to have been a buffoon and playboy, the French 
Interior Ministry monitored his supporters, some of whom made a pathetic attempt at 
a coup in 1899. However, the Prince spent little time in Britain and from 1900, 
principally resided in Belgium, having been obliged to leave Britain for 
congratulating a French cartoonist for an obscene caricature of Queen Victoria.269 
Although the Duc d’Orléans’ peripheral position in the existing historiography does 
not necessarily signify that his actions had no consequences for British diplomacy, it 
is highly unlikely that the aimless pretender’s activities created any great international 
controversy. Without meaningful support in Britain or France, the Orléans’ later exile 
was a coda to their previous one, and their activities ceased to seriously affect British 
diplomacy.  
 
The Orléans’ 1871 departure thus marks the end of a period when right-wing 
refugees’ opinions and activities had a serious bearing upon the course of British 
politics and diplomacy. Not until the disputes over offering asylum to members of the 
Russian Imperial family and ‘White Russian’ refugees in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution and Civil War, or perhaps even the arrival of multi-party governments-in-
exile during the Second World War, did right-wing refugees again occupy a 
prominent position in British politics.270 Whether their early 21st century counterparts 
– such as the fallen oligarch Boris Berezovsky, or Pakistani ex-President Pervez 
Musharraf – left any such legacy is a task for future historians. 
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9: Conclusion 
 
A more nuanced understanding is required of the position which refugees occupied in 
Victorian politics. Right-wing refugees comprise a class of political actors who have 
been overlooked, and when they are re-inserted into the narrative of British politics, 
its shape undergoes some changes. Whilst Porter plotted the array of problems which 
left-wing refugees caused for successive British governments, this study adds several 
more: Bourbon, Carlist and Miguelite exiles all created challenges for the makers of 
British foreign policy. It also provides numerous instances of refugees influencing 
British politicians. For example, Carlist refugees were able to mobilise British 
supporters, and the exiles of 1848 established a strong degree of influence over 
numerous British contemporaries, which almost precipitated the fall of Russell’s 
government. The Orléans’ wide-ranging influence later made them both important 
political actors and a problem in Anglo-French relations. Right-wing refugees thus 
influenced both government policies and party politics. 
 
Although these exiles relied upon informal political networks, they often exercised a 
strong degree of influence upon Conservative politicians. Whilst Charles Whibley 
contended that Lord John Manners did much to revive the Carlist cause in Britain 
around Montemolin in 1846-47, and Roger Bullen plotted the limits of Tory support 
for Don Carlos, this study demonstrates that Carlist refugees found the support of 
several Conservatives during the 1830s and 1840s, which ensured that refugee 
opinion found wider attention. It also argues that Aberdeen’s cooperation with right-
wing refugees during 1848-50 was greater than M.E. Chamberlain suggested, and 
comprised an important part of an exile-inspired attempt to reunite the shattered 
Conservative Party. Many historians have been intrigued by Disraeli’s relationship 
with Metternich, and this study affirms its close nature, demonstrating that further 
working relationships were established between the exiles and Conservative 
politicians. The position which these refugees established suggests that influences 
upon Toryism and the political environments which allowed them to intervene in 
British politics are both ripe for further consideration. 
 
The refugees considered in this study did not cooperate with Conservatives alone. 
Montemolin’s supposed liberalism ensured that he attracted interest from Palmerston 
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and Bulwer, and the exiles of 1848 also forged links with the governing Whigs. Far 
more significant was Lady Waldegrave’s support for the Orléans. Whilst Hewett and 
Reynolds both recognised that Waldegrave exercised an important role as a political 
hostess, neither fully considered her support for the Orléans throughout this period. 
Waldegrave’s career certainly deserves further attention in light of her efforts to 
transform these exiles from figures at the periphery of ‘society’ to respected political 
actors. Although the existing historiography correctly hints that the Orléans were 
close to both Waldegrave and Queen Victoria, it understates the importance they 
assumed with the help of their Liberal patroness. 
 
This study also sheds new light on the career of Lord Palmerston. Among its 
contentions is that the Orléans’ supposed ambitions were a major factor in his 
response to Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état, an aspect which has previously attracted 
little attention; for example, David Brown instead focused upon the importance of 
Palmerston’s response to the coup and his subsequent dismissal in domestic politics. 
This study proposes that Palmerston’s personal correspondence, commenting upon 
supposed exile intrigues, demonstrates a more sophisticated response to the role 
played by the Orleans. This was not an emotional reflex (as Webster identified in his 
responses to earlier crises), but a willingness to construct and/or promote rumours, lie 
to colleagues and even pursue phantom intrigues for political ends.  
 
Whereas several historians, most recently Lawrence Fenton, have stated that 
Palmerston pursued a refugee conspiracy in 1848-49, this thesis posits that the 
‘conspiracy’ was a canard which Palmerston deliberately pleaded to strengthen his 
own position. It also argues that Palmerston’s support for Montemolin was genuine, 
rejecting Bullen’s assertion that he had little serious interest in the Carlist pretender. 
Moreover, the narratives which Palmerston concocted in blue books about Don 
Carlos’ flight, Dom Miguel’s ambitions and the Orléans’ supposed intrigues in Spain 
expunged their importance in three embarrassing episodes. Palmerston’s responses to 
right-wing refugees were thus an important influence upon his actions, especially 
between 1846 and 1851, offering a counterpoint to the existing historiography which 
emphasises his pragmatism and political nous during this period.1 
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The impact of these exiles’ activities upon British foreign policy was more significant 
than previous works suggest. In considering Anglo-French relations during the 
tumultuous period of 1830-32, diplomatic historians have focused upon flashpoints 
such as the Belgian revolution and the Polish rebellion; this study adds that the 
activities of the exiled Bourbons, especially the Duchesse de Berri’s attempts to 
instigate rebellion in France, simultaneously threatened to cause discord.2 Whilst 
historians have considered Don Carlos’ brief exile, it also argues that the freedom 
accorded to Carlist refugees posed a further threat to British diplomacy, and that 
Grey’s government was responsible for the disastrous policy of allowing Carlos to 
escape to Britain. Those who arrived in the late 1840s caused further concern. 
Whereas Bullen gave little consideration to British concerns about Dom Miguel, this 
study argues that his ambitions influenced both the conception and critique of British 
foreign policy.3 It also builds on Bullen’s brief analysis of Palmerston’s failure to 
check the exiled Orléans’ supposed ambitions in Spain to suggest that the Foreign 
Secretary’s enmity for Louis Philippe was a major factor in Anglo-Spanish relations 
during 1848-50.4  
 
As the Orléans’ ambitions and Louis Napoleon’s unease about them grew, so did the 
attention they received from the Foreign Office. The Orléans’ attempted fusion of 
claims to the French throne, their supposed plans to counter Louis Napoleon’s coup, 
their close relationship with the British court and the confiscation of their French 
properties all created greater apprehension than previously suggested. British 
concerns about the Orléans continued throughout their sojourn in Britain. For 
example, although Amanda Foreman downplayed the Orléans’ role in the American 
Civil War, this study suggests that they did much to defuse Anglo-American tension, 
most notably during the Trent Affair, and that their opinions on the conflict found 
British attention. It also posits that the prospect of Aumale obtaining the Greek 
throne, whilst given little regard by Prebelakes, was considered a serious threat to 
British interests, and that the Orléans’ activities as far afield as America and 
Jerusalem concerned British diplomats. Throughout the period considered, both right-
                                                 
2 i.e. Betley, J.A., Belgium and Poland in international relations, 1830-1831 (Gravenhage, 1960); 
Fishman, J.S., Diplomacy and Revolution: The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt 
(Amsterdam, 1988) 
3 Bullen, Entente, ch.8-9 
4 Ibid., pp.290-92 
 242 
wing refugees’ activities and perceived intentions regularly affected British foreign 
policy. 
 
Individual biographies aside, refugees in Victorian Britain have often been considered 
in the form of communities. Whilst Bernard Porter briefly identified a few ‘famous’ 
refugees, his study concentrates on the problem posed by refugees as a whole.5 Yet it 
was as individuals that right-wing refugees had their greatest impact – as the protégés 
and advisers of British politicians, as well as inspiration to their supporters abroad. 
Britain’s neighbours feared not only revolutionary subversion, but usurpation, civil 
war and counter-revolution, all the end goals of the refugees considered above. 
Whereas left-wing refugees boasted a modest political legacy and provoked 
diplomatic and/or political disputes, those of the right not only enflamed controversy 
but often actively intervened in British high politics. 
 
This study thus alters our understanding of Britain’s relations with France in 1830-32; 
Britain’s role in the civil wars in Spain and Portugal; its elite’s reaction to the 
tumultuous years of 1848-49, and their relationship with Louis Napoleon. The 
presence and activities of right-wing refugees, who exploited British liberties to fund 
and inspire their struggles, had a strong bearing upon Britain’s relations with her 
neighbours, and even the course of foreign conflicts. Russell’s first government of 
1846-52 saw the apogee of right-wing refugee activity and bore the brunt of their 
multifarious impact. Palmerston’s Spanish policy was first influenced by his interest 
in Montemolin and then by fears of Louis Philippe’s intrigues; Dom Miguel’s 
ambitions were at the centre of Britain’s Portuguese policy in 1847; the exiles of 1848 
influenced the government’s foreign policy and Tory opposition to it, as well as the 
government’s relations with the British royal family; and Palmerston’s attempts to 
justify his response to Louis Napoleon’s coup resulted in his dismissal, itself a blow 
to the ailing government. Thereafter, the Orléans’ ambitions and Louis Napoleon’s 
fear that they might usurp him regularly affected the course of British politics and 
diplomacy.  
 
Tory and Whig/Liberal responses to right-wing refugees generally differed. Whereas 
Whigs and occasionally Conservatives welcomed liberal refugees, and both criticised 
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revolutionary ones, British politicians developed a wide range of relationships with 
right-wing refugees. A few reactionaries and eccentrics feted Carlists and Legitimists, 
whilst the rest of the political spectrum abhorred them; both Conservatives and (to a 
lesser degree) Whigs welcomed and cooperated with those who arrived in 1848; and 
Orleanists were treated sympathetically by the majority of British politicians, except 
at junctures when especially close cooperation with France was deemed necessary. 
Whilst Tories were more generous to refugee royalty in 1830 and 1848, they often 
shared Whig concerns about the risks which right-wing refugees posed to British 
diplomacy (Derby’s three governments were especially concerned about offending 
Louis Napoleon by showing regard to the Orléans), and both Tories and liberals took 
an interest in refugee counsel when it appeared particularly useful. 
 
When left- and right-wing refugees are considered together, it becomes clear that 
refugees played a far wider and more important role in nineteenth-century Britain than 
previously noted. Left-wing refugees were lauded in the 1820s and 1830s, and 
became a diplomatic concern throughout the 1850s. The desire to protect radical 
refugees played a major role in the fall of a government in 1858, and these refugees’ 
views influenced a few radicals and Chartists. In contrast, right-wing refugees 
affected British diplomacy throughout the mid-nineteenth century and established 
political relationships with wide range of British politicians. If refugees of the right 
are considered in conjunction with those of the left, then the position occupied by 
refugees in mid-nineteenth century Britain is transformed from one of relatively 
peripheral influence to one of importance across the political spectrum, whilst the 
impact their presence had upon British diplomacy is transformed from a particular 
problem in the 1850s into a mutating series of problems over several decades. From 
this study has emerged a more complex picture of the ‘Refugee Question’ which 
suggests refugees played an important role in British politics throughout the mid-
nineteenth century. 
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